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The first part of this study identifies, and then examines, whether institutional 
structures can be used to explain the occurrence of accounts manipulation. 
Specifically, at the country level, we investigate whether legal origin, level of 
corruption, press freedom, State's ownership of enterprises, and the State's attempts at 
investor-protection are likely to affect the occurrence of accounts manipulation. The 
second part of the study investigates whether, for firms exposed in accounts 
manipulation, there is any difference between ex ante and ex post abnormal stock 
returns. We also investigate whether ex post abnormal stock returns are associated 
with (a) the magnitude of the amount mentioned in the news of accounts manipulation, 
and (b) the section used in publishing the news in newspapers. 
Archival data cover the period January 2000-August 2008, inclusive. They are 
analysed using multivariate data analysis techniques, paired samples tests, and chi- 
square tests. 
We document evidence suggesting that legal origins can be associated with the 
occurrence of accounts manipulation. Our finding also suggests that the institutional 
structures explain more than 66% of the variation in likely occurrence of accounts 
manipulation after controlling for national cultural values and countries' level of 
wealth. Specifically, we find that the State's ownership of enterprises and the State's 
attempt at investor-protection are likely to encourage the occurrence of accounts 
manipulation. We document evidence that there are statistically significant 
differences between means of ex post and ex ante abnormal stock returns, for firms 
exposed in the act. Our result did not find evidence of a strong association or 
correlation between ex post abnormal returns and the magnitude of the amount 
mentioned in the news after controlling for firm size. Finally, we find evidence 
suggesting that the section where news of accounts manipulation is inserted in 
newspapers is not associated with investors' reactions. 
Keywords: Accounts manipulation, corruption perceptions, press freedom, legal 
origin, State-owned enterprises, investor protection, efficient market hypothesis, 
abnormal returns, contingency theory, limited attention, political economy, political 
cost hypothesis. 
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Intts'duction 
L1 Inh-oduction 
The problem of accounts manipulation in organisations appears to be increasing. 
In this study we define accounts manipulation as a situation whereby the 
management of a firm acting opportunistically or efficiently misleads parties (other 
than themselves) by misrepresenting or misstating the firm's situation through 
income statements, statements of cash flow, balance sheet and other non-financial 
items. 1,2 This definition closely follows Stolowy and Breton (2004) who define 
accounts manipulation as the use of management's discretion to make accounting 
choices or to design transactions so as to affect the possibilities of wealth transfer 
between the company and society (political costs), funds providers (cost of capital) 
or managers (compensation plans). 
Our definition has in mind what Gowthorpe and Amat (2005) describe as "micro- 
manipulation", which is the management of accounting figures by preparers to 
produce a biased view of the firm. Accounts manipulation becomes a possibility 
when "preparers of financial statements are in a position to manipulate the view of 
economic reality presented in those statements to interested parties" (Gowthorpe 
and Amat, 2005, p. 56). 
' We need to amplify this definition by saying that misleading may be as a result of innocuous but 
inappropriate reporting and not necessarily with an intention to commit impropriety or fraud, although 
this is often the case. 
2 Some researchers refer to this term generically as earnings management. We shall use the two terms 
interchangeably until a certain point in this chapter and the next chapter (and the rest of the thesis) where 
accounts manipulation will predominate, for reasons explained there. We use the term accounts 
manipulation with an all-inclusive meaning to encompass income statements, balance sheet, cash flow 
statement as well as other non-financial items containing (un) intentional errors meant to mislead others. 
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The definitions of earnings management available are difficult to operationalise; 
see for example, Dechow and Skinner (2000) who essentially dwell on this 
definitional issue. One definition offered by Bedard and Johnstone [2004, fin 1] is 
that earnings manipulation is management's intervention in the external reporting 
process using reporting practices with the intent of biasing users' views of the firm. 
Beneish (1999a, b) offers another definition of earnings manipulation as an instance 
in which a firm's managers violate generally accepted accounting principles 
(GAAP) to favourably represent the firm's financial performance. 
Stolowy and Breton (2004), Gowthorpe and Amat (2005) and Blake and Amat 
(1996) consider schemes used in accounts manipulation to comprise earnings 
management, income smoothing, big bath accounting, creative accounting, 
window-dressing, among others; saying that these schemes fall within GAAP. 
As it is conceptualised in the present study accounts manipulation goes beyond 
GAAP to include non-GAAP and other non-financial items manipulations, hence 
our study does not control for GAAP- and non-GAAP-related manipulations in 
gauging share prices reactions to the news; we are interested in any kind of 
accounts manipulation as we defined it earlier in this study 
Wiedman (1999, fn 1) offers yet another definition of earnings management. She 
defines it as situations where management undertakes actions to intentionally 
misrepresent the firm's financial performance (italics in the original). As in the 
case of Beneish (1999a, b), Wiedman (1999) does not indicate whether earnings 
manipulation is beneficial to managers, or the firm, or both. 
Schipper (1989, p. 92) considers earnings management to mean the purposeful 
intervention in the external financial reporting process, with the intention of 
obtaining some private gain (as opposed to, say, merely facilitating the neutral 
operation of the process). 
I 
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Healy and Wahlen (1999, p. 368) define earnings management as when managers 
use judgment in financial reporting and in structuring transactions to alter financial 
reports to either mislead some stakeholders about the underlying economic 
performance of the company or to influence contractual outcomes that depend on 
reported accounting numbers. Healy and Wahlen (1999) go to great lengths to 
amplify or embellish their definition of earnings management. 
From a practitioner's point of view, McAuley (2004) defines earnings management 
or manipulation (note the introduction of the word manipulation) as the 
technique(s) used in preparing financial information that is either misleading or 
inaccurate. McAuley (2004) recognises this problem when he posits that the 
distinguishing characteristic between manipulation and management is somewhat 
subjective, pointing out that the difference can rest in whether the technique used 
falls within or outside of the requirements of GAAP. Gowthorpe and Amat (2005), 
McAuley (2004), Rosner (2003), and Beneish (1999a, b) argue that it is earnings 
management where the technique(s) used by managers fall within GAAP, earnings 
manipulation otherwise. 
However defined, while some of manipulations are caught and exposed in the news 
media others remain unreported. But what contributions or explanations have 
accounting academics and practitioners been able to proffer for likely institutional 
factors that induce managers to engage in the act? 
In our considered view, the existing literature has not addressed this question using 
country-level institutional factors identified in this study. Furthermore, what are 
the consequences for firms exposed in accounts manipulation? Does the stock 
market listen to some second-order stimuli in reacting to the news of the act? 
These are what we aim to investigate in this study. 
Inspired by prior research (e. g., Bushman and Petrioski (2006), Bushman et al. 
(2004), Miller (2006), La Porta et al. (1998,2008), Dyck et al. (2008) and Watts 
and Zimmerman (1986), amongst others), the first strand of the study identifies, 
C1upäx I" IntrwducliCrrt 
and investigates, some institutional structures or environment-wide factors that can 
likely militate or aid accounts manipulation. Specifically, it investigates whether 
legal origin is associated with the occurrence of the act. 
It also investigates whether a combination of factors such as the level of corruption 
perceptions, extent of press freedom, the State's dominance of the economy, and its 
efforts to protect investors can affect or explain the occurrence of the act. We 
expect that these factors can explain a reasonable variation in probability of 
occurrence of accounts manipulation. 
Watts (1977), Cooper and Sherer (1984), Ball et al. (2003), Belkaoui (2004), and 
Holthausen (2009)) argue that accounting standards alone do not bring about quality 
financial reporting, hence they call for the recognition of economic, political and 
other institutional structures on financial reporting. In particular, Cooper and Sherer 
(1984) propose that the political economy of accounting may be a fruitful alternative 
approach to studying the relationship between accounting and the wider society. 
Their proposal seeks to empower an alternative approach with a descriptive nature 
that seeks to go beyond the "... ideologies of the status quo" (Cooper & Sherer (1984, 
p. 221)). 
Explicit in the first part of this study is the argument that accounting is contextually 
embedded; hence the need to understand "how accounting systems operate in social, 
political and economic context" (Cooper and Sherer, 1984, p. 207) may be useful. 
In the following few paragraphs, there are provided some additional general 
backgrounds to the study. 
gor 
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1.2 Backrmunds to the study 
In the field of management, contingency theory suggests that the environment in 
which a manager operates can influence managerial actions and decisions, and vice 
versa. 
The type of legal system which a country operates can be stern or lenient towards 
accounting and other financial misdemeanor. While some legal systems may 
demand or require full disclosure by firms, others may simply encourage it. Some 
legal systems are likely to protect investors more than the others. 
La Porta et al. (1997,1998, and 2000) investigate legal origin across a number of 
countries. They find that legal origin affects investor-protection across countries. 
Other studies (for example, Leuz et al. (2003)) find that earnings management is 
more pervasive in countries where the legal protection of outside investors is weak. 
It will be interesting to see whether legal origins can be associated with the 
occurrence of accounts manipulation. 
Belkaoui (2004) observes that one consequence largely ignored in the economics 
and accounting literature is the impact of corruption' on the quality of accounting; 
so, it is worth investigating the effect of corrupt environment on accounts 
manipulation. 
Existing anecdotal and empirical research evidences are suggesting that a free press 
is good for corporate governance (see Dyck et al. (2008)). There is also evidence 
that a free press is bad for corruption (e. g., Brunetti and Weder (2003)). Consistent 
with this view of the press, it will be interesting to see whether a free press 
environment can affect the occurrence of the act of accounts manipulation, and 
managers' tendencies to engage in it. 
Compared to some countries where the State owns a sizeable proportion of a 
number of firms operating in it, the extent of accounts manipulation may be 
Defined as one where the level of corruption ("cleanness") in a country is highly (lowly) pervasive. 
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different from countries where the State owns less proportion of firms in it. There 
may be differences in the extent to which accounts manipulation occurs in the two 
States. For example, Bushman et al. (2004) opine that States that directly own 
enterprises may suppress firm-specific information. 
The level of investor-protection can vary among/across countries. It can be the 
case that in order to protect the investor, one State pokes its nose in the affairs of 
industry and commerce more than another State. Coming from the angle of 
political cost hypothesis (see Watts and Zimmerman (1986,1978)), one would 
expect the extent of accounts manipulation to be different in the two States. 
If an environment in which a manager operates influences managerial accounting 
choices, will managers operating in these environments be influenced to engage (or 
not to engage) in acts of accounts manipulation? In view of this question, one can 
reason that the intuition for investigating the relationship between these country- 
level factors and accounts manipulation is not far-fetched. 
In addition to the contingency theory, the first part of the study operates on two 
other theories. These include political cost hypothesis (aka Watts (1977), Watts 
and Zimmerman (1978,1986,1990)) and political economy theory (e. g., Cooper 
and Sherer (1984), Bushman et al. [2004], Haw et al. [2004], Bushman and 
Petrioski (2006), Miller [2006], and Dyck et al. (2008)). Cooper and Sherer 
(1984) is one of the early papers in accounting that attempts to propagate the need 
for accounting to consider a societal or social welfare standpoint. 
A political economy of accounting tries to emphasise the relationship between 
institutional infrastructures or environments and accounting method choices. It 
seeks to understand and evaluate the functions of accounting within the context of 
the economic, social and political environment in which firms operate. Among the 
three features proposed by Cooper and Sharer (1984) as characterising this 
relationship, two are worthy of note. The first is the recognition of power and 
conflict in society as reflected in income distribution, wealth and power in 
societies. The second is the adoption of a more critical view of human motivation 
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and the role of accounting in society. Cooper and Sharer (1984) and other prior 
studies observe that existing research on choice of accounting methods exhibit a 
pronounced shareholder orientation. 
These theories are discussed in chapters 2,7 and 8. 
Consequences 
The literature lists a number of probable consequences of exposed accounts 
manipulation. These have been exhaustively discussed by Bernile and Jarrell 
(2009), and Karpoff et al. (2008a, b). Karpoff et al. (2008a, b) and (Dechow et al. 
1996, p. 5) argue that earnings management that is revealed can lead to loss of 
reputation by both management and firm. Karpoff et al. (2008a, b), especially, 
quantify corporate reputational loss in terms of dollar amounts of legal penalties as 
well as penalties imposed by the market on firms whose financial misrepresentation 
is revealed. 
Management loss of reputation can also involve personal costs (Dye, 1988, p. 198). 
Some personal cost for anyone caught in accounts manipulation may include (i) 
getting fired from current employment and hence loss of source of income; (ii) fine, 
or imprisonment to jail terms for those found culpable; (iii) restitution or 
disgorgement of what has been expropriated; (iv) discipline by managerial labour 
market (Fama, 1980) whereby the person may face adverse career and job 
implications because they may not readily find another (suitable) job. 
As an entity, the firm may endanger its corporate reputation because it diminishes 
the confidence of customers, trading partners, government agencies and other stake 
holders. Diminished reputation can also reflect an increase in the firm's cost of 
capital or bid-ask spreads (see for example, Dechow et al. (1996)), or reduced trade 
credits as suppliers of inputs used by the firm are likely to impose stricter 
(sometimes harsher) terms with which they do business with the firm; 
Roychowdhury (2006) also acknowledges these practices in supplier-firm 
relationship. 
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In addition, the firm can suffer real economic losses as "authorities" divert scarce 
resources to the investigation and away from normal company businesses. The 
revelation of improper accounting behaviour or malfeasance can also force the firm 
to implement new monitoring and control policies, thereby increasing the cost of 
operations at the same time. In extreme cases, the consequence can result in 
possible cessation of the firm and its auditors as going concerns, like the case of 
Enron and Arthur Andersen. Furthermore, both management and firm caught in 
accounts manipulation may face legal actions through, for example, shareholders' 
class-action suits in the law courts. 
At the level of regulation, another consequence of exposed accounts manipulation 
may include the creation of legal or quasi-legal institutional regulatory frameworks 
as quick fix measures to "fix" the problem. Indeed, Carnegie and Napier (2010, p. 
1) note that "professional accountants are currently striving to absorb and 
effectively deal with an ever-growing mix of new rules on corporate governance, 
audit independence and financial reporting, among other prescriptions. " 
As a recent example, the spate of vexatious accounting scandals in the U. S. 
procreated the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 in that country. In Australia, the HIH 
accounting scandal (see Carnegie and Napier (2010, p. 18)) together with those in 
the U. S. and elsewhere have warranted the promulgation of The Corporate Law 
Economic Reform Programme (Audit Reform and Corporate Disclosure) Act 2004. 
A dated example is "the failure of the City of Glasgow Bank under conditions of 
fraud" (Watts 1977, p. 65), which gave birth to the Companies Act of 1879 in U. K. 
Consequences can also result in securities exchanges and regulators to unleash 
more rules, regulations or guidelines on the capital market. It can also result in 
positively strengthening corporate governance mechanism of firms as concerned 
bodies look for innovative ways to forestall future occurrences. 
The present study does not examine nor control for these amalgams of 
consequences; its main interest lies in the informational efficiency of the news. 
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In this respect, using daily stock returns as a platform, and following events study 
methodology, the second part of the study investigates how the news of accounts 
manipulation impounds share prices. 
It is expected that investors will react to the news when they are published in 
newspapers. 
We recognise the existence (or possible) use of electronic-based sources of 
information such as Jones and Associated Press newswires, televisions and cable 
channels, and Bloomberg, which are likely to provide more timely news about 
companies than newspapers. But we also realise that electronic sources use the 
newspaper as one of the sources of their own news. For example, in England Sky 
News, BBC and other television stations preview tomorrow mornings' newspapers 
beginning from 1945hrs up to 2300hrs today. 
Furthermore, we have decided to use newspapers because, comparatively, they are 
cheaply and widely available. Both individual and institutional investors still largely 
use the newspaper, unlike electronic sources which may be mainly accessible to 
institutional investors because they can afford them, no matter the costs involved. 
Our decision to use the newspaper is supported by the research evidence that 
"... every weekday, some 55 million newspaper copies are sold to individual readers 
in the United States, reaching about 20% of the nation's population. If we consider 
online subscriptions and multiple readers per copy, the actual readership of the 
printed press is even larger, and certainly far broader than other sources of 
corporate information such as analyst reports. Given mass media's broad reach, one 
might expect it to affect securities markets. " (Fang and Peress, 2009, p. 2023) 
Anecdotal evidence from Financial Times of London also supports us. It says, 
"Front the lens of thousands of newspaper articles... being analysed every day, 
MarkeiPsy builds a picture of investor feelings about 6,000 companies. 
Measuring investor sentiment is not new; Dow Jones publishes an economic 
sentiment index based on textual analysis of 15 U. S. newspapers, while investment 
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banks measure everything from ratios of derivatives to the number of tines the 
word "crisis" is used in the media. " (Financial Times, London, July 17/July 18 
2010, p. 21) 
These research and anecdotal evidences are pointers to the relevance of using the 
newspaper in capturing investors' decision calculus, even in this twenty-first 
century. 
Tabulated below are comparative statistics regarding newspaper circulation, internet 
users and internet subscribers around the world between 2000 and 2004.4 The 
statistics show that newspapers are doing relatively well. 
Table 1.1 Comparative statistics of Newspaper and Internet usage 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Newspaper circulation per 1,000 people" 1 01.31 101.11 103.91 104.83 104.63 
Internet users per 100 inhabitants 6.45 7.97 10.72 12.31 14.11 
Fixed broadband Internet subscribers/100 people* 0.40 0.60 1.10 1.70 2.60 
Sources: **World Bank/World Development Indicators. *International Telecommunications Union 
Moreover, research (e. g., Miller 2006, p. 1015) has shown that the press is the first 
information intermediary to publicly identify accounting issues. He shows that up 
to 36% of caught cases of accounting malfeasance originated from reporter- 
generated information in daily newspapers. 
There are prior literatures that use the newspaper in gauging market reaction to 
accounting news. These include Bemile and Jarrell (2009), Klibanoff et al. (1998), 
Miller (2006), Fang and Peress (2009), Beneish (1999a, b), among others. 
It is possible that investors in their reaction to news of accounts manipulation also 
consider the magnitude of the amount mentioned in the news publication, following 
the materiality concept in accounting. This leads us to investigate whether there is 
a second-order effect between the magnitude of the amount mentioned and stock 
market reaction. In this wise, it will be interesting to investigate the association (or 
We could have shown up to 2009 figures, but for the fact that 2004 is the most recent year with statistics 
on newspaper circulation. International Telecommunications Union's statistics are available up to 2009. 
or 
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lack thereof) between the magnitude of the amount mentioned and investors' 
reactions. 
For various reasons that we shall illuminate later in the thesis, investors may not be 
able to read in detail every news item in a newspaper. But one thing can be taken 
for granted for now, and that is that investors have limited time, which may not 
allow them to give equal attention to every item in a newspaper. They are likely to 
concentrate on the ones that matter most to them. Because of this, the section 
where news of accounts manipulation is inserted in newspapers may (or may not) 
play a second-order effect in investors' reactions to the newsy. 
In broad terms, in this part of the study, we aim to investigate three main issues: 
1) The behavior of stock returns pre/post news of accounts manipulation 
2) The correlation between ex post abnormal returns and the amount mentioned in 
newspapers; 
3) Whether stock market reaction is associated with the section where the news is 
inserted in newspapers. There is no existing research that has used the 
newspaper in their investigation, save for Klibanoff et al. (1998). In chapter 2 
we will examine the improvements of our study over Klibanoff et al. (1998). 
The second part of the study operates on two theories, and we will examine them in 
detail later in the study. The theories include the semi-strong form efficient market 
hypotheses (e. g., Fama, 1970,1991), and limited attention theory (e. g., Hirschleifer 
and Teoh (2003), Daniel et al. (2002)). 
To provide a focus for the study, as a primer, the research questions for the study 
will revolve around the following sets: (a) Can the legal origins in which firms 
operate be associated with occurrence of accounts manipulation? (b) Does corrupt 
environment, free press, State ownership of enterprises, and the State's attempts at 
s The section of a newspaper is likely to be the same whether the newspaper is read as a hard copy or soft 
copy on the internet. It is most likely that the same file uploaded on the internet is used as "template" in 
the mill on the printing floor. 
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investor-protection affect the occurrence of accounts manipulation? These 
questions relate to the first strand of the study. 
For the second part of the study, we will be asking questions such as: (c) how will 
stock returns react to news of accounts manipulation? (d) Can the amount 
mentioned in the newspaper affect stock returns immediately after the news? (e) 
What role does the section where the news is inserted in a newspaper publication 
play in share prices behaviour? 
In a number of ways, our ability to provide answers to these questions will fill a 
number of gaps in the literature. Except for (e), to the best of our knowledge, we 
are not aware of any existing empirical research in accounting that has examined 
these research questions with respect to accounts manipulation that is published in 
newspapers. However, we are aware of the research on information content of 
news/announcements, generally; including the works of Beneish (1999a, b). We 
are also aware of Files et al. (2009), Bowen et al. (2008), and Gordon et al. (2008) 
who variously studied the prominence effect in relation to management's earnings 
or accounting restatement in a press release. In addition, we are also aware of 
Klibanoff et al. (1998) who studied market reactions to news published on the front 
page of the New York Times. The latter is one prior pioneering empirical research 
that has examined the effect on share prices of news based on exogenous placement 
by parties other than the management of a firm. However, as we shall see in 
chapter 2, Klibanoff et al. (1998) is narrow in scope, coverage and treatment. 
Overall, our main aims and objectives in this study are to 
0 Complement and contribute to the literature on likely institutional factors 
that can impact accounts manipulation. 
0 Gauge the informational efficiency of the stock market. 
0 Understand whether the magnitude of the amount mentioned in newspapers 
is likely to have a second-order effect on ex post abnormal stock returns. 
10 
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0 Understand whether investors are influenced, as a second-order stimulus, by 
the section where news of accounts manipulation is inserted in newspapers. 
is 3 Motivation for the study 
Motivation for the study derives from both anecdotal and research evidences to 
date. The evidences show that some or all of the variables identified in the first 
part of the thesis can have potential impact in some ways. For example, Watts 
(1977), Ball et al. (2003), Belkaoui (2004), and Hiolthausen (2009)) argue that 
accounting standards alone do not bring about quality financial reporting. 
This literature calls for the recognition of economic, political and other institutional 
structures on financial reporting. Ball et al. (2003) show that accounting standards 
and preparers' incentives interact to produce generally low quality financial 
reporting in four East Asian countries: Hong Kong, Malaysia, Singapore and 
Thailand. Holthausen (2009, p. 449) argues that many forces shape the quality of 
financial reporting, and that accounting standards should be viewed as but one of 
those forces. 
Holthausen 2009 is emphatic that 
"Only the alignment of the overall portfolio of countries' institutional and 
economic forces affecting financial reporting outcomes will lead to more uniform 
financial reporting quality across countries. Further, without the alignment of 
this portfolio of countries' institutional and economic forces, uniform financial 
reporting quality across countries, even if achievable, is not likely to result in 
substantive economic benefits in all countries. " 
Considered together, this prior literature has been calling for alternative means to 
ensure quality financial reporting, and hence to explain the occurrence of accounts 
manipulation. The present study will be attempting to answer this call. 
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In view of the inadequacy of using accounting standards to explain why accounts 
manipulation continues to happen, it would be worthwhile to turn to institutional 
structures for help. 
Increasingly, cases of accounts manipulation are being brought to the public 
attention by the media. The information contained in newspapers is likely to be 
value-relevant in the stock market. 6 
The types of publicly available information that one comes across in the literature 
include earnings announcements, stock splits, release of annual or quarterly 
financial reports, new and seasoned equity offerings, dividend omissions and 
initiations, mergers and acquisitions deals, and so on. 
Whatever may be the type of news, share prices are expected to impound the news 
- according to the semi-strong form efficient market hypothesis (e. g., Fama, 1991; 
1970; and Fama et al., 1969; to be reviewed in the next chapter)'. 
6 People read the newspaper either as a `9hard"/printed copy or on the internet. This does not change the 
fact that they are published and publicly available information. And, we like to emphasise that in using the 
newspaper, we do not foreclose the impact of other sources of information such as those based on real time 
online sources identified in the footnote above. In addition, we have listened to television and other 
electronic news analysis (e. g., BBC at 1900hrs) concerning stock prices movement. We observe that they 
focus on the index of the world's major stock markets rather than on share prices movement of one single 
company. 
7 We know as a matter of fact that all the stock markets involved in our study may not follow the semi- 
strong efficient market hypothesis. There are many individual markets in our sample that are found to 
exhibit weak form efficient market hypothesis (see, for examples, Hung (2009), Kim and Shamsuddin 
(2008), and Chan, Gup, and Pan (1997)). In this study, we do not test for market efficiency of the 
individual markets in our sample. We use the newspaper as a public source of information, in a general 
sense, to test the semi-strong-form efficient market hypothesis of all the markets where accounts 
manipulation occurred. We note that none of our hypotheses specifically mentions the semi-strong 
efficient market hypothesis; however, we explicitly test for it anyway as that is what using the newspaper is 
actually suggesting. 
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The research evidence to be presented in chapter 6 of this thesis also suggests that 
the stock market is informationally efficient by impounding the news of accounts 
manipulation. 
Stolowy and Brenton (2004) propose that a very important field to investigate is the 
reaction of market participants to financial information, which, in the context of the 
present study can be construed to include accounts manipulation. 
1.4 Impodancx ofthe study 
The importance of this study cannot be overemphasised. A study that attempts to 
understand the vexed problem of accounts manipulation, factors that likely 
contribute to its occurrence and the consequences thereof should be encouraged. 
There are potential lessons that can be learned from the study. 
Knowledge of the impacts or effects of the institutional variables on accounts 
manipulation can explain how or where to use them to reduce the practice. 
Accounts manipulation can affect the capital market in some three related ways, at 
least. First, it can distort investors' assessment of the relative performance, position 
and value of different firms. 8 
Economically, in their investment decisions, it can lead investors to make wrong 
investment decisions based on misleading information, which, in turn, can lead to 
resource misallocation, and thus sub-optimisation. If the wrong information is fed 
to the capital market it can lead to assets mispricing. This could be risky for 
investors whose preferences and risk perceptions may be altered as reflected in their 
desire to buy/sell the firm's securities when it is not planned. 
" Where ever investors are mentioned in this study, they refer to equity investors, reasons being that 
they bear the residual risk of a firm, and there is no listed firm without equity shareholders, unlike 
preferred shareholders or bondholders. 
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Second, there are risks for investors investing in firms involved in accounts 
manipulation (see e. g., Bedard and Johnstone, (2004)) because the market value of 
those firms may be eroded. 
Third, it is important to know whether share prices reaction to news of accounts 
manipulation are partly influenced by the magnitude of the amounts mentioned in 
the news and the section where the news is inserted in newspapers. 
In light of the above, therefore, the research is important, because of (hopefully) 
new knowledge that can be gained, especially when accounts manipulation is 
related to the institutional structures and the consequences described in this study. 
Moreover, as for its practical implications, there are potentials that the results of the 
study can have implications for securities market regulators (for example, 
International Organisation of Securities Commission and its member-countries) in 
view of the current collaborative efforts to see how the capital market can function 
better. 
I. 5 Dlafuiiiion of term 
LS-1 Expared accounts manipulation 
We define exposed to mean information that is made known about a firm's 
accounts manipulation. Publicly exposed means a situation whereby acts of 
accounts manipulation are brought to the public domain so that, literally, any 
interested members of the public become aware of it. 
Accounts manipulation can be exposed by groups or persons inside and outside the 
firm, such as employees not in management cadre, investors, analysts, the media, 
accountants and external auditors, etc. ' However, the profile, professional standing 
9Readers interested in other sources of public exposure of accounts manipulation are referred to Miller 
(2006), Dechow el a!. (1995,1996, p. 11), and Jiambalvo (1996). 
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and credibility of that person or body may determine the weight or credence 
attached to the news. 10 
LG Lpistcmologicst dialecfic 
There is a need to explain and/or motivate the choice of the word "accounts" in the 
title of this study, as opposed to the word "earnings" that is commonly or 
predominantly used in the literature. Most prior research in accounting has taken 
for granted the view that every conceivable financial act that is not what it should 
be is classified as earnings management, but this study differs and offers a broader 
connotation that leads to the adoption of its title. 
For purposes of this study, prior literature's use of the word earnings is restrictive, 
to say the least. Some manipulations affect the balance sheet without affecting 
earnings; for example, overstatement of value of properties, plants, and equipment 
which are compensated for by increasing revaluation reserves on the balance sheet. 
This may not be connected with write-downs in the income statements as a result of 
impairment tests. 
Figure 1.1 is a conceptual framework for understanding accounts manipulation and 
it serves as an attempt to delineate the proper remit of earnings management. Most 
items or schemes used in manipulating accounts can be located in any of the four 
numbered inner rectangles, but not all in rectangle 1 as earnings management is 
erroneously implied by some people. 
10 Notwithstanding the fact that anybody can detect and expose accounts manipulations, auditors have 
been placed in a statutory position to expose accounts manipulations through qualified audit opinions. 
However, most qualified audit opinions are not about accounts manipulation, and auditors shirk their 
statutory responsibility by the possibility that they can be "bribed" (Dye 1988, p. 198) not to report the 
act. Therefore, we caution against over reliance on auditors to expose acts of accounts manipulation. 
Also, please see Karpoff et at (2008b, p. 198) for trigger events that attract attention. These include 
self-disclosures of malfeasance, restatements, auditor departures, and unusual trading. Others include 
routine reviews or investigations by agencies, delayed filling of audited annual reports, management 
departures, whistle blower charges, etc. 
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Figure 1.1 A Conceptual Framework for Understanding Accounts manipulation 
Manipulations arising from financial items 
1 
Income Statements items 
manipulation (suggested remit 
of earnings management) 
2 
Balance Sheet items 
manipulation 
3 
Cash flow 
Statements items 
manipulation 
Accounts Manipulation 
4 Manipulations arising from non financial items, e. g, 
-Misstatement of number of shares 
-Manipulating accounting systems 
-Filing forged financial documents in wrong place to deceive auditors 
-Misstatement of employee number 
-Misstatement of sick leaves taken 
-And others 
Table 1.2 is a further attempt to show that newspaper reports of the nature or 
schemes used to manipulate accounts border on all areas of financial statements as 
well as items that are not financial in nature. The location of items in categories on 
the list may not be a perfect one but it has done the job of pointing to the fact that 
everything is not (exclusively) income statements-related. However, we recognise 
that some items may overlap one subheading, as the double-headed arrows in 
Figure 1.1 would indicate. 
So, one may ask why researchers continue to use the term earnings management in 
spite of this restriction, and the broad themes involved? Ball (2009, p. 4, fn 4) 
seems to provide the answer. In the process he appears to hold brief for these 
researchers by saying that earnings management appears to be popular because 
most financial statements manipulation involves earnings. 
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Table 1.2 Themes mentioned in newspaper publications of accounts manipulation 
1. Balance sheet re/a/ed: -Channel stuffing 
-Illegal round tripping 
-Failing to reconcile balance sheet accounts -Evading customs duties by incorrectly -Overstatement of trade receivables, closing reporting country of origin inventories, and properties, plants and Equipment 
-Under- /overstating demand for products -Deliberately classifying prepaid expenses as fixed assets 
-Overstatement of debtors 
-Scheme designed to increase inventory 
3. Cash flow related: 
-Overstating oil and gas reserves -Making 
personal cash advances for private 
-Exaggerating impairment provisions 
purposes 
-Misstatement of bond issued -Under- / overstatement of liabilities 
-Misclassification of transactions to increase goodwill -Understatement 
of cash and cash equivalents 
-Questionable equipment leasing practices -Failure 
to declare surplus funds 
-Concealing bad debts -Misappropriation of 
funds 
-Overvaluation of unrecoverable debts -Overstating cash 
flow 
-Understatement of property market values -Providing 
illegal slush funds for political 
-Failing to report negative worth 
-Overvaluation of work in progress 
purposes 
-Illegally diverting funds from one subsidiary 
to another to cover poor performance 2. Income statement related: 
-Overstatement or understatement of sales 
4. Others: 
-I Tiding income -Overstatement of employee number 
-Suspicious write-down of assets -Publishing false and misleading information 
-Understatement of administration costs -Insider trading 
-Misstating revenues -Concern about financial reporting 
-Overcharging customers -Accounting reporting problem 
-Timing of revenue -Misleading regulators about amount spent 
-Pricing goods below their market value to transfer profit on 
lobbyists and success fees 
to low tax jurisdictions -Filing forged financial documents in wrong 
-Scaling back current profit due to earlier overstatement places 
to deceive auditors 
-Under- over- reporting losses -Failing to keep proper accounting records 
-Revenue recognition problem -Manipulating accounting system 
-Failing to declare taxable income -Errors related to accounting for derivatives 
-Inflating management fees -Timing of share sales 
-Deliberate concealment of costs -Improperly accounting 
for transactions 
-Raising false invoices -Material weaknesses 
in internal control 
-Offering cash to distributors to ditch rivals -Manipulating share prices 
-Timing of directors' share sale 
Furthermore, apart from the fact established here that earnings management can 
embrace many things other than earnings; we look further to jurisdictional labeling 
to justify the use of the word accounts in the title of the thesis. In some 
jurisdictions (such as United Kingdom) the year-end financial document that is 
made available to regulatory agencies and shareholders are usually christened 
"annual reports and accounts", not annual reports and earnings. As a document, it 
(or any section of it) could be manipulated such that when the manipulation is 
exposed it can make the headlines. 
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For example, there are separate sections in annual reports and accounts that are, 
depending on financial jurisdiction, titled "income statements" or "profit and loss 
accounts" or "statements of income", "balance sheet" or "statement of financial 
position", "cash flow statements" or funds flow statement", "statement of changes 
in shareholders' equities", and "management discussion and analysis", among 
others. 
From the foregoing, therefore, the present study's choice of the word accounts, and 
hence accounts manipulation in its title is more appealing and more embracing 
than the usual connotation attached to the term earnings or earnings management. 
This argument is augmented further in subsection 2.3.2 of the next chapter. 
L7 Contz budons of the study to the literture 
We will show that this research makes some significant contributions to the 
literature. 
First, to the best of our knowledge, this study is the first in the annals of accounting 
and finance research to investigate in one-go the effects of corrupt environment, 
role of the press, State-ownership of enterprises and State's attempts at investor- 
protection on the likely occurrence of accounts manipulation. We will present 
evidence that shows that these variables explain more than 66% of the variation in 
the likely occurrence of accounts manipulation, after controlling for the effects of 
inequality and uncertainty avoidance in national cultures, and managers' economic 
status as captured by countries' level of wealth in which they operate. 
Second, this study contributes to the literature by showing that State's dominance 
of the economic activities of a country and the State's attempt at protecting 
investors through regulation/legislation is likely to lead to the occurrence of 
accounts manipulation. 
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Third, we contribute to the literature by showing that due (perhaps) to exposed 
accounts manipulation differences in means of ex post and ex ante abnormal returns 
are statistically and economically different from zero. 
Fourth, the study contributes to the literature on limited attention by showing that 
investors' reactions to the news of accounts manipulation may not be associated 
with the type of section used in publishing the news in newspapers. This 
contribution is unique in that we show this through exogenous placement of news 
in newspapers. 
Firth, we will also show that magnitude of the amount mentioned in the news of the 
act is not likely to have a second-order effect on investors' reactions to the news. 
Finally, from theoretical and epistemological or ontological standpoint, this study 
contributes to the literature by proffering an alternative name to earnings 
management. " In specific terms, the study proposes a conceptual framework for 
understanding accounts manipulation. 12 
LS Scope and delimitation of the study 
It is appropriate to delimit the scope of this study by saying what is of, and not of, 
interest to it; so, we would like to situate the remit of this study. 
Although we have used the term earnings management in this study, and said that 
the title of accounts manipulation is more embracing, the study is not based on any 
accruals models as one would find in most accruals-based earnings management 
studies. What we have done in this study is to investigate those things that can 
11 For example, in support of our position, it is the view of Beneish (2001,4) "that academics have no 
consensus on what is earnings management. " 
12 We note that this is not one of the original aims of the study, but this contribution should not be over- 
looked or downplayed in view of the fact that one needs to understand the theoretical/epistemological 
foundation of what one is doing. 
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likely cause earnings management or accounts manipulation to happen (or not to 
happen). So, rather than providing measures for accounts manipulation as studies 
on earnings management would do, we examine the information content of the 
news of the act. 
In its examination, the study is guided by the going concern principle or concept in 
accounting, especially in relation to the number of sample used in analysing the 
data of the second part of the study. The going concern principle restricts us to use 
firms whose stock data can be found for the analysis in chapter 6. 
It is pertinent to make it clear that this study does not investigate the environment- 
wide variables in their own right, or as a topic. We examine the impact the 
variables are likely to have on managerial behaviour with respect to accounts 
manipulation: to wit, whether they can influence managers in engaging (not 
engaging) in accounts manipulation. 
The remainder of the thesis is organised as follows. Chapter 2 discusses the 
theories underpinning the study. It also reviews extant related literature. Chapter 3 
considers the research questions and develops the hypotheses for the study. 
Chapter 4 deals with methodology and research designs issues including 
description of sample, sample selection method, methods of data collection, and 
data analysis, and so on. 
Chapter 5 carries out the analyses and interpretations of data relating to the first 
strand of the study while Chapter 6 does the same for the second strand. Chapter 7 
presents the research findings and results (together with discussions) while chapter 
8 makes conclusions, looks at policy implications, and suggests areas for further 
future research. 
To aid a visual grasp of the entire thesis processes or stages, its structure or schema 
is presented in Figure 1.2 on the next page. 
Figure 1.2 Schema of the thesis 
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7 ieorles and related lteratums 
2.1 InM2duct`ion 
This chapter is in two sections, 2.2 and 2.3, each addressing issues relating to the 
study. Section 2.2 presents the several foundational theories upon which the study 
is based. Section 2.3 reviews related literatures according to the themes of the 
study. 
22 Theories used by the sh4' 
Eclectically, this study draws upon a number of theories, ranging from accounting 
to behavioural finance and other related domains in the social sciences. 
Some of the theories that the research draws upon include, but not limited to: 
1 Political cost hypothesis (Watts and Zimmerman (1986,1978)) 
2 Contingency or situational theory (e. g., Lawrence and Lorsch (1967) and 
Mockler (1971)) 
3 Political economy theory (e. g., (Cooper and Sherer (1984), Bushman and 
Petrioski (2006), Bushman, et al. (2004), and Dyck et al. (2008)) 
4 Efficient market hypothesis (e. g., Fama 1970,1991) 
5 Limited attention theory of Daniel et al. (2002) and Hirshleifer and Teoh 
(2003). 
The remaining part of the chapter provides a brief exposition of these theories along 
with the agency theory, which underscores any study in management. At the end of 
the review the study shows how these theories are relevant to it. 
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2.2.1 PMrtcivd-agent theory 
This theory is not in the list above, but in a global sense it is very relevant to the 
entire study because the study looks at publicly traded companies which face 
conflict of interests between outside owners and managers. In publicly traded 
companies there is separation between ownership and control hence the agency 
problem is bound to arise. 
In free market economies, the owners of publicly traded companies are the equity 
investors who the agency theory refers to as principals. They invest money in the 
company and bear the residual risks in case of eventualities. The people who 
control the companies are the management who are directly or by proxy appointed 
by the owners (principals). In some cases, members of management are found to 
own equities in the companies they manage. The managers of the companies are 
expected to behave in ways that add value to the wealth of equity holders. 
The owners of a company select or appoint members of management because of the 
latter's specialised knowledge (see Jensen and Meckling (1976, p. 308)). However, 
owners "can never hope completely to check the agent's performance" (Arrow 
(1968, p. 538)) in the day-to-day running of their companies. It is the view of 
Arrow (1968) that the principal-agent relation is very pervasive in all economies, 
especially the modern ones. This is why the separation between outside equity 
owners and management is a proper setting for accounts manipulation, which forms 
the fulcrum of this research. 
Lins (2003, p. 161) argues that since it is the management group that actually 
administers a firm, the reduction in value from potentially costly agency problems 
may be even worse when the management group has sufficient control to exploit 
minority shareholders. 
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The separation of ownership and control creates a situation of moral hazard 
whereby it turns out that managers may not behave in ways that would enhance the 
welfare of outside equity holders. 
Authors generally agree that the principal-agent problem arises "where the owner 
of the firm delegates the running of the firm to a manager" (e. g. Grossman and Hart 
(1983, p. 5)), wherein the owner is not able to completely monitor the actions of the 
manager (Arrow, 1968). Grossman and Hart (1983) argue that one of the ways the 
owner can observe the actions of the manager is through the profit obtained by the 
firm. 
Jensen and Meckling (1976, p. 312) show that managers will behave differently 
when they own 100 per cent of the residual claims of a firm from when they own a 
fraction of the claims. They argue that if a wholly-owned firm is managed by the 
owner, he will make operating decisions which maximise his utility. Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) further argue that as the managers' fraction of the equity falls - or 
if they have no equity at all in the firm - they will tend to engage in appropriating 
larger amounts of the corporate resources or perquisites to themselves. 
This means that when managers own partial or no equity at all in a firm, they are 
likely to shirk; reminiscent of the case of the large modern corporation that has a 
dispersed outside equity holders, which is discussed by Arrow and Lind (1970, pp. 
375-376) and analysed by Fama (1980). 
Arrow and Lind (1970, p. 376) observe that while an investment may constitute a 
major part of a firm's assets, if each stockholder's share in the firm is small relative 
to his income, the cost of risk-bearing to an individual shareholder will be very 
negligible. 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) posit that there are positive agency costs where the 
ownership of a firm or corporation is partially owned between (1) outside equity 
holders, (2) inside equity holders (management), and (3) bond or debt holders. Part 
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of agency costs includes the cost of monitoring and bonding the behaviour of 
managers. 
The ways equity holders can monitor managers include the requirement that 
managers prepare financial statements at regular intervals, and that those financial 
statements be audited by qualified or certified public accountants. 
Jirapom et al. (2008) link the occurrence of opportunistic" or beneficial earnings 
manipulation to agency theory. They posit that opportunistic or beneficial earnings 
manipulation may occur depending on the severity of agency cost. (See the 
literature review section below for a detailed discussion of this issue). Jirapom et 
al. (2008) suggest that managers massage earnings more in firms where their 
agency costs are lower, which is consistent with Jensen and Meckling's (1976) 
view that as owner-manager's fraction of the equity falls, this will tend to 
encourage him to appropriate larger amounts of the company's resources to 
himself. 
The possibility (and in some cases, spectre) of managers' ability to consume 
excessive resources or shirk on the job can be likened to what Grossman and Hart 
(1983) describe as welfare loss on the part of owners. This arises when the 
principal is unable to monitor the agent, and because of "information asymmetry" 
(Akerlof (1970) where the agent possesses information about his actions/activities, 
which the principal does not have. 
Jensen and Meckling (1976, p. 309) argue that the issue associated with the 
separation of ownership and control in the modern diffuse corporation are 
intimately associated with the general problem of agency. While managers are 
employed to run the firm on a day-to-day basis, equity holders are distant from 
their firm since they do not participate in the day-to-day decision making activities 
of the firm. Hence, there is the principal-agency problem which arises because of 
information asymmetry (see Akerlof (1970)). 
13 Managers act opportunistically where they elect, ex post, to exercise discretion over accounting method 
choices that advantageously redistribute wealth to themselves. 
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Jensen and Meckling (1976) say that there will be some divergence between the 
agent's decisions and those which would maximise the welfare of the principal. 
Being concerned that the divergence may incubate some downside consequences, 
Jensen and Meckling (1976, p. 308) are led to suggest that there are reasons to 
believe that agents will not always act in the best interests of principals if both 
parties in the relationship are utility maximisers. Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
characterise the agency conflict as more severe when the manager has the tendency 
to appropriate perquisites out of the firm's resources for his own consumption. 
Fama (1980, p. 296) argues that a manager is likely to shirk or consume more 
perquisites on the job when he, on an ex post basis, perceives that he can beat the 
game. 
Their argument is that managers may take operational or investment decisions that 
may erode the wealth of outside equity holders, such as transferring or capturing 
non-pecuniary benefits to themselves. Other actions which management may take 
include manipulating the accounts of the firms to mask the real situation of things. 
14 
Arrow (1968, p. 538) suggests that there should exist a sufficiently strong relation 
of trust and confidence between principals and agents so that the latter will not 
cheat even though it may be a rational economic behaviour to do so. 
For the avoidance of doubt, we do not test nor operationalise the agency theory in 
this study; we merely demonstrate its relevance in situations where there is 
separation between ownership and control and where there are divergences between 
the interest of owners (principals) and those of the agents (managers). 
14 That is not to say that it is not possible that a firm which is entirely owned by management cannot 
experience accounts manipulation. The point being made is that accounts manipulation is more likely to 
occur in quoted companies because of the separation of outside equity ownership and management, 
management which may (may not) hold stocks in the firm. 
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We are of the strong contention that one outcome of these divergences is the 
possibility that acts of accounts manipulation can occur' S. 
Research evidence that suggests that managers manipulate opportunistically or 
efficiently is mixed and inconclusive. For example, Watts and Zimmerman (1990, 
p. 136) posit that most researches assume managers transfer wealth to themselves at 
the expense of other parties to the firm. 16 
222 Poliä'cal cost Izypothows 
Watts (1977) and Watts and Zimmerman (1978,1986,1990) postulate what they 
call positive accounting theory. The political cost hypothesis is one aspect of the 
positive accounting theory. The present research borrows from the political cost 
hypothesis branch of this positive accounting theory, which in simple term states 
that political costs influence management's attitudes in their choice of accounting 
methods. 
Firms have direct and indirect contacts with the government or the State. These 
contacts influence management's attitudes and actions in the choices they make (or 
do not make). Essentially, the political cost hypothesis suggests that large firms 
which are likely to attract government or State attention or intervention are likely to 
reduce their reported net incomes to deflate public attention. 
Watts and Zimmerman (1978) write that 
"Firms having contact (actual or potential) will, governments, directly through 
regulation... or procurement, or indirectly through possible governmental 
intervention..., can affect their future casl flows by discouraging government action 
through the reporting of lower net incomes" (Watts and Zimmerman 1978, p. 
131). 
's We hasten to say that this study does not rule out cases of collusive behaviour or consent where 
representatives of outside equity holders collude with management to engage in the act. See Dye (1988) for 
the competing interest between existing and potential equity investors. 
16 Watts and Zimmerman (1990) cite prior studies that assume managers manipulate earnings for 
efficient reasons. 
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The authors further suggest that "the existence of costs generated by government 
intervention may have (... ) fundamental and important effects on the firm's 
decisions... "" 
Given that the likelihood exists that the large profits declared by large corporations 
are likely to attract public attention, and therefore governmental intervention, Watts 
(1977) and Watts and Zimmerman (1978) expect firms to manage earnings. 
Government or State involvement in firms is multi-faceted, remotely and 
proximately. For example, government and its agencies can own firms partially or 
in whole. For national economic planning; and for regulatory, and tax purposes, 
the government or the State is interested in firms. (This topic is discussed further 
below in section 2.3.1). 
Ball et al. (2003) opine that "manager and auditor incentives, as well as political 
and tax considerations, influence the decision, and hence whether economic losses 
are recognised in a timely fashion or are incorporated in income gradually over the 
entire life of the impaired future cash flows. Thus, financial reporting practice is 
determined by the interaction between accounting standards and preparers' 
incentives". 
In utilising the political cost hypothesis, this study is interested in investigating 
whether political costs considerations as manifested through State ownership of 
firms, can influence management behaviour by engaging (not engaging) in 
accounts manipulation. 
" ibid. 
or 
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223 Conhrgencyorsitimlronal theory 
In the field of management, contingency theory suggests that managerial behaviour 
is constrained or contingent upon internal and external factors in the environment in 
which a manager operates. Because managers encounter externally imposed 
factors that limit their ability to use rational behaviour they can be influenced 
otherwise. 
Whether at the international or national level, environmental factors that influence 
managerial choices include factors such as societal/national culture, organisational 
culture, educational, technological environment, economic environment, 
political/regulatory constraints, among others. Elsayed and Hoque (2010) focus 
their attention on the international environment. They identify perceived 
international environmental factors that are likely to influence a firm's decisions as 
the intensity of global competition, international socio-political institutions, 
international accounting standards, and international financial institutions. 
Elsayed and Hoque (2010, p. 19) write that what constitutes effective management 
is situational, depending upon the unique characteristics of each circumstance. 
Lawrence and Lorsch (1967) who appear to influence many a writer on 
contingency theory opine that the determinants of effective internal organisational 
processes are dependent (or contingent) upon variations in the environment 
including external influences in which the organisation operates. Luthans and 
Stewart (1977) argue that "the contingency approach is generically situational in 
orientation... " They further describe the contingency approach as "identifying and 
developing functional relationships between environmental, management and 
performance variables. " (Luthans and Stewart (1977, p. 183). [Italics in the 
original] 
Arguably, most of the works in accounting that draw upon the contingency theory 
are found in the management accounting arena, however financial accounting is 
beginning to apply the theory. We do not intend to embark on a literature review of 
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this research but would like to refer the reader to Elsayed and Hoque (2010, p. 19) 
who mention some of these studies. 
The literature in general suggests that situational variables have an important 
influence on the effectiveness of managerial behaviour (See Elsayed and Hoque 
(2010), Wofford (1971), Gardin and Greve (2004), and David et al. (2010)). David 
et al. (2010, p. 257) write that "an optimal fit may require different organisational 
characteristics to suit different external conditions. " Mockler (1971) posits that 
"in doing any job, the manager's first step is to identify the major characteristics of 
the situation confronting him. " Furthermore, Mockler suggests that the manager 
has to study the factors (industrial, market, economic, political, social and so on) in 
the business environment that will affect future operations. 
Not many people would argue with the suggestion that managerial behaviour is 
constrained or contingent upon internal and external forces in the environment in 
which a manager operates and the view that "there has developed a general 
consensus that situational variables have a critical influence on managerial 
effectiveness" (Wofford (1971, p. 10). 
Strategic management teaches that the firm must have a proper `fit' with, and adapt 
to, the external environments. This is worthy of attention. Alchian (1950) while 
speaking in term of economic Darwinism, talks about the ability to adapt one's self 
by various methods to an "appropriate" situation. In contrast, he also speaks about 
the ability of the environment to adopt "appropriate" survivors even in the absence 
of any adaptive behaviour. He argues that survivors may appear to be "those 
having adapted themselves to the environment". Gardin and Greve (2004,307) 
opine that "it is (implicitly) assumed that fit is the result of a natural selection 
process that ensures that only the best-performing organisations survive to be 
observed at any point of time. " [Italics in original] 
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In the same vein Mockler (1971) argues that 
"the situational approach starts with a manager working in a specific job 
situation who recognises that he must adapt any theory to meet his specific 
need (.. ) For example, if the work situation involves reconciling behavioural 
and business needs, the manager looks at both kinds of factors (luunan and 
business), determines the impact of each on the situation, and balances any 
conflicting requirements in his selection of and administration of a course of 
action. A conflict between behavioural mathematical schools of thought has 
no relevance to him at this point. Ile may look to both parts for his solution. " 
Mockler (1971, p. 151) 
Jermias and Gani (2004, p. 186) make us to know that "contingency theories of 
accounting provide discerning and testable hypotheses of why there is no one 
universal system of accounting that is optimal for every environment and context in 
which these systems operate. " They hypothesise that the degree of contingent fit 
between a chosen strategy and its contextual variables has a positive correlation 
with organisational performance (performance defined as the ability of the 
organisation to survive in the market place). They point out that "contingency 
theory also predicts that the most important determinant of performance is the fit 
between strategic choice and its contextual variable[s] and not the type of 
strategies" (p. 187). Jermias and Gani (2004) findings indicate that contingent fit 
has a significant positive relationship with business unit effectiveness regardless of 
the strategic choice, which is consistent with the proposition from contingency 
theory that no systems arc universally appropriate to all organisations and to all 
circumstances. 
The present study capitalises on the reference to proper `fit' and adaptation to the 
external environment to investigate what that means for managers who either by 
chance or design (or both) find themselves operating in certain types of countries or 
environments. Will they adapt to the environment or be adopted by it to engage 
(not engage) in accounts manipulation? 
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2.2.4 Limited attention theory 
Limited attention theory is an interesting and a growing area of scholarship and 
research in behavioural finance. '8"19 Files et al. (2009), Peng et al. (2007), Gifford 
(2005), IHirshleifer et al. (2004), Daniel et al. (2002), and ilirshleifer and Teoh 
(2003) have been examining the theory in various ramifications. In their 
examinations, they use the platform of press releases that are dependent on 
managerial whims and caprices. 
With the exception of Klibanoff et al. (1998), to the best of our knowledge, the 
literature has not yet used the newspaper to test investors' reaction to a news event. 
In this study, we apply the theory to test market reactions to news of accounts 
manipulation. Klibanoff et al. (1998) appears to be the first research to have 
investigated whether the high level of salience generated by the coverage of a 
major news event in a newspaper publication is correlated with the degree of 
reaction in financial asset prices. We think that Klibanoff et al. (1998) did not go 
far enough because they examined only the front page of The New York Times, 
which is only one major newspaper in U. S. On the following points, we depart 
markedly from Klibanoff et aL (1998). First, we look at newspapers from 36 
countries around the world (some of the newspaper titles we used are listed on page 
85 of this thesis); second, we will be looking at any number of newspapers from 
any country that reports cases of accounts manipulation; and third, we will be 
looking at several sections of a newspaper, rather than just the front page alone. 
Hirshleifer et al. (2004, p. 302) predicts that limited attention will affect market 
prices in systematic ways. Hirshleifer and Teoh (2003, p. 342) write that, 
"See Daniel et al. (2002) for a rich survey of this behavioural finance literature. 
19 We would like to emphasise that this theory is but one of the theories being tested in the second part of 
the study. It is not intended to make it subsume, override, or predominate other theories being drawn upon 
in the second part of the study. Indeed, this disclaimer applies to the rest of the theories as well. 
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"Salience influences judgments about causality, the importance of a stimulus, and 
how extreme it is. For example, if the salience of a footnote disclosure is not 
high, some investors may fail to process it. " 
Daniel et al. (2002, p. 178) write that 
"A modest extension of this idea is that owing to limited attention, people focus 
on only a few ideas or theories at a time while neglecting others. If the idea or 
theory that needs to be recognised is that some party is strategically 
manipulating information, then there will tend to be too little skepticism on 
average. " 
Daniel et al. (2002) also say that it has long been recognised that a source of 
judgment and decision biases is that cognitive resources such as time, memory, and 
attention are limited. 
Hirshleifer and Teoh (2003) argue that it is a psychological fact that individuals 
focus on salient components of their environment at the expense of information 
items that are less salient or require additional cognitive processing. Hirshleifer et 
al. (2004) contribute by arguing that people simplify their judgments and decisions 
by using rules of thumb, and by processing only subsets of available information. 
With reference to using a bloated balance sheet information, they posit that 
"investors with limited attention may fail to make full use of available accounting 
information" (p. 300), hence mispricing of securities. l-iirshleifer et al. (2004, p. 
306) say that, 
"Investors with limited attention do not put sufficient weight on the possibility 
that the high cumulative investment of these firms represents either 
overinvestment, replacement of obsolescent fixed assets, or investment with 
relatively transient payoff. They will therefore overvalue firms with high net 
operating assets and undervalue firms with low net operating assets. " 
Peng et al. (2007) analyse the effect on investors' attention allocation and asset 
price comovements of macroeconomic shocks that increase market-wide 
or 
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uncertainty. According to them, "a large body of psychological research 
demonstrates that people have limited attention, i. e., they can only process a limited 
amount of information during a given period" (Peng et al. [2007]). They further 
note that investors can strategically shift their attention in response to changing 
conditions. According to Peng et al. (2007, p. 396), 
"In particular, when market-wide uncertainty rises upon the arrival of a 
macroeconomic shock, investors temporarily shift attention mvay from 
processing asset-specific information to processing more market-level 
information, sh f ing attention back to asset-specific information over the 
ensuing days. " 
They opine that when investors with limited attention are faced with vast amounts 
of information in the financial markets, they become selective in their information 
processing, depending on priority and urgency. Investors allocate attention across 
either market-level or asset-specific information processing tasks. They find result 
consistent with their hypothesis that investors' attention allocation is time-varying. 
It is plausible for us to speculate that most busy people have the newspaper but do 
not read all the news or articles in it. They quickly flip or skim through the 
newspaper looking for what will catch their attention. This cognitive selection (as 
we refer to it in this study) may be as a result of every day information overload on 
investors, because of their busy schedule, energy fatigue or because of other 
reasons such as benefit-cost consideration. For example, Hirshleifer and Teoh 
(2003, p. 345) argue that "... attention demands time, which has a monetary 
opportunity cost. " 
Gifford (2005, p. 27) opines that the limitless number of available targets of 
attention make information overload a common problem. lie further adds that 
"optimal decision making with limited attention appears to imply that the agent 
uses satisficing approximations of the environment in order to optimally allocate 
limited attention in this perceived environment. " 
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Our reading of this literature suggests that the theory of limited attention may have 
some explanation to offer for the observed stock returns with the publication of 
incidences of accounts manipulation in daily newspapers. 
With respect to the relevance of this theory to the present study, it is worth 
investigating whether the theory can be used to test the speed and completeness of 
stock prices reactions to the publication of news of accounts manipulation in 
newspapers. 
Intuitively, the present study believes that the section where news of accounts 
manipulation is published in newspapers may be one of the factors that may 
suggest how severe investors react to the news. In addition to this intuition, 
cognitive selection may hinder people from reading every news item in a 
newspaper. 
Hirshleifer and Teoh (2003)20 mention several experimental studies that find that 
the disclosure of equivalent information about a firm presented in different ways 
affects the valuations and trades of investors and even experienced financial 
analysts. We investigate this further by using the section where the news of 
accounts manipulation is inserted in newspapers vis-ä-vis stock price reactions. 
Like most busy people, investors' are faced with every day information overload. 
Their daily schedule may be too crowded to read every bit of news in a newspaper. 
Therefore, they may be attracted to the news that occupies a certain position, or 
section in the publication. 
Daniel et al. (2002) argue that the media likes to report on what is new, and to paint 
what is new as important. The present study argues that the attention the media 
pays to accounts manipulation as reflected by where the news is inserted in 
newspapers can influence the direction of change in stock prices. 
20 For the studies cited, see footnote 6 of ilirshleifer and Teoh (2003, p. 343). 
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To the discerning mind, limited attention appears to be antithetical to the semi- 
strong form efficient markets hypothesis (discussed later in section 2.3.6.1 of this 
chapter). Briefly, the hypothesis says that security returns reflect all publicly 
available information. However, investors may be choosy in their use of all such 
publicly available information, to reconcile the antithesis. 
In sum, this study attempts to demonstrate how it opcrationalises the limited 
attention theory by investigating whether or not the section occupied by news of 
accounts manipulation can have differential effect on share prices behaviour. By so 
doing, this research will be one of the first in empirical accounting research to 
examine this issue using the newspaper as a podium. 
2.3 Review ofirlaied Meraiurt 
The literature is reviewed based on the dictates of the structure of the research, i. e., 
the two strands of the study. But before then there are some preambles to be 
looked at. These are (a) a review of the literature on earnings management or 
earnings manipulation, (b) a review of the literature as it affects the motivation of 
the study, and (c) a review of the literature that identifies the actors involved in 
accounts manipulation. After the preambles in subsections 2.3.1-2.3.4, subsection 
2.3.5 embarks on a thematic review of the stylised institutional structures of 
accounts manipulation. Subsection 2.3.6 reviews the literature on the consequences 
of publicly exposed accounts manipulation on stock prices and firm value. 
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13.1 Lam LW Mar ment, /Fsrnings AUnlpulston/Ac counts manipulah'on 21 
Healy and Wahlen (1999, p. 380) observe that the "earnings management" area 
remains a fertile ground for academic research. From the brief epistemological 
discussion in section 1.6 of chapter 1, it is said that the term earnings management 
appears to be nebulous. 
Although earnings management is a generic term used by some researchers to 
summarily describe their work, the term is mostly used ambiguously by some 
people. However, note is taken of the fact that some people use earnings 
management synonymously with earnings manipulation (sec e. g., Gowthorp and 
Amat, 2005; Bedard and Johnstone, 2004; Rosner 2003; Beneish 1999b; Wiedman, 
1999, and Dechow et al., 1996; amongst others). 
On epistemological grounds this study offers two arguments here: First, it appears 
that the academic and practitioner literature in accounting is imprecise about the 
actual use of, or when to use, the term. Second, it also appears that there is a 
definitional problem of earnings management in the literature, as chapter 1 shows. 
Allowing the terms again to be used interchangeably, Jiraporn et al. (2008, p. 623) 
writes that 
"If earnings management is utilised primarily opportunistically by managers, 
firms where agency costs are more severe should exhibit a higher degree of 
earnings management. In other words, the extent of earnings management is 
positively related to the gravity of agency conflicts. 
Jiraporn et al. (2008, p. 624) argue further that opportunistic earnings management 
is harmful to firm value while beneficial earnings management has a positive 
relation with firm value. 
21 We like to note that because of sparsity of materials with the title "accounts manipulation" the bulk of 
the literature review is on earnings management. However, we like to emphasise that this is not a review 
of the literature on earnings management/manipulation in its narrow focus, but a review that is guided by 
the more embracing accounts manipulation as define in this study. 
or 
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This is not a critique, but we observe that Gowthorpe and Amat (2005), Blake and 
Amat (1996), and Feinstein (1995) do not make matters easy in the way they 
address earnings management because they equate accounting or accounts with the 
word earnings or profits. 
In particular, Feinstein (1995, p. 50) in one breadth writes that " [... ] a second 
effect is due to accounting manipulations, in which a partnership shifts profits from 
a less informative activity's line-item account to a more informative activity's 
account... " In another breadth Feinstein (1995, p. 53) writes that "an accounting 
manipulation arises when a firm shifts line-item entries in its accounting statements 
to misrepresent the relative contributions of different activities to overall profits. 
And in yet another breadth Feinstein (1995, p. 59) writes that "in general, groups in 
which account pooling sharply reduces banks' ability to distinguish one member of 
the group from another will be most affected by account manipulations", italics not 
in the originals but inserted here for emphasis. 
It is instructive to note that in the third example Feinstein is discussing whether a 
bank should give loan to one of two partners who are considering merging their 
businesses together. It is also note-worthy that in the first breadth of Feinstein's 
postulate accounting manipulation is being associated with profits. In the second 
breadth, accounting manipulation is being associated with accounting statements 
and profits (profit, found in income statements) whereas accounting statements 
include cash flow statements, and statements of owner's equity. 
Apart from this imprecise interchangeability of terms, the use of the word earnings 
management itself alone has been frowned at by Bradbury (2007) who observes 
that 
"One of the unfortunate features of the `earnings management' literature is that the papers 
move too quickly from the label 'abnormal accruals' to infer 'discretionary accruals' and 
then to infer 'earnings management"' (Bradbury (2007, p. 4). 
or 
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While the imprecision persists, however, the present study considers earnings 
management and/or earnings manipulation as parts of a broader panorama of 
accounts manipulation (see Figure 1.1 on page 18 in chapter 1) as "both refer to 
techniques that managers deliberately employ to achieve a desired level of reported 
earnings" (Rosner 2003, p. 367), or some underlying reality, to eschew the word 
earnings as used by Rosner (2003). She distinguishes material earnings 
manipulation from earnings management by misstatement magnitudes. 
Recently Ball (2009) asserts that "the term earnings management is used to 
describe managers intervening in the reporting of their own financial performance. " 
Ball (2009, p. 4) goes on to enumerate a range of practices that can be considered 
as earnings management. These include practices that are legal, violate no 
accounting rules or principles, and are generally viewed as ethical-such as 
structuring transactions with regard to their effect on the financial statements 
(leasing being a prominent example); timing asset sales to book gains in years with 
lower profits, and to book losses in years with higher profits; practices that are 
legal, violate no accounting rules or principles, but might violate accepted 
standards of disclosure-such as giving year-end quantity discounts to major 
customers, generating sales "pull forwards, " but failing to disclose that they inflate 
current earnings and borrowing against future earnings; negligent or grossly 
negligent financial reporting-such as unwittingly failing to comply with GAAP; 
and fraudulent financial reporting-such as knowingly failing to comply with 
GAAP. 
The reader would notice that Ball's (2009) assertion is consistent with the strand of 
the literature that tries to distinguish or regard earnings management as falling 
within the purview of GAAP violations. If we should go by the items listed in 
Table 1.2 on page 19, accounts manipulation goes beyond GAAP violation per se. 
We hasten to say that the definitions examined so far are not an exhaustive list of 
the literature's definitions, many others exist. The imprecision in the use of terms 
appears set to rest the with work begun by Stolowy and Breton (2004) who, it 
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appears, are the first to provide a unified conceptual framework of understanding 
the practice of accounts manipulation. 
Hence, prior literature taken together, this study defines accounts manipulation as a 
situation whereby the management of a firm acting opportunistically or efficiently 
misleads parties (other than themselves) by misrepresenting or misstating the firm's 
situation through income statements, statements of cash flow, balance sheet and 
other non-financial items. Our definition of accounts manipulation encompasses 
both within-GAAP and non-GAAP manipulation, and those with efficient or 
opportunistic connotation. The present study, in line with Tan and Jamal (2006), 
likes to emphasise from its definition that opportunism can be in the interest of 
managers alone, of the firm alone, or of both. 
2.3.2 Use of Ehe terms accounts and eam rzg 
(A revisit of epistemological dialectic in section 1.6) 
There is a need to motivate the choice of the word "accounts" in the title of this 
study (as opposed to the word "earnings" that is commonly or predominantly used 
in prior and contemporary literature). Based on epistemological foundations (see 
section 1.6 in chapter 1) this study questions the use of earnings management to 
describe all manner of acts that border on unreal accounting practices even when 
those practices do not belong to the realm of earnings management. It therefore 
sends out a caveat that the words earnings management should not be construed in 
the negative all the time. 
It could be a desirable thing to manage earnings, having income smoothing in 
mind; opinions differ on this: see for example, Tan and Jamal (2006) and 
Gowthorpe and Amat (2005). The latter justify income smoothing on the grounds 
that shareholders can benefit by the fact that managers arc able to smooth income 
since this may decrease the apparent volatility of earnings and so increase the value 
of their shares. According to Gowthorpe and Amat (2005) shareholders' acquiesce 
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to this practice makes them to be accessories to manipulation, which nevertheless 
will be approved by the agency theoretical supposition that such behaviour is 
inevitable given the conflict inherent in agency relationship. 
Let us use two examples to illustrate the point that earnings management through 
income smoothing may be desirable: (a) a firm that is uncertain of the state of 
nature for a future period makes a certain amount of earnings this period and 
decides to manage or spread it prudently in some way over a number of future 
years can be said to engage in earnings management, but this may be positive or 
desirable; (b) some firms can decide to smooth earnings for good or bad reasons 
that are in consonance with the general business climate in which a firm finds itself. 
These firms may be said to engage in earnings management even when it is in the 
interest of shareholders. 
On ethical grounds Gowthorpe and Amat (2005, pp. 62-63) conclude that 
manipulations are morally reprehensible arguing that the practice is not fair to 
users, because it involves an unjust exercise of power, and tend to weaken the 
authority of accounting regulators. Hence they admonish that "it is helpful to bear 
in mind the idea of individual responsibility for wrong actions, and the notion of 
good character when examining the rather amoral arguments employed to excuse 
accounting manipulative behavior. " Gowthorpe and Amat (2005) then argue that 
"a defence of creative accounting behaviour can be made which rests upon agency 
and positive accounting theories. " 
The two examples given above (and many more could be cited) show the misfit of 
dressing everything in the robe of earnings management. For example, in support 
of our position, it is the view of Beneish (2001,4) "that academics have no 
consensus on what is earnings management. " Everything a firm does is not all 
about the bolloan-line. Take for another example; it is difficult to see how a firm 
that misstates the number of its preference shareholders is managing earnings. This 
may be an extreme example but it suffices to show the nebulousness of using 
earnings management all the time. So how do people come to know what they 
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know about earnings management? How do people come to the belief that every 
conceivable financial act that is not what it should be should be termed earnings 
management? Based on this epistemological dialectic therefore, this study is of the 
view that researchers in general would benefit if they would consider using the 
word accounts manipulation or earnings management where it is appropriate. 
As we show in Figure 1.1 and Table 1.2 of chapter 1 (see page 18 and 19, 
respectively), financial statement items other than earnings can be manipulated, 
e. g., misstatement of the value of properties, plants, and equipment on the balance 
sheet; statement of cash flows; changes in shareholders' equity, etc. 
22 in a nutshell, 
there are manipulations which do not affect earnings (see, for example, 
Roychowdhury, 2006). 
23.3 Motivations fore unts mazupulatron 
From capital market perspective, Ball (2009) and Efendi et al. (2007) identify some 
incentives for accounts manipulation. Ball (2009, pp. 285-286) suggests that 
reasons which can influence managers to commit the act include managers' desire 
to ensure that the value of their firms' stocks continues to rise (aka Enron). Efendi 
et al. (2007) focus on the influence of managers' incentive regarding the value of 
their in-the-money stock option holdings, interest-coverage debt covenants, and 
new debt or equity capital issues. Efendi et al. 's (2007) results indicate that agency 
costs increased as substantially overvalued equity caused managers to take actions 
to support the stock price. 
22 We recognise that there are interactions between one financial statement and the other as shown by the 
double-headed arrow of Figure 1.1 in chapter 1, page 18. For example, there are linkages between the 
income statements and the balance sheet: the profit figure reported in the income statements is affected by 
depreciation provisions on fixed assets, provision for bad and doubtful debts on debtors, cost of goods 
sold and closing inventories, and investments undertaken to manage earnings (see Tan and Jamal, 2006). 
Our epistemology has taken cognisance of these scenarios. 
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Managers' incentives to manipulate accounts can also arise from their attempt to 
prevent lenders and credit rating agencies from downgrading their firm's debt 
profile. Other reasons include an attempt to avoid violating debt covenants [e. g., 
Watts and Zimmerman (1990), DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994), I3eneish (2001), 
Jaggi and Lee (2002)] that may limit dividend payments; and investment in new 
ventures. Still, other reasons may be to dress the firm in new robes for expected 
mergers and acquisitions deals so that it can bargain from a pseudo position of 
strength. In the extreme, it can also be as a result of the desire to steal outright (see 
Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
All these are endogenous factors that managers have some control over. Although 
they are important in their own right, the present research neither examines nor 
controls for these endogenous factors. 
The interest of our study lies in the expectation that when these endogenous 
attempts are unmasked they can make the headlines with repercussions through 
share prices reactions, as we shall see in the second part of the study where we 
examine the information content of the news. 
Using the lens of Watts (1977), Watts and Zimmerman (1986) and tenets of 
political cost hypothesis, incentives for accounts manipulation can include political 
costs consideration in order to reduce tax, or to avoid regulatory interference, or the 
maximisation of managers' compensation, which is due largely to orientation 
toward short-termism. Beneish (1999a, pp. 436-440) identifies four incentives for 
financial statements manipulation. These include insider trading, compensation 
agreements, the demand for external financing, and debt covenants. According to 
(Beneish 1999a), "the evidence on insider trading as an incentive to increase 
income to mislead investors is less pervasive, but [is] more compelling than the 
evidence on equity issuance as an incentive". 
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Two other factors can be identified from the literature, and these can be referred to 
here as a contest between current dominant owners, and potential investors and 
financiers. These are: 1) minimisation of cost of equity capital when trying to 
attract external financing (e. g., Dechow et al., (1996, p. 2)) and maximisation of 
current controlling shareholders' share value (e. g., Dye (1988), and Watts and 
Zimmerman (1978, p. 114)). 
Dye (1988, p. 196) discusses internal and external demand for earnings 
manipulation through contractual permission given to managers by current 
shareholders to engage in earnings manipulation. Dye (1988) reveals that to 
achieve this aim managers are sometimes given permission to produce two types of 
performance information; one, private information to enable managers' 
performance to be assessed by dominant current shareholders in order to negotiate 
compensation contracts; and the other, public; which is given to prospective 
investors and other outside stakeholders for the purpose of influencing potential 
investors opinion about the value of the company. Implicating information 
asymmetry, Dye (1988, p. 196) through his blocked communication thesis notes 
that two principal factors that further engender earnings management are the 
inability of managers to communicate all dimensions of their private information to 
all categories of shareholders and the inability of current investors to reveal 
completely all facets of their managers' compensation schedules to prospective 
investors. 
Beaver (1973, p. 5 1) recognises that as a result of the method of depreciation in use 
firms produce two types of earnings - reported and adjusted earnings - for tax 
purposes. This is consistent with Watts and Zimmerman's (1986) positive 
accounting theory which posits that due to contracting and political cost 
considerations managers produce two sets of earnings for different purposes. 
Dechow et al. (1996, p. 10) discuss other alternative motivations for accounts 
manipulation including issue securities, upwardly trending earnings per share, 
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earnings-based bonuses, insider trading, etc. 23 According to Bhattacharya, Daouk, 
and Welker (2003) managers are motivated to manipulate earnings for a number of 
reasons. This may arise because accounting standards allow substantial flexibility; 
because accounting standards do not exist to specify accounting principles related 
to some areas of business activity; and because accounting standards, though 
rigorous, are weakly enforced. 
2.4.1 1är vimnmental infuences on aaavunts manipulation 
This section reviews what the literature has to say about the institutional structures, 
beginning with legal environment. 
da4. L1 Legst ar%in 
Prior studies (e. g., Burgstahler et at (2006), Hail and Leuz (2006), Leuz et al. 
(2003), La Porta et al. (2002,2000,1998,1997), Ball et al. (2000), and Bushman 
and Piotroski (2006), among others) provide a very rich research evidence that 
legal origin matters in firms' scheme of things. Leuz et al. (2003, p. 507) propose 
and find that earnings management is more pervasive in countries where the legal 
protection of outside investors is weak. According to the authors, this is because in 
those countries insiders enjoy greater private control benefits and hence have 
stronger incentives to obfuscate firm performance. Burgstahler et at (2006, p. 
1001) show evidence that earnings management is more pronounced in countries 
with weaker legal systems and enforcement. They argue that in countries with 
large and highly developed equity markets, publicly traded firms engage in even 
less earnings management. 
La Porta et al. (2000,1998, and 1997) find that investor-protection and corporate 
governance can differ under different legal systems. Furthermore, La Porta et al. 
23 In addition to this, the reader may wish to review Healy and Wahlen (1999) for additional lists of 
motivations for accounts manipulation. 
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(2002,2000, and 1998) find that shareholder rights protection is different according 
to the legal origin in which a company operates. 
They categorise legal origin generally as common-law or civil-law origin, or a 
variant of both24. La Porta et al. (2002) show that firms in countries with stronger 
outside investor-protection and more effective legal systems enjoy higher share 
valuation. Furthermore, La Porta et al. (2000,1998) find that common-law 
countries afford the best legal protections to shareholders whereas French-law 
countries have the weakest protections. 
La Porta et al. (1997) empirically establish a link between legal environment and 
financial markets. They predict and find that for 49 countries around the world, the 
countries with better legal protections have more external finance in the form of 
both higher value and broader capital markets. They show that legal environment 
matters for the size and extent of a country's capital market(s). 
Consistent with La Porta et al. (2002,2000,1998, and 1997), Hail and Leuz (2006) 
provide strong support for the conclusion that the overall quality of a country's 
legal system is negatively associated with firms' cost of equity capital. 
In a cross-country context where country-level characteristics such as legal origin is 
hypothesised to matter for firms' wellbeing, or good corporate governance, the 
studies of both Bushman and Piotroski (2006) and Ball et al. (2000) are relevant to 
the present study. We begin with the latter which studies the effect of international 
institutional factors (including legal origin) on properties of accounting earnings. 
Ball et al. (2000) argue that compared to common-law countries, the demand for 
accounting income under code law is influenced more by the payout preferences of 
agents for labour, capital and government, and less by the demand for public 
24 As used by La Porta et al. (1997, p. 1131; 1998, p. 1115), common law refers to English law, which 
evolved through judicial pronouncements. That is, common law is formed by judges through settlement 
of disputes. Civil law evolved from Roman laws and can be of French-, German-, or Scandinavian- 
origin. Civil law evolved from legal scholars(hip) and the legislative process. 
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disclosure. Parts of the hypotheses investigated by Ball et al. (2000) are: (a) that 
the demand for timely incorporation of economic income in accounting income is 
lower under the code-law stakeholder model of corporate governance than under 
the common-law shareholder model (Ball et al. 2000, p. 13); and (b) that because 
parties contracting with the firm operate at greater arm's length from managers, 
information asymmetry in common-law countries is more likely to be resolved by 
timely public disclosure (Ball et al . 2000, p. 14). 
Specifically, they also hypothesise that code-law countries' accounting incomes are 
more smoothed and less timely in incorporating current-period changes in market 
value than common-law countries. They argue that code-law accounting standards 
give greater discretion to managers in deciding when economic gains and losses are 
incorporated in accounting income. Furthermore, they observe that managers 
reduce income volatility by varying the application of accounting standards or by 
influencing operating, financing and investment decisions (for example, by 
deferring discretionary expenditures such as R&D in bad earnings years). 
They expect that managers' operating, financing and investment decisions can 
affect accounting income differentially across countries because the use of 
accounting income in corporate governance varies internationally. 
Finally, Ball et al. (2000, p. 15) argue that firm-level politicisation typically leads 
to a stakeholder governance model, involving agents for major groups contracting 
with the firm who view current-period accounting income as the pie to be divided 
among groups, or as dividends to shareholders, or as taxes to governments, or as 
bonuses to managers and perhaps employees also. 
For the purposes of the present study, our reading and understanding of Ball et al. 
(2000) brings a number of issues to the fore: First, is the importance of legal origin. 
Second, we infer that the latitude given to managers by different legal systems to 
make discretionary operating, financing and investment decisions can breed 
unintended consequences such as accounts manipulation. Finally, the contracting 
parties' view of current-period accounting income as the pie to be divided among 
or 
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groups may encourage managers to cut big their own part of the pie, which may 
engender act of accounts manipulation. 
Operating from the angle of political economy, Bushman and Piotroski's (2006) 
paper explores how reported accounting numbers are shaped by the institutional 
structure of the country in which firms are domiciled. Their paper examines the 
impact of country-level institutional variables (legal/judicial system, securities 
laws, political economy, and tax regime) on accounting conservatism. Specifically, 
the premise of their analysis is that legal/judicial system, securities laws, political 
economy, and tax regime create incentives that influence the behaviour of corporate 
executives, investors, regulators and other market participants. 
Consistent with Ball et al. (2000), Bushman and Piotroski (2006, p. 112) assert that 
a country's legal/judicial institutions can influence incentives to produce 
conservative accounting numbers through several channels. They then go further to 
argue that if stronger legal/judicial regimes lead to a more prominent role for the 
use of accounting numbers in formal contracts, firms in countries with stronger 
legal/judicial regimes may face higher "contracting" demand for conservative 
reporting. They further reason that high quality judicial systems could increase the 
expected gains from litigation initiated to remedy violations of investors' rights 
(Bushman and Piotroski (2006, p. 113)). 
Bushman and Piotroski (2006) make three important conjectures regarding the role 
of legal systems on accounting conservatism. The first is that firms in countries 
with stronger legal/judicial regimes and high prevalence of private debt contracting 
will manifest more conservative accounting. The second is that firms in countries 
with stronger legal/judicial regimes and more diffuse ownership structures will 
manifest more conservative accounting. Finally, firms in countries with stronger 
legal regimes and high incidence of litigation will manifest more conservative 
accounting. (Original not italicised but is added here for emphasis). Consistent 
with these hypotheses, findings from tests conducted by Bushman and Piotroski 
(2006) document that the timeliness of accounting earnings is higher in common 
or 
THEORIES & REZA TED LITERATURES 
law countries than in code law countries. They also document evidence that the 
incorporation of good news into earnings is stronger in code law countries. 
Thirdly, they document that the asymmetric timeliness of earnings is stronger in 
common law countries. 
Taken the above review into consideration, the present study motivates the use of 
legal environment as capable of being associated with occurrence or non- 
occurrence of accounts manipulation. 
24. L2 Comipt envrmnment 
There is a massive literature on corruption (which we cannot explore to the fullest 
in this study) positing that "corruption has become a prominent issue of concern 
within international institutions and with firms active in foreign markets" (Pantzalis 
et al. (2008)). We note that in the past accounting has not contributed significantly 
to that literature. Indeed, as it has been observed by Belkaoui (2004, p. 74), "one 
consequence largely ignored in the economic and accounting literature is the 
impact of corruption on the quality of accounting. " He further notes that "the level 
of accounting quality is a direct result of the level of corruption". 
There are various definitions of corruption, one of which is that it is an illegal 
private gain made by an agent at the expense of the principal, when the agent deals 
with third parties (e. g., Paldam (2002, p. 217); and Shleifer and Vishny (1993)). 
Another definition offered by Jain (2001) defines corruption as where "public 
officials, bureaucrats, legislators, and politicians use powers delegated to them by 
the public to further their own economic interests at the expense of the common 
good. " 25 (Original not italicised). 
25 It is instructive to note that this study does not investigate corruption as a subject, but the impact of 
a corrupt (or clean) environment on managers operating in that environment: to wit, whether a 
corrupt environment can influence managers in engaging (not engaging) in accounts manipulation. 
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Jain (2001, p. 73) opines that there is consensus that corruption refers to acts in 
which the power of public office is used for personal gain that contravenes the rules 
of the game. In addition, Jain (2001, pp. 77-79) argues that the availability of 
discretionary powers in the hands of agents can bring about corruption; hence it is 
suggested that there should be "a policy of reducing accounting discretion in order 
to prevent misrepresentation by managers" (Tan and Jamal, 2006). When this is 
narrowed down to accounting the rules of the game can be accounting standards 
and generally accepted accounting principles (GAAPs) and other non-regulatory or 
discretionary accounting choices. 
It is the view of the present study that discretionary power comes about both as a 
result of accounting standards' allowed and preferred alternative treatments of 
accounting items as well as non-GAAP choices available to managers. Accounts 
manipulation thus becomes a possibility when managers are given discretion within 
existing accounting standards and GAAPs, and when managers can make their 
discretionary choices in non-GAAP situations. 
But an attempt to reduce managerial accounting discretion in order to (presumably) 
reduce the incidence of accounts manipulation may be counterproductive as it is 
likely to encourage "smart" managers to device other means to beat the game (see, 
for example, Roychowdhury (2006) and Tan and Jamal (2006) who identify 
operational and investment activities as vehicles for manipulation). The latter 
hypothesise that "a reduction in accounting discretion can induce high foresight 
managers to choose investments that reduce the variability of operating earnings"; 
that is, by way of income or earnings smoothing. The results they obtained from 
experiments administered on companies' finance officers are consistent with their 
hypothesis. The authors also find that reducing accounting discretion can achieve 
the desired objective of mitigating income smoothing with low foresight managers. 
Simply, the intent is to determine whether a corrupt environment can infest managerial accounts 
manipulation behaviour. 
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These countervailing findings lead Tan and Jamal (2006) to conclude that high 
foresight managers are more able to smooth earnings than low foresight managers 
in low accounting discretion environment. 
Ordinarily one may ask a global question such as, `Why should accountants be 
bothered about corruption'? A priori, we may not be able to provide a readily 
satisfactory answer to this question but Pantzalis et al. (2008) have done so by 
arguing that corruption is not only a key determinant of development and growth at 
the macroeconomic level, but that at the microeconomic level it may also have an 
impact on multinational corporation valuation. So, it follows that as accountants 
are part of the team that valuates firms they need accurate figures to work with. At 
the meso level, Carnegie and Napier (2010) are concerned about the image problem 
of accountants as a result of some accountants caught in accounting infractions in 
commercial organisations. So, because of their battered image accountants should 
be bothered about corruption. 
Accounting practitioners (and some sections of academic accountants) have been 
mulling over corruption and its multi-faceted consequences. The increasing 
attention been shown by accounting qualifying bodies and academic researchers are 
likely to reflect a keen interest in this activism. 
In addition to buttressing the importance (and menace! ) of corruption, a few of the 
global accounting qualifying bodies in the UK such as the Association of Certified 
Chartered Accountants (ACCA) and the Institute of Chartered Accountants in 
England and Wales (ICEAW) have recently taken a bold public position regarding 
the issue of corruption. For instance, after a corruption seminar held by the 
Business Law Committee of the Institute of Chartered Accountants and 
Transparency International in May 2002 the ICEAW states, inter alia, that 
"chartered accountants must be at the forefront of the fight against domestic and 
international corruption". 
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Among a wide range of issues identified as pivotal at the seminar include the 
observation and resolve that: 
"Tackling corruption will become more of a priority for the profession as the tide 
of public opinion turns against the view that the problem will always be endemic, 
and even acceptable, in certain parts of the world. 
The scale of the problem is significant at both a corporate and governmental level 
and creates a major distortion of trade as well as undermining the democratic 
development of emerging markets. " 
Speaking in the same vein, Allen Blewitt, a former chief executive of ACCA, says, 
among other things, that 
"... We [ACCAJ believe accountants are in a pivotal position to make a difference 
in this area and we are determined to ensure that our members across the world 
have the skills, training and the professional encouragement to do so... " 
26 
Commentators and some academic accountants have also found it necessary to 
delve into the potential role accountants can play with regard to mitigating 
corruption. For example, Everett et al. (2007, p. 515) posit that the issue of 
corruption is a problem and accounting can aid in its fight. Kimbro (2002, p. 332) 
observes that "accounting is an information system that communicates financial 
and economic data essential to the control and prevention of corrupt activities". 
Kimbro argue further that, 
"Accounting serves a dual role: financial statements provide information about 
transactions and auditing serves as a monitoring mechanism to check on the 
accuracy of this information and to prevent and discourage financial 
misappropriation". 
In a recent work Pantzalis et al. (2008) investigate how the involvement of U. S. 
multinational corporations in corrupt countries affects firm value. They 
hypothesise that the value impact of intangibles should be lower for multinational 
corporations that primarily operate in corrupt countries than for those that primarily 
26 Allen Blewitt speaking in the run up to the United Nations' Anti-Corruption Day on 9 Dec. 2007 
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operate in clean countries. Pantzalis et al. (2008, p. 402) find evidence suggestive 
that the general impact of intangibles on the value of multinational corporations is 
positive, but smaller for multinational corporations whose foreign operations 
networks include many corrupt countries than for multinational corporations that 
primarily operate in clean countries. They also find that the direct effect of 
multinationality (i. e. the size of the firm's foreign operations network) on market 
value is negative for a group of multinational corporations whose foreign 
operations are primarily in corrupt countries, while the effect is insignificant for 
multinational corporations operating in clean countries. 
Our review of the literature shows that the various definitions of corruption are not 
directly linked to accounts manipulation. Hence, the present study attempts to 
create the missing link between corruption and accounts manipulation. 
Recall from the various definitions of earnings management in chapter 1 that 
Schipper (1989) observes that earnings manipulation is perpetuated with 
the"intention of obtaining some private gain" rather than "merely facilitating the 
neutral operation of the process". Explicitly or implicitly, Schipper (1989) may not 
have had the construct of corruption in mind. Being enabled by our review of the 
literature, we argue that corruption can be factored into Schipper and others' 
definitions of earnings manipulation. 
Meanwhile Kimbro (2002) proposes that: 
"Internal and external factors influence the decision of whether to engage in 
corrupt behaviour. The external factors associated with the agent's rational 
decision are related to the degree of monitoring, detection and enforcement 
mechanisms designed to prevent corruption. Institutional monitoring, with 
moderate rates of growth, economic prosperity, and the consequent development 
of good institutions, should lead to less necessity, less incentive, and less 
opportunity to be corrupt". 
Placing Kimbro's proposition in context, for the purpose of this study, parts of the 
external factors he refers to can be construed to mean a corrupt environment, legal 
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systems, freedom of the press, State ownership of enterprises and the State's 
interest in the capital market in efforts at investor-protection; all of which are 
identified in this study as institutional structures that arc likely to influence 
accounts manipulation. Some of these institutional structures are as well identified 
in Pantzalis et al. (2008). 
Kimbro (2002) observes, among other things, that poor countries have less 
institutional development and the people live with scarcity, hunger, poor health, 
and little education and with great basic needs. This makes him to conclude that in 
poor countries corruption is more a function of lack of economic development than 
of anything else. He further observes that in poor countries people are driven to 
corruption by need whereas in rich countries they are driven to corruption by greed. 
In fact, one of Kimbro's hypotheses has it that "the level of wealth will affect the 
degree of corruption differently in rich and poor countries" (Kimbro 2002, p. 336). 
He breaks this hypothesis into two by saying that (a) the level of national wealth 
will not be associated with the degree of corruption in rich countries and (b) the 
level of national wealth will be associated with the degree of corruption in poor 
countries. Results reported by Kimbro provide some evidence to support the 
hypothesis that among rich countries the level of wealth is not associated with 
corruption. 
Having regard to the various definitions of corruption as reviewed above, in this 
study we operationalise a corrupt ("clean") environment as one where the level of 
corruption in a country is highly (lowly) pervasive, relying on some index 27 - 
Most studies dwell on corruption in government, national life, public offices, (i. e., 
at the macro level) whereas other studies dwell on it as it affects individual persons, 
i. e., at the micro level. The present study investigates the effects of a corrupt/clean 
environment with the binocular of a meso-level analysis (i. e., at the level of the 
27 An authoritative working definition of a corrupt (clean) environment can be found at 
www. transparency. org and in Pantzalis et at (2008, p. 391, and Table Al of their Appendix) 
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firm or corporation as perpetuated by management or their close allies). The 
present study closely aligns itself with the literature on corruption in the corporate- 
world (aka Lee and Ng 2006, and Kimbro 2002). 
In their study, Lee and Ng (2006) investigate and find that corruption has 
significant economic consequence for shareholder value of firms. Their finding 
suggests that higher levels of corruption are associated with lower corporate values. 
The abundant literature on corruption has shown that it has significant effects on 
the economics of a country (including corporate value and cash flows). However, 
and on the opposite side of the argument, it is instructive to note that some 
researchers have gone as far as propagating the notion of efficient corruption, but 
this notion has quickly been debunked by Aidt (2003, pp. F634-F635). Consistent 
with Aidt (2003) who debunk the notion of efficient corruption and Kimbro (2002), 
we conjecture that corruption can be a dysfunctional aspect of organisational 
economic life as manifested by managers' accounts manipulation behaviour, which 
can be a function of the level of corruption of the country in which managers 
operate. 
The above discussion, therefore, points to a need and rationale for why accountants 
should be bothered about corruption and why this study is interested in 
investigating the relationship between accounts manipulation and a corrupt 
environment, an attempt that has hitherto not been made. The present study tries 
to infer whether the level of corruption in a country can help explain why accounts 
manipulation occurs more in some countries than in others. 
4Z4. L3 Thermeofthepiws 
Save for the research by Miller (2006), to the best of our knowledge, in accounting 
research there is no prior study that empirically examined the impact of the press on 
accounts manipulation. And except for a few relatively recent studies in political 
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economy (e. g., Bushman et al. [2004], Haw et al. [2004], and Dyck et al. (2008)), 
very little is known about the role of the press or the media in corporate life. 
The hitherto scanty study of the role of the press in accounting research in general, 
and the non-existence of one in accounts manipulation in particular, may be due to 
such a question as, `Why should accountants be bothered about the press? ' Prior 
studies in political economy may have this concern in mind. A journey into this 
literature shows some possible reasons why the press is important and (in our 
opinion) should be of concern to accounting researchers. The press, as the fourth 
estate of the realm, has entrenched interests in enterprises for the sake of its 
readership. We can say that to a certain extent, the press serves or strives to protect 
the public good by promoting "social welfare", in the parlance of political economy 
of accounting (Cooper and Sherer, 1984). 
Another answer that can be proffered for why accountants may be bothered about 
the press is that accountants may care about what they do (or do not do) and how 
they do it (or do not do it) as individuals with reputation to protect, aka the image 
problem examined by Carnegie and Napier (2010). Consistent with this intuitive 
and simple answer, Dyck et al. (2008) show that the press can be useful in a 
number of ways: For example, to rein in managers in the interest of corporate 
governance. They opine that "the press pressures managers to act not just in 
shareholders' interest, but in a publicly acceptable way. " (Dyck et al., 2008). 
Miller (2006) examines the press's role as a monitor or "watchdog" for accounting 
fraud. The purpose of Miller's (2006) study is to provide evidence on the role of 
the press as an information intermediary. Bushman et al. (2004) examine the 
relationship between the media and quality financial reporting. They find that 
information dissemination as measured by their media construct (which they use as 
a proxy for the intensity of information dissemination in a country) is positively 
correlated with some aspects of the quality of financial reporting. 
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Haw et al. (2004) posit that private control benefits are limited in situations where 
there is both an independent press that publicises information about improper 
behaviour and a large number of educated investors who read the newspaper and 
sanction improper behaviour. Haw et al. (2004, p. 450) results suggest that there is 
a significant negative correlation between income management and extra-legal 
institutions; one of which is the newspaper. 
In line with Dyck et at (2008), Brunetti and Weder (2003) regard press freedom as 
an external control mechanism on corruption. Brunetti and Weder (2003) further 
posit that independent journalists have incentives to actively investigate any 
wrongdoing. Specifically, and in accord with Haw et at (2004), Brunetti and 
Weder (2003) hypothesise and find that press freedom negatively significantly 
affects corruption across 125 countries. They find that in countries where there is 
high press freedom, corruption declines. 
In the political economy literature, Daniel et al. (2002, p. 169) posit that the media 
likes to report on what is new... and that ... the 
intense attention the media devotes 
upon transitory phenomena [... ] can induce investors (and economists) to pay too 
much attention to them. 
Going back in time to 1969, Arrow (1969, p. 33) recognises the important role of 
the press in the diffusion of innovation. He compares the mass media side-by-side 
with personal contacts in the dissemination of innovation. He recognises that the 
mass media may provide some overall alertness to change and acknowledges that 
while the mass media play a major role in alerting individuals to the possibility of 
an innovation, it seems to be personal contact that is most relevant in leading to its 
adoption. 
Klibanoff (1998), Haw et al. (2004), Miller (2006) and Fang and Peress (2009) are 
among the recent studies in accounting and finance that have investigated the role of 
the press. Consistent with this literature, it is our opinion that the pulse of the capital 
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market regarding news of accounts manipulation can be gauged from newspapers, and 
we argue that investors listen to the pulse. 
For our purposes, it will be interesting to see whether the print media or the press 
can have an effect on accounts manipulation tendencies of managers. Hence the 
research is an attempt to see whether the press in performing its role can affect the 
occurrence of accounts manipulation. 
In line with the foregoing stream of literature, we expect that managers operating in 
an environment where the independent press is free to publish uncensored will be 
more careful to mind the ga(s)ps! 
It is plausible to reason that the press in some countries may not report cases of 
accounts manipulation because it does not meet the threshold of reporting it in that 
country or the press does not regard such cases as accounts manipulation. For 
example, giving and taking bribes may be acceptable in some countries while not 
acceptable in others. In those countries where it is acceptable the press may not see 
the need to report such cases as it may be perceived not out-of-the-ordinary. 
24.1.4 State ownership ofenieipthes 
The concept of State ownership of business enterprises is not a new one. However, 
in an international setting, there are but scanty empirical evidence in accounting 
research of the impact of government or State ownership of firms on accounts 
manipulation. Generally in accounting research, most prior studies that exist on 
State ownership of enterprises are mostly carried out with respect to the Chinese 
environment. 
Of most importance and specific to this study, we have come to the realisation that 
there is a vacuum in accounting research in that there is no study yet that examines 
the relation between State ownership of business enterprises and accounts 
manipulation in an international setting. The present study attempts to fill this 
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vacuum. It expects that State ownership of firms can offer explanations for the 
occurrence or non-occurrence of accounts manipulation. 
Approaching this issue from the perspective of political economy, it is argued (see 
Bushman et al. 2004) that States that directly own enterprises may suppress firm- 
specific information to hide expropriation activities by politicians and their cronies. 
They argue that it is also possible that benevolent governments use the State's 
ownership of enterprises to directly govern and manage firms, obviating the need 
for public information. 
Consistent with the political cost hypothesis (see Watts and Zimmerman, 1978, 
1986,1990), Bushman et al. (2004) observe that politicians may thus seek to 
restrict the flow of information to prevent public scrutiny of their business dealings 
with cronies and protect their economic interests by suppressing information flows. 
In the emerging literature of political economy, state-owned enterprises is one 
institutional factor that has been used to examine the extent of State or government 
involvement in the economy of a country (see Bushee and Piotrioski (2006) and 
Bushman et al. (2004), among others). They note that it is also possible that pub- 
licly traded firms with partial State ownership may be pressured by a self-serving 
government to optimistically tilt their reporting decisions (Bushman et al. (2004, p. 
115). 
The above implies that it is conceivable "that government can promulgate weak 
accounting and disclosure requirements [... ] or use influence over the media to 
retard dissemination of firm-specific information in the economy" (Bushman et al. 
2004). 
24.1.5 SYate's attempts at invrstor-pivtccdon 
In an effort to have a credible and investor-friendly capital market, the state may 
take steps to ensure that the capital market operates in the overall interest of 
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investors, and the economy. This may warrant the promulgation of rules and 
regulations to guide the operators of the system. But this may be at the expense of 
firms in some way. 
Watts and Zimmerman (1978,1986 and 1990) discuss the implication of 
government or State involvement in business firms through their political cost 
hypothesis, as we see in section 2.2, subsection 2.2.2 of this chapter. They posit that 
a company's size (measured by the magnitude of reported profits) can attract the 
attention of politicians and government so much so that they would attempt to 
appropriate part of the company's wealth to themselves. Politicians (and their 
cronies) and governments (and their agencies) can do this through corporate 
taxation, fines, levies, political extortions such as politically motivated solicitations 
for donations or levies which can be imposed on a company's earnings. Because of 
this, companies sometimes seek to reduce reported earnings; perhaps through 
manipulating their accounts; Watts (1977) also comments in a similar fashion. 
The size of firms attracts the attention of Jensen and Meckling (1976), who 
hypothesise that the larger firms become, the larger are the total agency costs 
because it is likely that the monitoring function is inherently more difficult and 
expensive in a larger organisation. The preceding shows that there is not a shadow 
of doubt that the State or its agents intervene in commercial activities. But what is 
the ability of that intervention to empirically explain the occurrence of accounts 
manipulation. 
The State's underlying motives for involvement in firms have been examined by 
Bushman et al. 2004. They posit that under a self-serving government, if firms 
believe that politicians seek evidence that a firm is profitable in order to expropriate 
the owners' wealth, managers would then have incentives to report conservatively. 
They reason that on the other hand, if benevolent governments intervene when they 
perceive that firms are inefficient, firms have an incentive to look healthier through 
the application of less conservative accounting. 
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Bushman et al. (2004) document evidence suggesting that in common law 
countries, high State involvement leads firms to speed recognition of good news 
and slow recognition of bad news relative to firms in countries with less State 
involvement. In contrast, in civil law countries, high State involvement leads firms 
to slow recognition of good news and speed recognition of bad news relative to 
firms in countries with less State involvement. Thus, managers appear to adjust 
their financial reporting in response to the nature of the State's involvement. 
In light of the above, the present study tries to empirically examine the implications 
of government involvement in the capital market in an effort to protect equity 
investors, and how it can affect accounts manipulation. 
24.2. Consequences ofexposerd a=unts manipulaHron 
This part of the chapter reviews the literature on market reaction to news of acco- 
unts manipulation published in newspapers. A number of prior researches have 
shown that the capital market reacts to accounting news or events (see for example, 
Ball and Brown (1968), Beaver (1968), Fama et al. (1969), Oppong (1980), Brown 
and Warner (1980,1985), Fama (1991), Feroz et al. (1991), Beneish (1999a, b), 
Balsam et al. (2002), Miller (2006), Karpoff et al. (2008a, b), and Bemile and 
Jarrell (2009), amongst others). 
14.21 Semi-strnrz form ofmarket efHdency 
Semi-strong form efficient market hypothesis can be described as one where stock 
prices react are most likely to immediately to the news that is available in the 
public domain such that share prices fall on receiving the news. 
According to Fama (1970, p. 1576-1577), there are three forms of market 
efficiency. He originally categorised market efficiency as (a) weak-form market 
efficiency, (b) semi-strong-form market efficiency, and (c) strong-form market 
efficiency. A weak-form test attempts to predict how well past returns are able to 
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predict future returns. A semi-strong-form test tries to determine how quickly 
security prices reflect publicly available information. A strong-form test attempts 
to determine whether any investors have private information (e. g., insider-trading 
information) that is not fully reflected in market prices. 
For reasons attributed to expansion of coverage of areas, Fama (1991, pp. 1576- 
1577) proposes changes to the titles of the categories. He proposes that the weak- 
form test be christened "tests of return predictability" while the semi-strong-form 
test be titled "event studies" and the strong-form test be called "tests of private 
information ". 28 
Prior literature documents mixed evidence on information content of various kinds 
of news/events such as earnings announcements, stock splits, release of non- 
financial information, and so on. 
Ball and Brown's (1968) seminal work on evaluation of accounting income 
numbers provides one of the pioneering evidences of the adjustment of stock prices 
to earnings announcements. Result presented by Ball and Brown (1968) 
demonstrates that the information contained in annual accounting income numbers 
is useful in that it is related to stock prices. Ball and Brown (1968) show that of all 
the information about an individual firm which becomes available during a year, 
more than one-half is reflected in that year's income number. Results reported in 
their paper indicate that net income and earnings per share increase after annual 
report announcements. Ball and Brown (1968) conclude that the market reacts to 
28 The tests conducted in this study rely on semi-strong-form market efficiency because the information 
used in identifying the countries and companies involved in accounts manipulation are sourced from the 
newspaper. There is reason to believe that a semi-strong market has metamorphosed from a weak-form 
market to its present state. Information published in newspapers includes both past and contemporaneous 
information. So, (implicitly) the use of newspapers has taken care of weak-form efficiency because 
information contained in them includes both past and currently available news. The tests in this study do 
not address tests of private information or strong-form market efficiency. 
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earnings report releases even though most of the information contained in the 
reported income is anticipated by the market before the annual report is released. 
Another of the pioneering papers on informational efficiency of the stock market is 
Beaver (1968) who documents evidence of a dramatic increase in volume in the 
week of earnings announcement. For 506 earnings announcements, there is a large 
peak where the mean volume in the week of earnings report announcement is about 
33 per cent higher than non-report period. Beaver (1968, p. 74) findings suggest 
that investors respond quickly to new pieces of information as reflected in changes 
in volume which were found to be low eight weeks prior to earnings announcement 
or report release. Beaver (1968) finding indicates greater volume and price 
activities in the week of earnings announcement than weeks prior to announcement. 
Fama et al. (1969) in their study of adjustment of stock prices to new information 
(i. e., announcement of stock splits), document evidence that announcement of 
dividend changes is "fully reflected" in the price of the security by the end of the 
split month. Their findings suggest that once the information effects of associated 
dividend changes are properly considered by the market, a split per se has no net 
effect on common stock returns (Fama et al. (1969, p. 17)). Moreover, Fama et al. 's 
(1969) result indicates that the market's judgment concerning the information 
implications of a split are fully reflected in the price of a share at least by the end of 
the split month but most probably almost immediately after the announcement date. 
Brown and Warner (1985,1980) also find that the stock market fully reflects the 
information contained in news announcements almost immediately after the 
announcement date. We address this issue through looking at share prices 
movement of the day of the news against other relatively longer event windows. 
Beneish (1999a) documents evidence of a loss in stock price of up to 21% 
following revelation of financial statements manipulation by managers. 
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Feroz et al. (1991) find that the market reacts negatively to news of firms subject to 
the SEC investigation. For a group of firms under SEC investigation for disputed 
accounting, Feroz et al. (1991, p. 124) document a cumulative abnormal return of 
-6% for event days {-1,0}. Dechow et al. (1996) investigate market reactions to 
news that some firms are under SEC investigation for various accounting related 
issues and they also document share price reduction of 9%, on average. 
Miller (2006) examines market reactions to alleged accounting malfeasance to see 
whether the market views articles in newspapers as providing new information. lie 
investigates market adjusted reactions of day zero and a-three-day event windows. 
He finds an average one-day market adjusted reaction of -6.3% and a-three-day 
market adjusted reaction of -8.20%. 
Karpoff et al. (2008a, b) find evidence that the market penalises firms when their 
earnings manipulation is revealed. Karpoff et al. (2008a, b) find evidence of 
abnormal loss of various percentages (depending on the firm) on one day market 
return of trigger events that attract the attention of the SEC. Also, results reported 
in Karpoff et al. (2008a, b) show the monetary cost (e. g., from class-action suits) 
and non-monetary costs (e. g., cease-and-desist orders issued to firms by the SEC) 
incurred by firms revealed to have manipulated their earnings. 
Benile and Jarrell (2009) investigate stock market reactions to the scandal 
surrounding stock options backdating in the U. S. as reported in the Wall Street 
Journal. They show that investors' typical reaction to firm-specific backdating 
news is negative and significant, both economically and statistically. Specifically, 
they report that the first trading day is associated with negative abnormal risk- 
adjusted returns of around 7%. They attribute this result to the consistency of 
market efficiency. 
Joy et al. (1977) report mixed results in their study of adjustment of stock prices to 
announcements of unanticipated changes in quarterly earnings. Dichotomising 
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between favourable and unfavourable announcement, Joy et al. (1977) report small 
marginal price adjustments subsequent to an unfavourable announcement. 
The results reported in (by) this stream of literature lend considerable credence to 
the view that the stock market is efficient in the sense that stock prices adjust very 
rapidly to new information. 
In contradistinction, at the same time the mixed evidence reported by Joy et al. 
(1977) study suggests that price adjustments to the information concerning security 
valuations that are contained in unexpected `highly favourable' quarterly earnings 
reports are gradual, rather than instantaneous. Joy et al. (1977) could not adduce 
exact reasons for the failure of market efficiency in this latter regard. 
LeRoy (1989) in a theoretical critique and rebuttal of the efficient market 
hypothesis through mathematical modelling of variance-bounds and mean 
reversion finds reasons to reject the efficient market hypothesis. Specifically, 
LeRoy (1989) adduces reasons for the failure of market efficiency. Some of the 
reasons include the joint-hypothesis problem, the high volume of trade on 
organised securities markets that pose a serious problem, the January and holiday 
effect on traded volumes. Based on these reasons, LeRoy (1989) is led to conclude 
that, 
"However attractive... capital market efficiency is on methodological grounds; it 
is extraordinarily difficult to formulate nontrivial and falsifrable implications of 
capital market efficiency that are not in fact falsified" (LeRoy 1989, pp. 1614-15). 
Abedini (2009) and El-Temtamy and Chaudhry (2009) investigate market 
efficiency in the Gulf Co-operation Council countries. In their opinion, the 
evidence about semi-strong form market efficiency is inconclusive. While a 
version of their tests rejects the efficient market hypotheses other versions accept it. 
In particular, part of Abedini (2009) findings rejects efficient market hypotheses, 
while another part accepts it. Furthermore, the results of Abedini (2009) shows that 
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efficient market hypothesis can be accepted for daily price general index for Dubai 
whereas the hypothesis may be rejected for Bahrain and Kuwait. 
In sum, the foregoing review of this portion of the literature suggests that the 
documented evidence on the movements or changes in share prices in various 
capital markets is inconclusive or mixed. 
25 Summsry 
Before this chapter is brought to a close, it is instructive to emphasise that there is 
no claim that the literature review undertaken in the chapter is conclusively 
exhaustive. However, we have reviewed the "'root" literatures that are germane to 
all aspects of the study. 
As well as capturing contemporaneous studies, the review has gone as far back as 
1950. This is an indication that the review is able to connect established past works 
with contemporaneous researches in the areas it has chosen. In this regard, the 
review attempts to mesh or blend the multidisciplinary strands of the literatures 
together. In the process it tries to discover whether there are any prior studies that 
addressed the issues raised in this research. 
The review undertaken in this chapter indicates that there are vacuums in the 
literature that this study can attempt to close. To the best of our knowledge, the 
various literatures reviewed show that there are no prior empirical studies to date 
that has examined the effect of the study's institutional factors on accounts 
manipulation. Therefore, this will be the first study in accounting and finance that 
will be examining whether, and to what extent, the institutional structures can 
explain the occurrence of accounts manipulation. 
Furthermore, extant research appears not to have taken into account the effect of 
news placement in a newspaper publication on share prices. The prior literatures 
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(these are very recent) that have applied limited attention theory did so under 
endogenous conditions where the management of firms was the party that initiated 
the release of the news to the public. Ours will be one of the few studies in 
accounting and finance that will be applying the limited attention under a different, 
novel and exogenous context where parties other than management will be the ones 
exposing the news in newspapers. 
To the best of our knowledge, Klibanoff et al. (1998) appears to be the first 
research to have operationalise the limited attention theory but we think that their 
did not go far enough. 
Finally, our review indicates that most prior studies have not examined (un)likely 
association between the size or magnitude of the amount mentioned in the news of 
accounts manipulation and share prices after news. To the best of our knowledge, 
Miller (2006) appears to be the only paper as the time our study was going to the 
printers that has attempted to relate amount mentioned in the news with share 
prices after the news. This study will be the second attempt in this direction, by so 
doing it will be adding to the literature. 
The next chapter considers the study's research questions in details and formalises 
the research hypotheses. 
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Resc=h questions and hypotheses 
3.1 Intwducdon 
This chapter formally presents the research questions, the development of 
hypotheses, and models of consequences of the act. First, it begins with the 
research questions and then moves on to their accompanying hypotheses. 
3.2 Re march questions (RQs) 
There are eight specific research questions that this study is posing, and would 
attempt to answer. For more clarity and consistent with the two parts of the study 
the research questions have been organised into institutional structures questions 
(section 3.2.1), and consequences questions (section 3.2.2). Institutional structures 
questions cover questions one to five while consequences questions cover questions 
six to eight. In fine details, questions one and eight are an association question 
even though they are grouped together with the others in the two sections. 
3.2.1 Research questions on institulonal siructures ofaccounts manlpulah'on 
We post the following research questions regarding the institutional structures 
variables: 
RQI. Can legal origins be associated with the occurrence of accounts 
manipulation? 
RQ2. Can the level of corruption in a country explain the occurrence of accounts 
manipulation? 
RQ3. Can a country's level of press freedom explain the occurrence of accounts 
manipulation? 
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RQ4. Is the extent of the State's ownership of economic activities in a country 
likely to explain the occurrence of accounts manipulation? 
RQ5. Can the State's attempt to protect investor explain the occurrence of accounts 
manipulation? 
Taken together, the above research questions attempt to investigate whether we can 
explain the likelihood of accounts manipulation occurring in a given environment. 
322 Consequences ztth questions 
The research questions applying to the second strand are as follows: 
RQ6. How will stock returns react to news of accounts manipulation? 
RQ7. To what extent can the amount mentioned in the newspapers explain 
abnormal stock returns after the news? 
RQ8. Can the section where news of accounts manipulation is inserted in a 
newspaper be associated with share prices behaviour after the news? 
3.3. Development ofHypotheses 
This section presents the hypotheses of the research. The first set of hypotheses 
formally state the relationship between the country-level variables and accounts 
manipulation. The second set of hypotheses captures the consequences of the act 
when exposed in daily newspapers. 
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3.3 LI Legal origin 
An argument can be made for the need to investigate whether the occurrence of 
accounts manipulation by firms can be associated with the legal origin of the 
country in which firms operate. Leuz et al. (2003) document evidence suggesting 
that earnings management is more pervasive in countries where the legal protection 
of outside investors is weak. Burgstahler et al. (2006, p. 1002) also document that 
earnings management is more pronounced in countries with weaker legal systems 
and enforcement. La Porta et al. (2008, p. 286) conceptualise legal origin broadly 
as a style of social control of economic life. These prior works provide documented 
empirical evidence that legal rules protecting investors vary systematically among 
legal traditions or origins. This strand of literature argues that different legal 
origins can present different scenarios for accounts manipulation. However, we 
will argue that accounts manipulation is equally likely to occur in any country 
irrespective of the type of legal origin the country may be grouped into. The 
above discussion leads to the hypothesis (stated in the null form) that: 
H, There is no association between the legal origins in which firms 
operate and the occurrence of accounts manipulation. 
3.3.1.2 Corrupt environment 
The literature on contingency theory suggests that managerial behaviour is 
constrained by the environment in which a manager operates. This may lead one to 
argue that the level of corruption in a country can influence managers in that 
country to engage or not to engage in accounts manipulation because managers 
may want to conform to the prevailing order in the environment. This assumes 
that managers operating in corrupt countries may engage in accounts manipulation 
while managers operating in clean countries may not engage in it. That is, the 
higher (lower) the level of corruption in a country the higher (lower) the likelihood 
of accounts manipulation. This statement may lead to stigmatising or stereotyping 
managers depending on where they operate. 
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We argue that managers who have the tendency to engage in accounts manipulation 
will do so irrespective of whether the environment in which they operate is corrupt 
or not. This leads to the null hypothesis that: 
H2: Ceteris paribus, the level of corruption is not likely to 
affect the occurrence of accounts manipulation 
3.3.1.3 Role of the press 
Prior empirical research as well as anecdotal evidence has demonstrated that the 
press is a vital organ in commercial affairs. For example, Miller (2006), Brunetti 
and Weder (2003), and Dyck et al. (2008), have all emphasised the important role 
of the press as disseminator of information to the capital market. Among other 
things, Miller (2006) provides evidence that the press acts as a watchdog for 
accounting fraud by reporting cases of accounting malfeasances. Dyck et al. 's 
(2008) anecdotal evidences show that the media affect companies' policy toward 
[... ] the amount of corporate resources that are diverted to the sole advantage of 
controlling shareholders. What Dyck et al. 's (2008) case study evidence suggests 
is that the press can affect managers' accounts manipulation behaviour. The 
overall message from the literature is that press coverage of commerce is important 
because of the pressure it exerts on management to behave in a socially acceptable 
manner. 
According to this popular view, a free press environment that exposes alleged 
accounts manipulation without fear or favour is capable of affecting the act; hence 
it is thought that the extent of press freedom is capable of explaining why accounts 
manipulation may occur in some economies than in others. When managers are 
conscious or realise that they are under the constant watch of the media their 
behaviour may be moderated such that they "mind the ga(a)ps", literally or 
professionally speaking. Consistent with this positive view of the press, some might 
expect that the level of press freedom in a country has a vital role to play in 
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explaining the occurrence or non-occurrence of accounts manipulation across 
countries. However, we hypothesise (in the null form) that: 
H3: Ceteris paribus, the level ofpress freedom is not likely to 
affect the occurrence of accounts manipulation. 
3.3.1.4 State-Ownership ofEnterprses 
The State's dominance of the economic activities of a country comes next in the 
hypotheses formulation. In the literature, this comes under various rubrics such as 
State-ownership of Enterprises, State-Owned Firms, and the like. However called, 
there is concern that firms that operate in countries where the State dominates the 
economic activities of a country are likely to experience accounts manipulation 
probably because of the belief that the State's property is for every citizen, so much 
so that those citizens who are at the helm may likely help themselves with the 
spoils of office. For instance, Bushman et al. (2004, p. 223) have argued that States 
that directly own enterprises may suppress firm-specific information to hide 
expropriation activities by politicians and their cronies. It is also possible that 
benevolent governments use their States' ownership of enterprises to directly 
govern and manage firms, obviating the need for public information. Bushman et 
al. (2004) observe that politicians may thus seek to restrict the flow of information 
to prevent public scrutiny of their business dealings with cronies and protect their 
economic interests by suppressing information flows. 
This implies that it is conceivable that government or any of its organs can 
promulgate (or countenance) weak accounting and disclosure requirements or use 
perceived or real influence over the media to retard dissemination of firm-specific 
information in the economy. This leads to the hypothesis (stated in the null form) 
that: 
H4: Ceteris paribus, State's ownership of enterprises is not likely to 
affect the occurrence of accounts manipulation 
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3.3. (. 5 State's attempts at intestor-prnte+ct on 
This study uses a measure of institutional variables of political economy in 
examining efforts at investor-protection by the State as a possible explanation for 
why accounts manipulation occurs in some economies. Thus, the study examines 
whether accounts manipulation is likely to occur where the State intervenes in the 
capital market, not by direct or indirect ownership but by regulatory/quasi 
regulatory interferences. Investor-protection can be a proxy for the State's interest 
in the capital market. State's intervention can be in form of disclosure 
requirements and regulation or the creation of other constraining or enabling 
environment in which firms operate. The default argument can then be made that 
the State's efforts at investor-protection is not likely to affect accounts 
manipulation. Hence, it is thus hypothesised (stated in the null form) that: 
Hs: Ceteris paribus, the State's attempts at investor protection is not likely 
to affect the occurrence of accounts manipulation 
3 . 3.2 Con ! gable 
The level of wealth of a country and managers' share of that wealth as measured by 
managers' economic well-being and other conditions is likely to impact or affect 
managers' choices or disposition to issues. In addition, it can also be argued that a 
country's cultural values can encourage or discourage accounts manipulation. 
Cultural values can determine what the people of a country consider as accounting 
malfeasance, or whether the press will report one if it does occur. To control for 
potential endogeneity in the regressions in chapter 5, we will therefore control for a 
country's level of wealth (as captured by gross national income) and national 
culture (using two of Hofstede's cultural dimensions). These control variables are 
discussed in chapters 4 and 5. 
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3.3.3 Con. s quences Hyp0thc3c3 
Bek re the consequences hypotheses are stated, we model market reactions its terms 
of stock returns and share prices. 
3.3.3.1 Modelling share prices and stock returns 
Exposure in newspapers of a firm's act of accounts manipulation is capable of 
affecting the firm's stock prices. The semi-strong version of' the efficient market 
hypothesis says that the stock market 'f lly i-e lect, s" all publicly available 
information set, {0}, which is the news contained in exposed accounts 
manipulation. Newspapers are one source of publicly available information which 
investors are likely to rely upon. So, we expect that equity investors will price the 
information content of the news. This expectation leads to modelling changes in 
share prices or firms' stock returns as a result of information content of'the news. 
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Figure 3.1: Timeline of events leading lip to exposed accounts manipulation 
The sequence of events of publicly exposed accounts manipulation as 
conceptualised in this study can be shown in the timeline in Figure 3.1. 
Now, let us define: 
as daily share prices of the days t+n for the i"' firm. i I. 2, ... 
98 and t+n 
0 to 6 (i. e., each ex pose event window). 
Piet-n as share prices of the period t-n Cor the i"' firm where i°1,2, ... 98 and t-n= 
-6 to -1 (i. e., each ex ante event window). 
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DsT;, t+ as ex post daily abnormal stock returns of firms (i. e., day zero to day +6) 
DsT;, t.,, as ex ante daily abnormal stock returns of firms (i. c., day -6 to day -1) 
The symbol 0 as information contained in the published news in newspapers. By 
definition, on day zero daily share prices are observed to be pi, o 
10 and realised 
daily abnormal stock returns are DsT;, 0 
10. That is, on day zero the news of accounts 
manipulation arrives, which is the information set, 10). On days t-n share prices 
are Pi't-n" 
The model investigates mean differences between pi, t+n 
10, pt-n and 
DSTi, t+n 
10, DSTi, t-n" 
According to the semi-strong-form of the efficient market hypotheses, for the 
market to "fully reflect" information contained in news of accounts manipulation, 
{0}, it is expected that the following conditions will hold: 
Pi, t+n 
10) # Pi, t-n ........ 
(1) 
DSTi, t+n 
10)'0 DSTi, t-n ... """"" 
(2) 
3.3.32 Abnormal stockzvtuns (main hypothesis) 
Because the stock market is considered to be informationally efficient, rational or 
perfect by incorporating the news into prices, it is expected that for firms exposed 
in accounts manipulation pre and post event day share prices are not likely to be 
equal. We hypothesise (in the null form) that: 
H6: For firms exposed in accounts manipulation, there is no 
difference between ex post and ex ante abnormal stock returns 
This hypothesis is the main hypothesis of the second part of the research. 
In contradistinction to perfect rationality, the next two hypotheses rely on some 
arguments in behavioural finance that "price discovery is a dynamic and complex 
process, which is accomplished through the interplay between noise traders and 
information arbitrageurs" (Lee 2001, p. 235), typically informed or sophisticated 
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investors. Shleifer and Vishny (1997), Hirshleifer (2001), Lee (2001), Daniel 
(2002), Haw et al. (2004), and Hirshleifer and Tcoh (2003) arc in concordance on 
this argument. 
3.3.3.3 R el tiom p bctween amount mendon«l and cx past Abnarmsl rtturns 
As a second-order effect, and following the materiality assumption in accounting 
(see Woods and Sangster 2008) it is expected that the magnitude of the amount 
mentioned in the news can have impact on share prices. 29 Thus, it will be 
interesting to examine whether there is a relationship between amount mentioned in 
the news and ex post abnormal returns. It will examine to what extent the variation 
in ex post abnormal stock returns is explained by the amount mentioned in a 
newspaper. This leads to the hypothesis that: 
H7: The amount mentioned in news of accounts manipulation is 
not associated with ex post abnormal returns 
The size of a company may determine whether the amount mentioned in the news 
can be taken seriously to the extent that it affects share prices. We therefore control 
for firm size using alternative proxies of total assets and shareholders' equity. This 
is addressed in chapters 4 and 6. 
3.3.4 Placement effect 
Kim and Verrecchia (1991) propose that price reaction to a public announcement is 
proportional to the importance of the announced information relative to the average 
posterior beliefs and the surprise contained in the announced information plus 
noise. 
29 Amount mentioned can be considered material if its magnitude or size can influence investors' 
reactions to the news. Materiality depends on the size of the item or error judged in the particular 
circumstances of its misstatement. See Woods and Sangster (2008, p. 112) for a detailed treatment of 
materiality. 
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Limited attention theory would suggest that people deliberately select the 
information they feel matters most to them because of certain constraints on their 
daily routines: for example, time, energy, benefit-cost considerations, etc. It is 
suggested that one of the information channels through which investors make 
investment decisions is by reading newspapers (Miller, (2006)). 30 The seriousness 
attached to the news as reflected by share prices reaction could be due to the place 
where news of accounts manipulation is featured in a newspaper publication. 
As we pointed out in chapter 2, limited attention theory may appear antithetical to 
the tenets of semi-strong-form market efficiency (discussed in section 2.3.6). A 
well-grounded exposition of this antithesis can be found in Lee (2001). The two 
seem antithetical about whether the placement of a news item in certain sections of 
a newspaper can affect market reactions. Semi-strong-form market efficiency 
posits that stock prices quickly reflect all publicly available information; hence it 
should not matter where news of accounts manipulation is inserted in a newspaper. 
But Hirshleifer and Teoh (2003) while relying on the idea of limited attention, 
predicts that the speed and "completeness" of stock prices reactions are both 
reduced when information is disclosed in a less conspicuous place, (for example, in 
a footnote) which may not be spotted by all investors. This is likely to "occur 
because equilibrium stock prices reflect a weighted average of the beliefs of 
investors who attend to different signals, with weights that depend on the size and 
risk tolerance of each investor group" and the fact that "investors with limited 
attention may fail to make full use of available accounting information" 
(Hirshleifer et al. 2004, p. 300). 
Daniel et al. (2002) argue that if investors have limited attention, they may fail to 
discount for manipulation fully. Thus, as a second-order effect stock prices are 
30 For a number of reasons, using sections of the electronic edition of a newspaper or the hard copy version 
to operationalise the limited attention theory may be problematic in view of the fact that the news could 
have been carried by other real time online electronic sources before the newspapers are read. Please see 
threats to the thesis in chapter 8 for further comments. 
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likely to react differentially to news according to the section-type used in 
conveying the news. This leads to the hypothesis (stated in null form) that: 
H8: The type of section used in publishing news of accounts manipulation in 
newspaper is not associated with ex post abnormal stock returns 
3.4 Summary 
This chapter presented the study's research questions and accompanying 
hypotheses to carry out its investigation. In brief, the research questions that we 
will be attempting to answer revolve around the following sets: (a) Can the legal 
origins in which firms operate be associated with occurrence of accounts 
manipulation? (b) Does corrupt environment, free press, State ownership of 
enterprises, and the State's attempts at investor-protection affect accounts 
manipulation? These questions relate to the first part of the study. 
Furthermore, we will be attempting to answer questions such as: (c) how will stock 
returns react to news of accounts manipulation? (d) Can the amount mentioned in 
the newspaper affect stock returns immediately after the news? (e) What role does 
the place where the news is inserted in a publication play in share prices behaviour? 
These questions relate to the second part of the study. 
Our ability to provide answers to these questions in chapters 5 and 6 will fill a 
number of gaps in the literature. 
Using Figure 3.1, the chapter showed the three steps involved in exposed accounts 
manipulation. Finally, via conditions (1) and (2) the chapter built models of 
consequences as it conceptualises them. 
Chapter 4, which follows next, discusses the data collection methods employed. It 
also describes the research sample as well as other methodological issues relevant 
to the research or study. 
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4.1 Inftoduch'on 
Following on from chapter 3 which addressed the research questions and 
hypotheses of the study, the present chapter focuses on the methodology and 
research designs employed in the study. It describes in great detail the methods 
used in collecting data as well as describing the research sample, and statistical 
methods used to carry out the analyses. 
The chapter is divided into six main parts, namely: 
4.2 Methods of identifying sample and sources of data collection 
4.3 Sample description 
4.4 Sources, description of variables and measurements 
4.5 Overview of research methods 
4.6 Methods for analysing data 
4.7 Justification for using statistical methods 
4.2 Methods ofidend6*Wsample and sources of data collection 
This section describes how, where and when the data for the study were collected. 
It also describes cross-national distribution of sample firms. To begin with, all data 
are secondary data which were sourced from the internet. The sample is collected 
in an unbiased manner as there was no prior knowledge of which countries cases of 
alleged accounts manipulation would come from, neither was it known which firms 
would be involved in the act. 
The data collection effort began in the first week of June 2008 and ended towards 
the end of June 2009, which covers approximately 13 months. 
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In order to identify the countries and firms where accounts manipulation reportedly 
occurred, detailed online media searches were conducted. Table 4.1 contains a list 
of countries (where accounts manipulation was found published in the newspapers, 
research sample; and where it was not found published, control sample) used in the 
study. 
Table 4.1 Countries involved in the study, both research and control sample 
Panel A. Countries where accounts 
manipulations were reported, n= 36 
Panel B. Countries selected as control 
sample, n= 36 
1. Australia 19. Netherlands 1. Argentina 19. Jordan 
2. Bahrain 20. New Zealand 2. Austria 20. Iran, Islamic 
3. Brazil 21. Nigeria 3. Bangladesh 21. Jamaica 
4. Belgium 22. Norway 4 Botswana 22. Kenya 
5. Canada 23. Philippines 5. Bulgaria 23. Mexico 
6. China 24. Poland 6. Chile 24. Pakistan 
7. Czech Republic 25. Portugal 7. Colombia 25. Panama 
8. France 26 ROC (Taiwan) 8. Costa Rica 26. Peru 
9. Germany 27. Russia 9. Denmark 27. Romania 
10. Hong Kong 28. Singapore 10. Ecuador 28. Saudi Arabia 
1. India 29. South Africa 11. Egypt 29. Slovakia 
12. Indonesia 30. South Korea 12. El Salvador 30. Spain 
13. Ireland 31. Sweden 13. Estonia 31. Tanzania 
14. Israel 32. Switzerland 14. Ghana 32. Thailand 
15. Italy 33. Ukraine 15. Greece 33. Turkey 
16. Japan 34. UK 16. Finland 34. Uruguay 
17. Luxembourg 35. UAE 17. Guatemala 36. Venezuela 
18. Malaysia 36. USA 18. Hungary 36. Vietnam 
In view of the fact that there is no single database containing cases of accounts 
manipulation all over the world as they occur, the number of' firms and countries 
used in the study is dependent on published cases of the act. This is why the data 
gathering process involved a massive hand-collection of secondary or archival data. 
The search worked with the study's definition of accounts manipulation as a 
situation whereby the management of a firm acting opportunistically or efficiently 
misleads parties (other than themselves) by misrepresenting or misstating the firm's 
situation through income statements, statements of cash flow, balance sheet and 
other non-financial items. 
We present below three examples capturing the different component parts of this 
definition. The relevant parts have been underlined for clarity. Note that all real 
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names of the actors mentioned in the publications have been disguised in the 
reproduction; however, the names of the publications are real. 
The Financial Times of London, United Kingdom of 11 March 2003 reports that 
"The specter of accounting problems returned to haunt "Stickyhands Plc" 
yesterday, after the plant hire group suspended a senior member of its U. S. 
financial staff and warned that full year profits would be well below expectations. 
The company said it had suspended the man after he had admitted failing to 
reconcile certain balance sheet accounts for the last financial year and this. " 
We can see from the above excerpt that both income statements and balance sheet 
items were schemes used in the manipulation. 
Another example of accounts manipulation (this time involving income statements, 
balance sheet and cash flow statements items) is taken from the Independent of 
London, UK of 23 January 2005, and it reads: 
"US financial regulators have launched an investigation into alleged accounting 
irregularities in a business controlled by "Emperor ". 
The Securities and Exchange Commission said late on Friday night that it was 
looking into a series of accounting issues at "Worldßox "... 
In particular, the SEC was making inquiries about how JVorldBox accounted for 
deals between itself and "TopElec ", the French electronics group, and with 
"ALG ", a rural telecommunications group formerly owned by "Rugged" Corp. 
Rugged Corp. and WorldBox have been engaged in a legal battle since June last 
year after Rugged Corp. accused WorldBox of attempting to destroy its business. 
WorldBox made cash offers to third party distributors to persuade them to ditch 
Rugged Corp. In a turnaround, WorldBox agreed to buy the satellite TV assets 
of Rugged Corp. for $938n: (1S00m) in August. TopElec agreed last year to buy 
WorldBox's set-top box manufacturing unit for $250ni. The SEC said it was also 
looking for more information from TopElec to do with its $1.47bn write-down of 
its "Jupiter" satellite assets. This related to the withdrawal of JVorldBox from a 
venture to provide high-speed internet via satellite to rural homes in the US ... 
(Underlines added for emphasis). 
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The final example is taken from Financial Times of London of 12 February 2003. 
The headline reads: "Errors found in "Conglomerate" subsidiary accounts". 
Excerpts of the story written by Peter Smith go that 
"Conglomerate, the food retailer stalking "Trust", has had to correct the accounts 
of two of its subsidiaries after discovering a number of errors in its original filings 
to Company House. 
The mistakes include the overstatement of employee numbers and the level o 
debtors, and the understatement of property market values and administration 
costs.... " 
One can see from the last excerpt that the schemes used in accounts manipulation 
involves a non-financial item (employee number), an income statement and balance 
sheet item (level of debtors), an income statement item (administration costs), and a 
balance sheet item (property market values). 
In addition to these three examples, a comprehensive list of items mentioned in 
reports of accounts manipulation can be found in Table 1.2 on page 19 of chapter 1 
of this thesis. 
The search began with random online searches of news of accounts manipulation 
(or related topics as enumerated below). We use a number of search engines and 
databases such as Infotrac (Gales databases allow us access to Infoirac's Full Text 
Newspaper Databases), Onlinenewspapers. com, Dow Jones's Facliva ijVorksTM, 
Google, and Yahoo! Among other news categories, these databases contain 
information about alleged accounts manipulation, their dates of publication, 
countries where they were reported and other pertinent information. This was the 
first stage in identifying the research sample. 
The following keywords or their variants were used in the search: earnings 
management; accounting problem; earnings manipulation; financial statements, or 
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reports; deceptive accounting; false accounting; fraudulent accounting; misleading 
accounting; inappropriate accounting; misstated earnings; spurious accounting; 
inflated earnings, or overstated earnings; cooking the books; manipulated earnings; 
accounting fraud; accounting investigation; accounting probe; accounting 
restatement; understated profit, or overstated profits; accounting scandals; 
accounting deficiencies; creative accounting; inaccurate financial statements; 
accounting irregularities; accounting errors; among other such related terms. 
When a hit comes up during the random search, the story is then traced to the 
country where it happened and the firm or company involved. This process 
enabled the firm to be identified by name, and country. However, the Infotrac 
database has its limitation as it does not carry every of the world's newspaper. 
What we do in that case is to continue to hunt for the news through other internet 
sources such as onlinenetivspapers. corn until we are able to get a newspaper that 
carries the complete story at the appropriate time. This is part of the second stage 
used in identifying the sample. 
The search in onlinenewspapers. com database was very helpful in accessing 
newspapers from around the world. The database hosts almost all major newspaper 
titles from virtually every country in the world. We searched a number of English 
language newspapers from around the world from this database. Selected titles of 
the newspapers that were searched include Financial Times of London, THISDAY 
of Nigeria, The New York Times, The Wall Street Journal, The Washington Post, 
The Daily Mail of London, The Daily Telegraph of London, The Scotsman of 
Edinburgh, The Evening Standard of London, The London Times, DutchNews of 
Netherland. 
Others include Kyodo News of Japan, the Japan Times, China Daily, The Moscow 
Times, Connexion of France, the Independent of London, Los Angeles Times, 
International Herald Tribune of France, The Philippine Star, Malaysia Today, The 
Strait Times of Malaysia, The Milwaukee Journal Sentinel of Canada, The 
Guardian of London, and of Nigeria, AFP of Germany, AD newspaper of 
Amsterdam, The Nation of Kenya, Globe and Mail of Canada, and many, many 
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others too numerous to mention. All the newspapers are written in English 
language. 
On gaining access to a newspaper's website, a word-search is carried out through 
its archives section or through an embedded search field. Interestingly, most of the 
newspaper searches returned a variety of hits. When a hit throws up, it is then read 
and decided whether it is, indeed, a case of accounts manipulation. When it is 
decided that it is so the news is then hunted to the original date of publication of the 
event (see the three newspaper publication examples cited above and Table 1.2 on 
page 19 of chapter 1 of this thesis, for what was reported in the news alleging 
accounts manipulation). 
There were instances where two or more newspapers published the same event. 
However, this posed little or no difficulty in identifying exact dates and times 
because we are able to know the exact dates and times of publications because they 
were written on top of the newspapers. And the newspapers usually indicated 
whether the news is an update or not. This helped in collecting the news as at the 
time it was first published, not on subsequent publications of the same news. And 
when an event is published by newspapers in more than one country, the first date 
of publication is reckoned with and the newspaper of the country where it happened 
is chosen. We did not find multiple publications of the same story in the same 
issue of a newspaper; if by chance we missed any we did not control for it. 
Tracing the news to its original date, company and country of publication is 
necessary because of the second part of the study which requires that we be as 
precise or exact as possible in terms capturing share prices information without 
being diluted or polluted by other factors. 
The third and final stage of data collection is this: when a firm that is alleged to 
have been involved in the act is identified, its annual reports and accounts (or 
financial statements) are retrieved from its website on the internet, assuming it had 
one. Where a firm does not have its own website, information about the firm is 
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sourced from third party websites such as the Stock Exchange where the firm is 
quoted or listed. 
To collect some aspects of the data for the second part of the thesis; together with 
market index databases, we accessed a number of national stock exchanges online. 
Although the list is not an exhaustive one, and by no means limited to these, the 
market index data we use were collected from S&P 500 (for firms listed in the US), 
S&P TSX Composite (covering Canada-listed firms), DAX (for firms listed in 
Germany), Bursa Malaysia Stock Exchange Index (for firms listed in Malaysia), 
BEL-20 Composite Index (for firms listed in Belgium), FTSE 100 or FTSE- 
AliShare Index (for firms listed in the United Kingdom). 
Others indexes include OMX Stockholm 30 (covering firms listed in Sweden), All 
Ordinaries (for Australia-listed firms), CAC40 Composite Index (covering France- 
listed firms), Han Seng Composite Index (covering Hong Kong-listed firms), Strait 
Times (Singapore) Composite Index (covering firms listed on the Singapore Stock 
Exchange). We also collected data from Jakarta stock exchange composite index 
(for firms listed in Indonesia), KOSPI Composite index (covering firms listed in 
South Korea), Nikkie 225 Composite Index (covering Japan-listed firms), Taiwan 
Composite Index (for firms listed in Taiwan), Shanghai Composite Index (for 
China-listed firm), BSE Sensex Composite Index (covering firms listed in India). 
Market indexes data for the years 2000-2008 were extracted from these stock 
exchanges. In the absence of an (active) stock exchange from a firm's home 
country, we go to the nearest exchange in the region or an alternative exchange 
where the firm is listed to collect data. 
Also, where a going concern entity has no website (or its website could not be 
located), we resort to DataStream and Amadeus. These two databases are not 
sufficient as they do not have data of companies from every country of the world, 
which makes it necessary to supplement them with Yahoo! Finance, Google 
Finance, AOL money and finance, BusinessWeek, etc. Where a going concern has 
a website and its historical stock quotes pages are available, we use it instead of the 
ar 
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ones mentioned. However, in doing this, as a reliability check, we cross check 
between any two or three databases to ensure that share prices information arc the 
same in all the databases. This exercise did not find any discrepancies in the share 
prices quotes or the market index return of the different databases accessed. 
We follow prior researches that have used newspapers to collect data. These 
include Beneish (1997), Miller (2006), Deschow et al. (1996), and Feroz et al. 
(1991). In particular, Beneish (1997, see footnote on p. 276) and Miller (2006) use 
news media searches on the internet. These prior researches use the opportunity 
provided by the Securities and Exchange Commission's Accounting and Auditing 
Enforcement Releases (AAERs) which sometimes reveals names of firms under 
investigation. For the research conducted in the U. S. that uses this sources to 
identify their firms they say that SEC's method lags behind the news with about 
three to four years (see for example, DeFond and Smith (1991) and Dechow et al. 
(1996)). The reason for the lag is due to the long process it takes the SEC to 
initiate action (Dechow et al. (1996, p. 6)). 
4.3 Sample do= pdorz 
The study is interested in alleged cases of accounts manipulation by listed firms 
covering the period January 2000 up to August 2008, inclusive. Table 4.2 shows 
the yearly distribution of published cases of accounts manipulation for the 9 years 
covered by the study. 
Table 4.2 Number of Accounts Manipulations Found in Newspapers 
Between 2000-2008 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Total 
7 10 17 29 26 19 21 24 30 183 
The table shows that there are relatively fewer published cases of accounts 
manipulation in 2000 compared to, say, 2003 or 2004 or up to the third quarter of 
2008. The reason for the noticeable increase in published cases of the act in the 
press can be attributed to the Enron/WorldCom/Parmalat imbroglio that probably 
Methodology AndRxxs vh Dlc jns 
Chapter 4 
made the press to become more alert in reporting financial issues because the 
"media like to report on what is new, and to paint what is new as important" 
(Daniel et al. 2002, p. 69). In fact, it became fashionable for the press to be 
sniffing for accounting related issues in order to (presumably) report/expose 
accounting improprieties to their readers. Indeed, Ball (2009, p. 9) speculates that 
during the scandal period, accounting-related issues were unusually newsworthy, 
and the press reported even minor issues that previously would not have made the 
news, adding that this bias was fed by panicking companies that, in a post-Enron 
`witch hunt, ' combed their books for the slightest hint of an accounting issue, 
which the press duly reported as scandalous. 
August 2008 is set as an arbitrary cut-off date because of the financial turmoil and 
credit crunch experienced in most major market-based economies of the world, 
which was spearheaded by the world's two leading arrowheads of free market 
economy, as the numbers in Table 4.4 below would suggest. 
January 2000 is chosen as the start-off date for a number of reasons: One, so as to 
avoid too much missing data as some companies may not keep their annual reports 
and accounts for much longer. Although some of the data are still available in 
DataStream, Amadeus and Bloomberg, they do not cover all countries. Indeed, 
experience gained in the course of data collection reveals that most of the firms do 
not have daily historical or on-the-spot stock quotes, and annual reports and 
accounts for a longer period. 
Two, in order not to allow (or to minimise) other extraneous factors unconnected 
with accounts manipulation interfere with data. 
Finally, so that cases of accounts manipulation can still be found in archives of 
newspapers. The longer the period, the more the probability they are removed from 
the archives. For example, at the expiration of a certain period The Wall Street 
Journal transfers its old issues to Factiva. 
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Moreover, by coincidence, the essay by Ball (2009, p. 1) supports our concentrating 
on this period because, as he says, "the tsunami of accounting scandals at the 
beginning of the millennium is well known. " (We take particular note that Ball 
(2009) was not published before the data for the present study were collected). 
To be included in the sample, we required that all materials about a firm or country 
must be in English language or have English language version. 
The data search found a total sample of 183 publicly quoted firms from 36 
countries around the world where alleged cases of accounts manipulation were 
reported in newspapers. " 
For the analysis in chapter 6, based on criteria listed in Table 4.3, we trim down the 
183 cases to 99 firms, which are, in turn, further reduced to 83 firms because of 
problem of data availability for some companies relating to the amount mentioned 
in the news and total assets and/or value of shareholders' equity. The pruning 
process can be seen in Table 4.3. 
Table 4.3 Sample selection criteria 
Number % 
Number of firms discovered to have manipulated their accounts 183 100 
Number of firms delisted from an exchange during the period (11) (6) 
Number of firms merged with or acquired by other firms (9) (5) 
Number of firms without websites or whose information or 
page cannot be found on a stock exchange's website (23) (13) 
Number of firms whose website is not in English (or their 
English language translation is considered insufficient) 1S U8 
Number of firm qualified to be included in sample 125 68 
Number of firms without stock quotes 
Number of firms qualifying for final sample 99 54 
'1 On the adequacy of sample size, the study satisfies a statistical condition of the central limit theorem, 
which requires that sample size (N) >_ 30 can be considered adequate for meaningful statistical analysis. 
The higher the sample size the higher the power of a statistical test. 
I 
Methodology sad Remwrh Dcx(gns 
Chapter 4 
Table 4.4 Distribution of Accounts Manipulation by country and legal origin 
Legal 
English French German Russ ian Scandi navia 
Origin 
Country Fd Us I'd Us I'd Us I'd Us I'd Us 
1. Australia 4 2 
2. Bahrain 1 
3. Brazil 1 
4. Belgium I 
5. Canada 4 4 
6. China 6 1 
7. Czech Republic 1 1 
8. France 8 4 
9. Germany 4 3 
10. Hong Kong 3 1 
11. India 7 1 
12. Indonesia 4 2 
13. Ireland 2 2 
14. Israel 2 1 
15. Italy 3 1 
16. Japan 6 4 
17. Luxembourg 1 1 
18. Malaysia 12 6 
19. Netherlands, the 2 2 
20. New Zealand 1 
21. Nigeria 3 
22. Norway 1 
23. Philippines 5 
24. Poland 4 1 
25. Portugal 3 
26 ROC (Taiwan) 1 1 
27. Russia 6 
28. Singapore 3 1 
29. South Africa 3 2 
30. South Korea 3 2 
31. Sweden 6 
32. Switzerland 1 1 
33. Ukraine 2 
34. United Kingdom 19 14 
35. United Arab 
Emirates 
1 
36. USA 49 39 
Total 114 73 29 11 21 12 12 1 7 2 
Key: I'd = Nr. of firms exposed Us = Nr. of firms used In the study 
Out of the 183 firms, 125 (68%) firms' data are useable. Eleven or (6%) were 
delisted from stock exchanges, 9 (5%) were either merged or acquired by another 
company32. 
32 We cannot say whether the delisting of some of the firms from the sample introduces survivorship bias, 
the possibility exists. Attrition is due to a firm being delisted from an exchange, or merged with or 
acquired by other firms. We do not attempt to control or account for survivorship bias. Generally, 
reducing the sample size can only have the effect of reducing the explanatory power of the tests. 
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Twenty three or 13% of the firms had no website of their own or their information 
could not be found on an exchange and 15 (8%) of the firms had no English 
Language version of their web pages; or where an English Language web page 
exists, it is inadequate. 
In chapter 5, the chi-square test for legal origin uses the 183 reported cases of 
accounts manipulation. In the logistic regression of that same chapter, we use the 
36 countries where actual cases of accounts manipulation were reported in 
newspapers together with a control sample drawn from another 36 countries where 
we did not find cases of accounts manipulation reported in newspapers (see Table 
4.1 on page 82). 
Table 4.4 shows the distribution of cases of accounts manipulation per country per 
legal origin. The table shows the number of cases of accounts manipulation that we 
found for each country (Fd), and the number that was eventually used in the 
analysis (Us), especially in the second part of the study. 
Control sample 
The need for a control sample arises because "prior research typically selects a set 
of firms with an observed accounting irregularity and then obtains another firm 
without an irregularity that is matched on" (Armstrong et al. 2010, p. 238-239) 
certain characteristics specified by the researcher. To constitute the country 
control sample we select countries based on data availability on the independent 
variables in the logistic regression in chapter 5. 
As a starting point for selecting the control sample, we required that all countries 
must be covered by Hofstede (2001). Except for the control variables of national 
cultural values, data on the remaining independent variables in the logistic equation 
in chapter 5 are available for the countries involved in the study. llofstede' (2001) 
work on cultural patterns across the world has been used (most widely) by prior 
researchers. He classifies countries of the world according to five cultural 
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dimensions. These are power distance, uncertainty avoidance, individualism/ 
collectivism, masculinity/femininity, and long-/ short-term orientation. Each of the 
countries has a score on each of these cultural dimensions. 
In building the control sample, first we exclude any country that is not found in 
Hofstede (2001, pp. 500-502). Next, in selecting the countries that are covered by 
Hofstede (2001), we select a given country in the control sample having regard to 
the five continents of the world. We purposively select a representative country 
from each geographical region on the basis of contiguity or similarity within each 
continent. We also take the legal origin of the country into consideration. 
4.31 Covarrate Balance between »valment and Control Samples 
We examine the covariate balance between the treatment and control samples. 
"Covariate balance is achieved if both the treatment and control samples appear 
similar along their observable dimensions" (Armstrong et at (2010). 33 
Table 4.5 conveys the descriptive statistics containing minimum, maximum, mean, 
standard deviation (in parentheses), differences in means and p-values from the 
Paired Samples T-Tests. Specifically, Panel A of the table shows descriptive data 
for the research sample while Panel B does the same for the control sample. 
Variations in the data of the two samples can be seen by comparing the two panels 
side-by-side, and variable-by-variable. Panel C shows the Paired Samples Test 
statistics. 
33 Armstrong et a/. (2010, p. 245) remind us of the reasons for assessing covariate balance between 
control and treatment samples: (a) an adequate degree of covariate balance is necessary to properly 
account for the confounding effects of the observed control variables used to match the observations. (b) 
Examining covariate balance is important also because it can highlight potential identification problems. 
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Table 4.5 Comparative data of Research and Control Samples 
Table 4.5 Panel A. 
CorruptEnvi 
Press Freedom 
Investor-Protection 
State's ownership of enterprises 
Gross National Income 
Power Distance 
Uncertainty Avoidance 
Table 4.5 Panel B. 
CorruptEnvi 
PRESSFree 
Investor-protection 
State's ownership of enterprises 
Gross National Income 
Power Distance 
Uncertainty Avoidance 
Descriptive Statistics (Research Sample) 
N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
36 . 70 7.90 3.8694 2.30426 
36 9.30 99.11 80.8661 21.97878 
36 3.00 9.30 6.0875 1.61361 
36 38.56 97.67 68.5725 14.58720 
36 3.06 4.75 4.2631 . 36572 
36 13.00 104.00 57.8056 23.02647 
36 4.51 104.00 59.2640 25.30567 
Descriptive Statistics (Control Sample) 
N Minimum Maximum Mean S td. Deviation 
36 . 70 8.48 5.7878 1.94250 
36 10.41 99.14 65.4200 30.613 86 
36 2.70 6.70 5.0396 1.15873 
36 4.50 91.74 31.9350 21.37097 
36 2.89 4.93 3.8935 . 42991 
36 11.00 104.00 64.8056 20.60211 
36 13.00 112.00 70.9167 21.40944 
Table 4.5 Panel C Paired Samples Test 
Paired Differences' 
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Std. Difference Sig. (2_ 
Mean Deviation Lower Upper t df tailed) 
CPI T- CPI-C+ -1.9183 3.10362 -2.9684 -0.86822 -3.709 35 . 
001 
PREEFree_T - PRESSFree C 15.446 35.70553 3.3651 27.52712 2.596 35 . 014 
INVSTPro_T - INVSTPro_C 1.1194 2.17805 0.3825 1.85639 3.084 35 . 004 
SOE T- SOE C 36.637 23.52775 28.6768 44.59814 9.343 35 . 000 
Log_GNI T- Log_GN1C 0.3695 . 56668 0.17785 0.56132 3.913 35 . 000 
Hofstede_PD_T - Ilofstede_PD_C -7.0000 29.14496 -16.8612 2.86124 -1.441 35 . 158 
Hofstede_UA T- Hofstede_UA_C -11.652 30.49843 -21.9718 -1.33346 -2.292 35 . 028 
+ The suffix 
_C, and 
T represents control and research samples, respectively. 
' Paired differences are computed as the treatment(research) sample values minu s control sampl e values 
CPI = Corruptions perceptions index PRESSFm. = Press freedom INVSTPro = Investor-protection 
SOE = State ownership of enterprises. GNI= Gross National Income PD = Power Distance 
UA = Uncertainty Avoidance 
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Looking at Panel C, the absolute difference 11.9183 1 between the mean scores of 
both groups for CPI is statistically significant (t = -3.709, p=0.001). 
34 
The absolute difference 115.44611 between the mean scores of both groups for 
press freedom (PRESSFRE. ) is statistically significant (t = 2.596, p=0.014). The 
absolute difference 11.1194 1 between the mean scores of both groups for investor- 
protection (INVSTPro) is statistically significant (t = 3.084, p=0.004). The 
absolute difference 136.6375 I between the mean scores of both groups for State's 
ownership of enterprises (SOE) is statistically significant (t =9.343, p =0.000). The 
absolute difference 10.3695 I between the mean scores of both groups for the level 
of wealth in a country (log GNI) is statistically significant (t = 3.913, p =0.000). 
The absolute difference 17.0000 I between the mean scores of both groups for the 
level of inequality in a country (Hofstede's PD) is statistically not significant (t =- 
1.441, p=0.158). The absolute difference 111.652 1 between the mean scores of 
both groups for the level of uncertainty avoidance in a country (11ofstede's UA) is 
statistically significant with t-value = -2.292, p=0.028. 
The statistically significant p-values indicate that there are differences in the 
covariates of the two groups. The statistical differences may be due to the 
purposive matching procedure used in selecting or constituting the control sample 
which was not stringent: we only required that countries be classified according to 
the two relevant Hostede's cultural dimensions used in the study. The statistical 
differences may not be biased; the non-randomisation procedure may have made 
the matching to be imperfect. Because of non-randomisation direct comparisons of 
covariates from the two samples may be misleading. 
There are indications that the economic differences between the hypothesised 
variables of both the treatment and control samples are relatively small, except for 
SOE. Take each of the two values at the two ends of the continuum, for instance. 
Minimum CPI values for both the control and treatment groups are the same. The 
34 Result of the Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test is included in Appendix 4-1 at the end of thesis. The 
significant test results are consistent with results in Panel C of Table 4.5 
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absolute difference (0.58) between the maximum CPI scores of the two groups is 
economically not significant. 
The absolute difference (1.11) between the minimum scores of press freedom 
between the two groups is also not economically significant; as is the difference 
(0.04, absolute) in the maximum scores of same variable for the two groups. The 
difference of 10.30 I in investor-protection between of the minimum value of the 
two groups is also not large. 
The differences in the standard deviations are not economically large also, except 
in the case of press freedom which is due to the large difference between the 
minimum scores of the two groups. 
4.3.2 Exclusions 
In order to put the entire sample on the same pedestal, and because of the following 
reasons, we exclude banks and other financial institutions from the study. 
a) Because of the very nature of their operations, legally, financial institutions 
sometimes shuffle funds from one account to the other -a practice that the non- 
bank staff or personnel may consider as manipulation. 
b) Nature of assets and liabilities. Because of the fact that most assets (aside from 
properties, plants and equipment), and liabilities of financial institutions are very 
fluid, even in the short term. 
c) Financial institutions are in a world of their own in terms of regulation. Their 
regulatory environment or regime in different countries follows the Basel Accord. 
This is different from Companies Acts which are used to regulate firms in various 
countries around the world. 
d) Finally, there are precedents in the literature to back us in ignoring financial 
firms and banks. Several prior research in accounting such as Jiraporn et al. 
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(2008), Pantzalis et al. (2008), Roychowdhury (2006), and Lins (2003), to name 
but a few; exclude finance firms from their study. 35 
In spite of not including financial institutions, based on the central limit theorem we 
have enough sample size for the forthcoming analysis, and for generalisation. 
To an extent, the recent embarrassing revelation of backdating of stock options in 
the U. S. qualifies to be treated as accounts manipulation (see, for example, Bcrnile 
and Jarrell, 2009 for a research examining stock market reactions to stock options 
backdating scandal in the U. S. ). We have excluded firms exposed in the practice 
because they are peculiar to the U. S. This decision enables us to collect and 
analyse like-for-like data from all the countries involved. 
4.4 Souzmsý da=ip ion of variables andmessiuvments 
This section describes the variables of the two parts of this study. 
4.4.1 Parfl 
4.4.1.1. Legal origin 
Classificatory measure for legal origin is taken from three sources: La Porta et al. 
(1998,2008), Harper and McNulty (2008) and the World Factbook (2009)36. 
La Porta et al. (1998,2008) grouped legal origins into four categories including 
English origin, French origin, German origin, and Scandinavian origin. Harper and 
Mcnulty (2008) borrow and then extend La Porta et al. (1998,2008) into five by 
introducing an additional (Russian) legal origin. The World Factbook is a 
comprehensive source document because it covers all countries around the world; 
35 With the exception of Lins (2003) and Jiraporn et at. (2008), most of these studies do not advance 
reason(s) for their action. 
36 The World Factbook (2009) is available at https: //www. cia. govAibmry /publications/ the-world- 
factbook/countrylisting. html 
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however it does not group countries into their legal origins. It merely describes the 
legal system being operated by each country of the world. 
Countries where accounts manipulations were published come from every legal 
origin such as those contemporaneously described and categorised by La Porta et 
al. (2008) and Harper and Mcnulty (2008). 
4.4. L2 Dependent variable 
All the variables in the logistic regression equation in chapter 5 are measured at the 
country-level. The dependent variable for the logistic regression is likelihood of 
accounts manipulation occurring. Each of the 36 countries where we found cases 
of accounts manipulation reported in newspapers (i. e., the research sample) is 
assigned 1 whereas each of the 36 countries (the control sample) where we did not 
find the act reported is assigned 0, see Table 4.1 which contain the two groups of 
countries. 
4.4.1.3 Independent/con tl variables 
The hypothesised independent variables are: 
4.4.1.3.1. Convpt envimnmen((CORRUFJ'J ,) 
One of the independent, hypothesised, variables of the study is corrupt 
environment. In order to have a measure for this variable we rely on the Corruption 
Perceptions Index (CPI) of Transparency International (TI), which measures the 
level of corruption perceptions across the world. TI ranks more than 150 countries 
by their perceived levels of corruption. 
It is thought that these perceptions can enhance an understanding of real levels of 
corruption around the globe. The index ranges from 1 to 10 on a continuous scale. 
In its original construction or conception, a country that has a low level of 
corruption gets high score whereas a country that has a high level of corruption gets 
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low score. That is: low level of corruption, high score; and high level of corruption, 
low score. 
Mimicking previous studies, this study would like to associate a high score with a 
high level of corruption, hence the need to reverse-score the index. 
Consistent with Lee and Ng (2006) and Pantzalis et al. (2008), we re-define the 
corruption score of country j at year t (Cj, t). This is done by subtracting each 
original CPI score from 11, so that, as indicated, a high (low) score of this measure 
indicates a high (low) level of corruption in countryj. 
The visual mechanic of this reverse-scoring is shown here: 
Original CPI scoring 
High level Low level 
of corruption of corruption 
4 P, 
123456789 10 
As re-calibrated in this study: 
(I 1- CPI) 
High level Low level 
of corruption of corruption 
10 987654321 
Lee and Ng (2006) reverse-score the index to range between 9, for highly corrupt, 
to 0, for highly clean. This is similar to the way the CPI is implemented by prior 
studies (see Pantzalis et al. 2008, p. 391). We maintain the original scale of 0 to 10. 
For any current year's assessment of CPI Transparency International combines 
assessments from the last two years immediately before it. This is to reduce abrupt 
37 variations in scoring of the current year that might arise due to random effects. 
Because countries' corruption perceptions scores change from year to year, in 
"Apart from CPI there are other alternative indices that one can use, one of which is the International 
Countries Risk Guide (ICRG) Index. Lee and Ng (2006) and others use the CPI and they argue that all 
ratings are subjective. However, they observe that while these ratings are by definition 'subjective', there 
are compelling reasons to take the patterns they reveal seriously. 
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obtaining the index used for each country used in the regression, we compute an 
average CPI score covering the year 2000 (when CPI started) up to 2008, inclusive. 
4.4. L3.2 w ft, alom (press 
The measurement instrument for this variable is taken from Reporters Without 
Borders, which compiles the world press freedom index. The index reflects the 
degree of freedom that journalists and news organisations enjoy in each of the 173 
countries of the world that the index covers. It examines the efforts made by the 
authorities to ensure respect for this freedom. It includes every kind of violation 
directly affecting journalists such as murders, imprisonments, physical attacks and 
threats. It also looks into matters affecting news media such as censorship, 
confiscation of newspaper issues already printed, searches and harassment of 
newspapers houses and journalists38. The index also measures the level of self- 
censorship in each country and the ability of the media to investigate and criticise. 
On a continuous scale, the score for press freedom ranges from 0 to 100. In its 
original construction and interpretation, a country is scored low if its level of press 
freedom is high whereas the same country would be scored high if its level of press 
freedom is low. 
This study would like the press freedom index to be scored in such a way that low 
score means low press freedom while high score indicates high press freedom, so 
that high score/high press freedom can be interpreted to mean likelihood of reduced 
accounts manipulation occurring, 113. Hence, in operationalisinb the index, it is re- 
defined by reverse-scoring each countryj at year t (Cj, t). To do this, we subtract 
each original score from 100, an arbitrarily chosen number; the maximum bound of 
the original score is not more than 100 anyway. But before performing this 
operation, we first compute the average of available data from 200239 to 2008 
'$ See "How the Index is compiled" at http: //www. rsf. org/articic. php3? id_article=29013 
39 We started from 2002 because Reporters Without Borders started compiling the press freedom index in 
that year. 
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(inclusive) in order to even-out any imbalances over the years that the index has 
been in existence. It is this computed average that is used in the analysis in chapter 
five. 
4.4.1.3.3 State-owned Enterprises (SOSS) 
State-owned Enterprises (SOEs) stands as a proxy for government enterprises and 
investment in an economy. It indicates the extent of the State's dominance of the 
economic activities of a country. The scores for each country range from 0 to 10. 
The instrument to measure State ownership of enterprise is the index compiled by 
Gwartney (et al. ) of the Economic Freedom Network. 40 We use the government 
enterprises and investment dataset, which is a subset of the government size index 
of Economic Freedom Network. The database hosts cross-national data of 141 
countries of the world on government enterprises and investment. 
Economic Freedom Network uses data on the number, composition, and share of 
output supplied by State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) and government investment as 
a share of total investment. In its original interpretation, a country is said to be 
dominated by the State where government investment exceed 50% of total 
investment. In such a case the country is scored zero. The same country would be 
scored higher if its economy were less dominated by government investment. 
This study would like to associate a high score with a high level of government 
investment, so that high State dominance of the economy would imply likelihood 
of accounts manipulation occurring more in those economies. For this reason there 
is a need to reverse-score the original index. Thus, in operationalising the index, 
this study re-defines it by re-calculating the respective scores for each countryj at 
year t (Cj, t). We mimic the computational mechanics of corrupt environment and 
press freedom described above. To do this requires subtracting the original scores 
from 11, an arbitrarily chosen number. Before this exercise, we first compute the 
average of available data from 2000 to 2006 (inclusive). It is this computed average 
40 www. freetheworld. com 
ar 
Methodology and Research designs 
Chapter 4 
that we use in the analysis in chapter S. In 2008 when our data collection for this 
study was carried out, 2006 data are the latest available from Economic Freedom 
Network, reported in its 2008 annual report. 
4.4.1.3.4 Investor- pmt, ec h' on 
Investor-protection measures the extent of the State's involvement or interest in the 
capital market in whatever form or shape: legal, regulatory or otherwise; for a 
number of reasons. The State may be interested in the capital market to protect 
shareholders, to ensure the integrity and sound development of the capital market. 
The measure for investor-protection is taken from Doing Business, which is an arm 
of the World Bank . 
41 The database contains the strength of investor-protection 
index. Doing business measures the strength of minority shareholder protections 
against directors' misuse of corporate assets for personal gain. Out of the ten 
datasets provided by Doing Business, we find the "Protecting Investors" datasct to 
be most relevant to this study; hence we chose to use it. 42 
The index is compiled by taking the average of three indicators of investor- 
protection. The indicators are transparency of related-party transactions (extent of 
disclosure index), liability for self-dealing (extent of director liability index) and 
shareholders' ability to sue officers and directors for misconduct (case of 
shareholder suits index). Each dimension has its own scores, which Doing 
Business averages to get what it calls Strength of Protecting Investors Index. The 
index ranges from 0 to 10, with higher values indicating more investor-protection. 
Because of this the index is used as it is without re-calibrating or re-defining it. 
41 Www. doingbusiness. org provides a database of investor-protection across the world. 
42 There exist other alternative (but closely related) measures of investor-protection, which are constructed 
with different methodologies that address different situations, see Djankov et al. (2008). Djankov el al. 
(2008, p. 461) say that "this raises an obvious question of what is the "best" measure for researchers to 
use? ". This is why Doing business uses the average of related-party transactions, liability for self-dealing, 
and shareholders' ability to sue officers and directors for misconduct to arrive at strength of investor- 
protection index. 
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Doing business started compiling the investor-protection index in 2004, so we 
computed the average score from 2004-2009 which is used in the regressions in 
chapter 5. 
4.4.1.3.5 Conbvl variables 
Ruland et al. (2007) harp on the need to control for country-specific factors in an 
international study. They reason that "perhaps the most distinctive clement of 
effective design in these studies is the control for institutional, cultural, and 
structural differences between countries. " Ruland et al. (2007, pp. 101-102) 
proffers an indicative list of factors that an international study can control for. We 
note however, that there is a limit to the number of control variables that can be 
included in a model, one possible limitation being the number of independent 
variables in the model. In this study we are able to control for national cultural 
values (via the instrumentality of Hofstede, 2001) and the level of wealth or 
economic circumstances facing each country involved in the study. 
It would have worth the effort if it were possible to control for what the press in 
various countries consider as accounts manipulation that is qualified for 
publication. To the best of our knowledge, there is no measure as yet that captures 
possible country differences in what the press perceives as accounts manipulation, 
bearing in mind the various aspects of our all-encompassing definition of accounts 
manipulation. Therefore, the absence of this measure has made it impossible to 
control for it. 
4.4.1.3.51 Hofstede's cultural values 
Hofstede (2001, p. 1) defines culture "as a collective programming of the mind; it 
manifests itself not only in values, but in more superficial ways: in symbols, heroes, 
and rituals". Hofstede (2001) uses five constructs to describe the national cultural 
dimensions of a country. A number of extant studies in accounting (e. g., Doupnik 
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(2008), Braun and Rodriquez (2008), Ding (2005), Hope (2003), and Gray (1988), 
among others) have examined the role of culture43, and most of these studies rely 
on the work of Hofstede (1980,2001) or other works using the foundation laid by 
Hofstede. 
Ding et al. (2005) examine the role of culture in explaining why generally accepted 
accounting practices (GAAP) in countries differ from international accounting 
standards (IAS). They argue that opposition to IAS is not driven exclusively by 
contractual motives or claimed technical superiority but also by diversity in cultural 
factors in a country. 
Doupnik (2008) examines the influence of national culture on earnings 
management across a broad section of countries. His findings suggest that there is 
a significant link between culture and national differences in earnings management. 
Braun and Rodriguez (2008) use Gray's accounting values to explain earnings 
management in a sample of 31 countries. Their findings provide some support that 
earnings management is positively associated with Gray's accounting values. 
Hofstede (1980,2001) describes national cultures in different countries of the 
world. As a result of this he came up with five categories of national culture. 
These are power distance (PD), uncertainty avoidance (UA), individualism and 
collectivism (I/C), masculinity and femininity (MAS), and long- versus short-term 
orientation (LTO). 
Here, we briefly describe power distance and uncertainty avoidance because of 
their relevance in explaining why managers may or may not engage in accounts 
manipulation. 
Power Distance (PD) measures the level of inequality in a given country or 
society. Inequality is the extent to which society or organisational members put 
different weights on status consistency in the areas of prestige, wealth, and power. 
41 A comprehensive review of this work can be found in Finch (2009) 
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Also, power distance describes the extent to which the less powerful members of 
society accept or expect injustice or inequality in relationships. Unequal 
relationship plays out well in organisational and other settings: For example, the 
superior-subordinate dyadic relationships in organisations, or father-son, mother- 
daughter relationship in the family. Hofstede [2001, pp. 500-502]) power distance 
(PD) Index has a score for each country and the score ranges from 1-100; the 
higher the score the higher people accept or expect inequality in the country. 
Uncertainty Avoidance (UA) captures concerns for time, the future, uncertainty, 
and anxiety, etc. It also defines how people deal with rule orientation, employment 
stability and stress. Hofstede (2001, p. 145) posits that uncertainty about the future 
is a basic fact of human life. Countries are rated on a UA scale of 1-100. For 
example, a country whose citizens are worried about the future, are stressful, faces 
unstable situations that cause anxiety will be scored high whereas countries whose 
citizens exhibit the opposite tendencies will be scored low. 
Another of Hofstede's (2001) important dimension that is relevant to this study is 
Long-Term Orientation (LTO). It describes the extent to which human beings 
favour future-oriented virtues such as endurance or perseverance instead of short- 
termism. LTO is likely to explain the incidence of accounts manipulation by 
managers. This dimension could have been used in this study, but the available 
data do not cover all the countries involved in the study. 
Based on their relevance to our study, we use two of the dimensions as surrogates 
for national cultural values to control for the influence of culture in managerial 
propensity to manipulate accounts. 
Another alternative index that we could have used to measure culture is Gray's 
accounting value (see Gray 1988); however it is built upon Ilofstede (1980) and it 
does not cover all the countries used in this study. Gray (1988,8) categorise 
accounting values as professionalism versus statutory control, uniformity versus 
flexibility, conservatism versus optimism, and secrecy versus transparency. 
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Although Gray's classifications may be relevant in explaining the occurrence of 
accounts manipulation, Gray (1988) covers fewer countries than llofstede (1980 
and now 2001), that is one. Secondly, Gray (1988) accounting values scores arc 
derived by averaging Hofstede's culture measures. 
For these reasons, we are persuaded to stick to using Hofstede's (1980,2001) 
power distance and uncertainty avoidance measures of cultural values in this study. 
And although Hofstede faces a lot of criticisms (one of the most well-known being 
Baskerville, 2003), it appears that no other measures of culture have been as 
popular as Hofstede, and "none to date has been accepted by the cross-cultural 
research community as a clear successor to Hofstede" (Doupnik, 2008, fiz 2, p. 
322). 
From anthropological and sociological point of argument, Baskerville (2003) has 
criticised the use of Hofstede on the basis that culture is unstable and that assigning 
numerical values to national cultures may be problematic. He points out that there 
is a low usage of Hofstede in anthropology and sociology whereas business-related 
research has made an extensive and increasing use of Hofstede, see Table 1 of 
Baskerville (2003, p. 4). According to Baskerville (2003, p. 5) "critiques of 
Hofstede have periodically appeared in accounting, but these have not diminished 
the attractiveness of his indices. " The critiques "alerts the researcher to be wary of 
indices in cross national studies" (Baskerville, 2003, p. 9). 
4.4.1.3.52 Level of wealth in a country 
Managers' share of the level of wealth of the country in which they operate can be a 
factor that influences their behaviour. A country's level of wealth is proxied by the 
Gross National Income of the country. Gross National Income (GNI) is made up of 
personal consumption expenditures, gross private investment, government 
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consumption expenditures, net income from assets abroad (net income receipts), and 
gross exports of goods and services, after deducting gross imports of goods and 
services, and indirect business taxes. GNI is the same as gross national product 
(GNP), except that in calculating the latter one does not deduct indirect business 
taxes. 
GNI per capita can be associated with better education, health, infrastructure, 
communications, and in general, better provision of public goods. It can reasonably 
be assumed that citizens of rich and poor countries may have different disposition to 
issues, e. g., tendencies toward accounts manipulation. There is reason to also believe 
that income level in a country can potentially affect managers' financial behaviour, 
hence we equate individual's economic status in a country with the gross national 
income per capita of that country. 
We control for this in the occurrence of accounts manipulation. Using data query 
function, we obtain information about countries' gross national income per capita for 
years 2000-2008 from the World Development Indicators database of the World Bank 
(see http: //data. worldbank. org/indicator). For this study, we compute an average GNI 
covering years 2000-2008, inclusive. We could not use the score of one particular 
year because the rating of a country's level of wealth changes from year to year, 
which is why we calculate the average from 2000 to 2008. 
According to the World Bank GNI per capita (formerly GNP per capita) is converted 
to U. S. dollars using the purchasing power parity method, 44 divided by the midyear 
population. GNI represents the sum of value added by all resident producers plus any 
product taxes (less subsidies) not included in the valuation of output plus net receipts 
of primary income (compensation of employees and property income) from abroad. In 
comparison with salary per capita which can also be used to measure economic status 
of individuals, GNI per capita seems to be a more robust indicator than salary per 
employee, which is restricted to employees' salary alone. 
44 This is based on the law of one price all over the world, implying that in the absence of transaction costs, 
identical goods will have the same price in different markets of the world. 
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Cross-national studies have used either GDP or GNI as a control variable. For 
example, Djankov et al. (2008) use GDP as a control variable while La Porta el al. 
(1998) and Kimbro, among others, use GNP (now GNI) as a control variable. We 
elect to use GNI because it relates to individual's level of poverty or wealth in a 
country. Since people's level of wealth as measured by economic and financial, 
education, health, and other circumstances matter in the choices they make, it is 
persuasive to use gross national income per capita, which is an objective measure, as 
opposed to, say, GDP or quality of life generally which seems enticing to use but 
lacking in certain respects. The quality of life index constructed by Economic 
Intelligence Unit incorporates nine items. 45 Some of the items (e. g. community life, 
divorce rate, life expectancy, and others) are noisy and irrelevant and inappropriate in 
measuring accounts manipulation tendencies of an individual. 
4.4.2 lard II (consequcncri) 
4.4.21.1 Dependent variable in linear m iwsian analysis 
In the linear regression analysis in chapter 6, abnormal returns of day zero is the 
dependent variable. 
4.4.21.2 Independent/aantrvl vsri$bles in rvgzwsian an4 is 
The independent variable is the amount mentioned in the news of accounts 
manipulation. We control for size using total assets of a firm and value of a firm's 
shareholders' equity, alternately. 
4.4.22 Placement el ct 
This is a dummy variable that is used to capture the effect on stock prices of the 
section where the news of accounts manipulation is featured in a newspaper 
45 See http: //www. economist. com/media/pdf/QUALITY_OF_LIFE. pdf for the nine items 
gr 
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publication. Together with amount mentioned in the news, this is another sccond- 
order effect measure on market reactions to news of accounts manipulation. 
We categorise sections of a newspaper into three: "business, finance, and 
companies section", for articles appearing in these sections of a newspaper, "news 
section", for articles appearing in opinion, editorial, special reports, comments and 
news analysis section, and "others", where the news is not in any of the two 
sections, or it is unclear which section the news is inserted. 46 We code the first, 
second, and third category as 3,2, and 1, respectively. 
4.5 An overview of the zr esroh method employed by the study 
This section discusses the research method employed by this study. In the process, 
the section also provides an overview of the other two available methods that any 
researcher in the social sciences can elect to use. 
The discussion of this topic is short as the study is not about research methods. The 
reason why research method is discussed here is because it will help to illuminate 
why this study has taken the route that it did. However, it is expected that at the 
end of the discussion the reader will appreciate the other types of research methods 
available, and the relative advantages and disadvantages of each. Research 
methods can take three basic modes: quantitative, qualitative and mixed methods. 
4.51 Quantitative method 
The present study employs the quantitative method. This method falls into what is 
known as the positivist tradition, which is economics-based. The positivist aspect 
of the quantitative research method makes predictions, states formal hypotheses 
and structures problems with mathematical equations such as multivariate 
46 The sections of online edition of a newspaper are not likely to differ from sections of hard or paper copy. 
The two versions may differ in how the pages are numbered. 
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regression equations, paired samples t-test, etc. Finally, the quantitative method 
tests hypotheses to conclude whether predictions are supported. 
The quantitative method uses figures and counts and measurements obtained from 
present or past records of events to achieve its aim. That means that the method is 
number-crunching in orientation because it is statistics or mathematics oriented. 
In terms of the sources it uses to collect data, it uses a variety of methods, including 
both primary and secondary or archival sources, involving both personal and 
impersonal contacts. For example, either by post or in person, or both, it can use a 
questionnaire as a primary source. The responses from questionnaires are 
converted into numbers and calibrated accordingly. Secondary or impersonal 
source involves the researcher sitting by their computer and collecting third party 
data from the internet, or the researcher using some public or a third party "brick 
and mortal" library to collect data. The quantitative method can also use surveys as 
a source of data collection. 
Most empirical studies based on the quantitative method, for example, the present 
one, rely on archival or secondary sources for their data. The data that quantitative 
researchers use to build econometric models are prepared by a third party or body 
which may be known (or unknown) to the researcher. And the researcher may or 
may not be affiliated to that third party. 
One advantage of archival data as used by the quantitative researcher is that the 
researcher has no personal input into it. This ensures that the research(er) is 
unbiased. However, this is a disadvantage at the same time because the data 
collected may have been meant for a different purpose. It is most likely that there 
may have been assumptions or nuances which the original owners of the data may 
have made that are unknown to the person using it on another or different occasion. 
Primary data collection methods, such as the personal administration of 
questionnaires, are prone to some sort of bias. However, this has an upside because 
in the process of personal interactions unclear issues are clarified by both the 
researcher and her respondents. 
I 
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Moreover, empirical archival method of data collection of this method has the 
advantage of being less expensive, less time consuming, and involves less physical 
risk on the part of a researcher. 
4.52 Quelitafivemethod 
The qualitative research method is another method of doing research. This method 
eschews mathematical or statistical relations in the way it goes about its research, 
hence the method is usually mostly descriptive, narrative, exploratory, text-based or 
discursive. 
The qualitative method uses a variety of approaches to collect data. Examples of 
data collection methods used by this research method include focus groups; 
observations (direct participant or non-participant observations); questionnaires 
(structured and unstructured, mailed or administered in person); in-depth interviews 
either by phone or in person; role-plays and simulations. In the case of mailed 
questionnaires the response rate can be disappointingly low. 
Compared to the quantitative method, by nature the qualitative researcher is in a 
better position to meet face-to-face with respondents because of the methods of 
data collection, which are likely to involve human interactions. Human interactions 
and personal contacts has other downsides, for example, they are risky, time 
consuming and expensive, especially when it involves a very large population. 
Another advantage of the qualitative method is that it essentially uses first-hand or 
primary method of data collection that is tailored to the needs of a research. 
Having said so, a researcher's nuances and idiosyncrasies can be built into it, which 
is a disadvantage at the same time. On the plus side, first-hand data are collected 
with all freshness and precisely for the purpose of the research. 
Methodology and Research Designs 
ch pfr4 
4.53 Mixed method 
Rather than being regarded as competing methods, both the qualitative and 
quantitative research methods can serve as complementing each other, depending 
on the context. Hence, the third method of research is a hybrid of both the 
qualitative and quantitative research methods. It combines, and harnesses, the good 
properties of both. This is why it is called mixed method of research, and some 
researchers use both methods in one research. 
4.6 Methods ofanaom data 
4.6.1 Chi-square test ofassodation and logistic tvvgrr ion 
In chapter 5, legal origin (111) is tested using chi-square tests. In one of the two chi- 
square tests employed for legal origin, we relate the number of accounts 
manipulation exposed in each legal origin to the number of companies listed in the 
same legal origin. Data on the number of listed companies in each country of the 
world are available from World Bank's World Development Indicators47. 
According to the World Bank, listed domestic companies are the domestically 
incorporated companies listed on a country's stock exchange at the end of the year. 
We extract the number of listed companies in each country for the years 2000- 
2008. The number of listed companies does not include investment companies, 
mutual funds, or other collective investment vehicles. For each country, we 
calculate the average of these years. It is this average that we use in the study (see 
Table 4.6 next page). 
The reason for using the average figure is to even-out the data in case there are any 
problems affecting any particular year's figure. Where a country does not have 
data for all the nine years, we take the average of the available years. 
For the data, see http: //data. worldbank. org/indicator/cn. mkt. idom. no 
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Table 4.6 Average Number of Listed Companies by Legal Origin (2000-2008) 
Country English French German Russian Scandinavia 
1. Australia 1430 
2. Bahrain 43 
3. Brazil 398 
4. Belgium 157 
5. Canada 2894 
6. China 1258 
7. Czech Republic 76 
8. France 743 
9. Germany 747 
10. Hong Kong 974 
11. India 5420 
12. Indonesia 324 
13. Ireland 62 
14. Israel 604 
15. Italy 282 
16. Ja an 2951 
17. Luxembourg 45 
18. Malaysia 892 
19. Netherlands 188 
20. New Zealand 144 
21. Nigeria 201 
22. Norway 180 
23. Philippines 234 
24. Poland 225 
25. Portugal 73 
26 ROC (Taiwan) 1509 
27. Russia 235 
28. Singapore 457 
29. South Africa 471 
30. South Korea 1499 
31. Sweden 271 
32. Switzerland 268 
33. Ukraine 164 
34. United Kingdom 2298 
35. United Arab Emirates 42 
36. United States of America 5873 
Total = 33,632 20877 3448 7964 892 451 
Proportion 0.621 0.1025 0.237 0.027 0.0134 
The remaining seven explanatory variables in chapter 5 are analysed using logistic 
regression. The hypothesised variables in the logistic regression are corruption 
perceptions, press freedom, State-owned enterprises, and State's interest in the 
capital market in order to protect investors; relating to III, HI, 114, Ils, respectively. 
There are no hypotheses regarding the remaining three independent variables (two 
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of Hofstede's (2001) cultural dimensions: power distance and uncertainty 
avoidance; and log GNI) because they are control variables. 
In its generalised formulation the multivariate logistic function can be expressed in 
the two equivalent forms below. 
The logistic curve relates the independent variable, X, to the rolling mean of the 
dependent variable, p(y). Tabachnick and Fidell (2007, p. 493) show that the 
formula for logistic regression is: 
P(V) = 
e (b X+ b2X2 + *- + bnXn+ bo) 
I+e 'lb, Xi+ b2X2 + ... + b,, X,, + bo) I+E, (biXi + b2X2 +' "+ bnXn + bp) 
....... { 
4.1 } 
Stated equivalently, 
Logit(p) = (b1Xl + b2X2 + ... + bX+ bo) {4.2} 
Where p(y) or logit(p) denotes logistic function, p=1 if accounts manipulation 
takes place and/or reported in country i (i. e., countries where accounts manipulation 
were published in newspapers, the research/treatment sample), and 0 otherwise (in 
country j, j being countries where accounts manipulation were not reported in 
newspapers, control sample). XI, X2,..., X7 are the seven explanatory variables 
keyed into equation {4.3) below. 
Plugging in the institutional structure variables in the model, the logistic equation 
regressing probability of occurrence of accounts manipulation on the explanatory 
variables is expressed as: 
Prob(ACCMan) = F(a + ACORR UPTEm7 +92 PRESSFREE + A3j SOEs + f14INVSTI'ro 
+ß5 log GNI + P611ofstede PD + ßß 11ofstede UA + c1 ... {4.3) 
Where: 
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Prob(ACCMan) = 1, probability that accounts manipulation was found to have been 
reported in newspapers in country i, and 0, probability that accounts manipulation 
was not found or reported to have occurred in countryj. 
CORRUPTENr., country's level of corruption perceptions 
PRESSFREE =A country's extent of press freedom 
SOEs = extent of the State's dominance of the economic activities of a country 
INVSTPro = extent of State's interest in the capital market in order to protect 
investors 
Log GNI is logarithm of gross national income, measured at purchasing power 
parity 
Hofstede's PD measures inequality in societies. 
Hofstede's UA measures the extent to which societies try to avoid uncertainties 
related to the future, job insecurity, etc. 
a= constant or intercept 
/31, ß1,..., ß7, are the coefficients of each predictor variable 
Et is the models unexplained residual 
Consistent with the custom in prior studies that examined legal origin (e. g. La Porta 
et al. 1997,1998,2008; Harper and Mcnulty, 2008; and others) we capture it in this 
study by using five unrelated categories. 
The sources and how the variables are measured arc fully explained in section 4.4. 
4.62 Paired samples fist Wllcoxon S&cd Ranks Tests Sign Test, 
line ariv it sfon and chi-square test ofassoclation 
The second set of hypotheses in chapter 6 is related to II6,11,, and u s. Following 
event study methodology 116 is analysed using paired samples t-test, Wilcoxon 
0r 
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Signed Ranks Test, and Sign Test. 117 is analysed using linear regression analysis 
while II8 is analysed using chi-square test of association. 
We gauge stock market reactions by using abnormal returns of share prices before 
and after the event. Both will be tested in the paired samples t"test analysis. The 
test uses the widely-accepted event study methodology (see Brown and Warner, 
1980; and DeFond and Jiambalvo, 1994) to capture information content of exposed 
accounts manipulation through share prices reaction. Event studies arc ways to 
directly test for market efficiency (e. g., Fama 1970) or information content of news 
event as a reduction in ex post abnormal stock returns is consistent with send- 
strong-form market efficiency. We also follow Faccio et al. (2006), Bartov (1992), 
and Oppong's (1980) approaches to calculate a thirteen-day (-6,6) announcement 
period abnormal returns. 
In applying events study methodology for H6, the study examines changes in share 
prices and stock returns. Event studies are ways to directly test for market 
efficiency as abnormal stock returns ex post event will be consistent with market 
efficiency. The event "window" examined by the study ranges from day -6 to day 
+6 (-6,6), setting day of event to zero. The choice of this event window is 
arbitrary. While some researchers elect to use monthly event windows (e. g., Brown 
and Warner (1980)), others elect to use daily (e. g., Brown and Warner, 1985; and 
Files et at. 2009), weekly (e. g., Oppong 1980)) or yearly (e. g., DeFond and 
Jiambalvo (1994)) event windows. 
There are upsides (downsides) to the choice of short or long event windows. So far, 
there is no theory in events studies research that specifics or prescribes the choice 
of event windows. This is why, following prior research (e. g., Balsam Cl al. 
[2002]), we arbitrarily or conveniently chose these thirteen-day short windows 
around the publication day rather than a wider window. A short window will 
eliminate the problem of clustering and reduce the effect of other extraneous 
variables that have no relation with accounts manipulation but which may impact 
on data of a wider window. 
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Balsam et al. (2002, p. 1001, fit 13) agree that the choice of a very wide window 
will reduce the statistical power of a test whereas a very short window will fail to 
capture the stock prices reaction sufficiently, which can lead to insignificant results. 
It is expected that reasonable and short windows will allow the news of accounts 
manipulation to be impounded throughout the market, and for the market to quickly 
assimilate and price the news. It is equally probable that the choice of a very short 
window may or may not accomplish this objective. 
Definitions 
The following key words would be used in the second part of the study, formulae 
for the actual calculations are provided later on in the chapter and in chapter 6. 
1) Abnormal return, AR. Calculated for one single firm, this refers to abnormal 
returns of any day in the event window, see equation {4.7}. 
2) Cumulated abnormal returns, CAR. This is the summation of the abnormal 
returns from day ±1 to day ±6 for one single firm, see equation (4.8). 
The following matrix may help to explain this better: 
C1 
0 
1,2 1,3 1,4 1,5 1,6 Firm 1 CAR 
02 2,1 2,2 2,3 2,4 2,5 2,6 Firm 2 CAR 
m3 3,1 3,2 3,3 3,4 35 3,6 Firm 3 CAR 
p4 4,1 4,2 4,3 4,4 4D 4,6 Firm 4 CAR 
a ... ...... ...,... ...,... ...,... ...,... ...,... ... 
98 98,1 98,2 98,3 98,4 
Total Day 1+ DaY 2+,,, + Day 4 
98R AAR AAR 
...,... ...,... ... 
98,5 98,6 Firm 98 CAR 
. }. Day 6= Six 6 AAR CAAR 
The entries in the cells represent the abnormal returns of a given company for a 
particular event day. For example, the abnormal return for company I on day I is 
located in cell 1,1. The abnormal returns for company 4 on day five is located in 
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cell 4,5. Through this we calculate 588 abnormal returns and 98 cumulative 
abnormal returns, CAR 
3) Average abnormal returns, AAR. This is one day abnormal returns of all firms 
divided by the sample size n; where n are the 98 firms, see equations {4.9} and 
(4.13). 
4) Cumulative average abnormal returns, CAAR. This is the summation of the 
average abnormal returns of all 98 firms from day tl to day ±6, see equations 
{4.10} and (4.15). 
We shall associate the terms pre (ex ante) and post (ex post) to describe whether 
the definitions above are before or after the event day. 
Analysis by the use ofdif ervnce. sin meazg t- less 
It is pertinent to explain in detail how the paired samples t-test is implemented for 
H6. The exercise involves computing, analysing and comparing the differences 
between the means of pre- and post-event window data. This is done in order to 
determine whether there is a statistically significant difference between the means 
of pre/post event abnormal returns data. 
For H6, we test the null statement that the mean of post-event abnormal stock 
returns are not equal to those of pre-event abnormal stock returns. 
As a parametric test, for the paired samples t-test to be valid some conditions or 
assumptions must be met. We shall examine the assumptions later in this chapter. 
Suffice it to say that the conditions of paired sample tests are met by the data for 
this study. Generally, except for the sets of data relating to hypotheses III (on legal 
origin) and H8 (on placement effect), it is expected that data distribution for the rest 
hypotheses is continuous. 
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Marketmodel 
The market model is the stochastic version of the capital asset pricing model of Sharp 
(1963) and Lintner (1965). It can be used to isolate abnormal returns. The market 
model is expressed as: 
Rr, e =a ii + %, 1i,, + .... {4.4a} 
By a rearrangement of terms, this is equivalent to 
Ear =Rar - aij - ltý, lýrvr ..... {4.4b} 
Where 
the abnormal return for firm ion day t. t=-6, -5, -4,..., +6 
Rar = the realised return for firm i on day t. t=-6, -5, -4,..., +6 
Mi, t = the realised market index return of country i where firm i is listed on day t. 
t=-6, -5, -4,..., +6 
There have been variants of the market model, which have been used by prior 
research. Two such variants are the Fuller, Netter and Stegemoller (2002) modified 
market model and the Brown and Warner's (1980) market adjusted returns method. 48 
Both of these variants are essentially the same and they are used to calculate daily 
abnormal stock returns. The only difference between these two variants is the symbol 
used in representing daily abnormal returns. 
These two variants of the market model calculate daily abnormal stock returns as 
follows: 
ARbt = Rf, - Mb: ... {4.5a} Fullcr, Ncttcr and Stcgcmollcr (2002) 
E;, t = 
Rl, 
t - Alb, ... {4.5b} Brown and Warner (1980) 
This study mimics Fuller, Netter and Stegemoller (2002) and Brown and Warner 
(1980) by using the modified market model. 
From {4.5a} and {4.5b}, AR,, = e1,1. 
48 The same variants of the market model can also be found in Vernimmen et al. (2009, p. 277) and Ross et 
al. (2002, p. 351) 
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Typically, abnormal returns, AR,,, are assumed normal independent and identically 
distributed. Expected mean of the event day abnormal returns, E(AK,, 0) - 0. 
The modified market or adjusted market model appears to be a simple model to 
implement because it does not use Ordinary Least Square, OLS, to estimate a and 0; 
in fact, it does not estimate a and ß at all. It can be seen from equations {4.4a, b} and 
{4.5a, b} that parameters a and ß are the differences between the market model and 
its modified variants. 
In using either {4.5a} or {4.5b}, we use a true return generating process to calculate 
firms' abnormal returns by subtracting the realised daily return of stock market index 
of the country where a firm is listed from the firm's daily stock return each day 
around the event period. 
Brown and Warner (1980) show that for short window event studies weighting the 
market return by a firm's systematic risk does not significantly improve estimation. 
Because of this they assume beta = 1. According to Brown and Warner (1980, p. 
252) "an assumption sufficient for using such a performance measure is that the 
systematic risk for each sample security is equal to I". 
Because ß measures the systematic risk of a firm, which we assume in this study is 
likely to be stable within the short event window of day -6 to day +6, we assume beta 
to be unity and constant for all firms. 49 It is taken by the capital asset pricing model 
that a+ß=1, or that a= 1- P. Because ß is equal to 1 or unity, it therefore means 
that a=0, hence as used in this study the modified market model or the market 
adjusted model is well-specified. 
Brown and Warner (1980) come to the conclusion that simple methodologies based 
on the market model are both well-specified and relatively powerful under a wide 
a' Note that the market model or adjusted market model sets beta to unity for all firms irrespective of size. 
We note that our sample is likely to consist of firms with higher (or lower) than average systematic risk, 
beta. Beta can proxy firm size as "empirically there is a negative relationship between beta and firm size" 
(Brown and Warner, 1980) such that large firms are expected to have lower beta while small firms arc 
expected to have higher beta. This study does not address the size effect of beta. 
ar 
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variety of conditions, and in special cases even simpler methods also perform well. 
So, even though the modified model we use in this study appears to be simple, for our 
purposes, it is well-specified, powerful and can perform well. Finally, other extant 
studies that we referred to above have used the same modified model to good effect. 
According to the CRSP, the "return most days is simply the relative or percentage 
change in price from the end of one day to the end of the next" 50. That is, 
Firm's daily returns, 1 ,, = 
Pt - Pt-n Pt = 1__ - .... {4.6a} Pt-n Pt-n 
r Mr, r - Mr, r-n Mr, r Market daily index returns, Al,,,, =_ -- 1 .... {4.6b} Mi, an Mr,, -n 
Subtracting the last term in {4.6b} from the last term in {4.6a} gives daily abnormal 
returns of firm ion day t, (hilt - Ali,, ), or ARb,, as 
Pt r 1,1 
4.7 } (E1, - M1, e) = AR,, r =--1- Li: 
1 
.... { 
Please note that abnormal returns are calculated in this chapter as price relative. 
These will be expressed in percentages in the analysis in chapter 6. 
Six-day cumulated abnormal returns (CAR) for each firm is the average of the 
summed {4.7} over six days and then dividing by 6 thus: 
CAR =E 
(R,, 1- MI,, ) = ZAR,,: _ 
Pt 
_ 
MI't 
... 4.8 
66L Pt-n 
6 
To get average abnormal returns (AAR) for all firms on an event day, t, we divide 
AR, j by the number of firms (ninety-eight) thus: 
50 See http: //www. library. hbs. edu/helpshects/wrdscrspstock. html for formulas to calculate stock returns. 
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I 
ý(Rt, t - Mbt) ARtj 1, t -1'r't-t Mi9t - MA,,. 
AARt = 98 ... {4.9} 
98 98 Pt, 1.1 M1, t-I 
The daily AARs are cumulated over the window period for computing the 
cumulative average abnormal returns, CAAR, of all 98 firms. This is shown below: 
(-5, +6) 
, 
(-5. +6) 
CAAR -All,, ) _ ZAARi,, ... {4.10} r=! t=1 
Equation {4.10} calculates the cumulative average abnormal returns on both sides of 
the event day; ex post and ex ante cumulative abnormal returns are denoted by t +6 
and t -6, respectively. The average abnormal return calculated through {4.9} is 
shown in Graph 6.1 in chapter 6, page 161, and is referred to as "day-on-day or 
"rolling" average abnormal returns in the graph. 
A second type of price relative is calculated in this thesis and is explained as follows: 
Firm i's day zero stock price, P,,, 0, and day zero market index, 
M1,, 
-o, are used as 
benchmarks or denominators in calculating realised stock returns while firm i's stock 
price of any day within the -6 to +6 days of the window, P,, 1, and the market 
index, 
Mi,,, within the same period are used as numerators in calculating realised stock 
returns. That is, 
P, q1- Pr, t-o Pb, 
hilt ==- ... (4.11a) 
Mi't 
_ -1 
(4.11 b) 
M,,,. 
n N1,, ß 
Using the last terms {4.11a} and {4.11b}, abnormal returns (all based) on day zero is, 
I'r'r kt 
{Rvr -Mb, r) =ARb, r =--i---i... {4.12} 
Pr, r-o M1, t. o 
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Take note that {4.11 } and {4.12} will neutralise abnormal returns of day zero to a 
zero value, as we shall see in Graph 6.2, chapter 6, page 162 and Graph 7.1.2 in 
chapter seven and/or in the annexed tables to the left of the graphs. 
To get average abnormal returns (AAR) for all firms on an event day, t, we divide 
AR, j by the number of firms (ninety-eight) thus: 
Al,,, ) AR, 1 P191- P191-o Mr, r - Mrgr-o 
AAR, 98 ... (4.13) 
98 98 Plat-o M, ýý. o 
Using share prices and market index returns of day zero as the denominator 
through-out, the daily AARS are cumulated over the window period for computing 
the CAR as shown below: 
(-6. +6) (-6, +6) 
CAR = ý('L -l ib, ) 
ý__ 
2: AAR1,, ... {4.14} 
Equation {4.14} is the mean of five- /six-day cumulative average abnormal returns of 
all 98 firms. 
The average abnormal return of each event day that is calculated by {4.13} is shown 
in Graph 6.2 on page 162 in chapter six. The reader may wish to look at Graph 6.2 
in chapter six for the effect of this. The reader may also wish to compare equation 
{4.10} with equation {4.14}, or compare Graph 6.1 and Graph 6.2, both in the same 
chapter, chapter six. 
We are interested in daily event window following news of accounts manipulation 
published in newspapers because daily stock returns are capable of ameliorating 
possible clustering effects associated with monthly or quarterly or weekly or yearly 
stock returns. Daily stock returns following publication of news of accounts 
manipulation allow us to make inferences about the information content of the news 
as newspapers are a medium of publicly available information. 
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We compute overall mean cumulative abnormal returns of all 98 firms put together 
as: 
(-6. +6) (-6. +6) 
.. 4.15 CAAR = E(Ri, I -- Mbg) = AAR,,, " .. {} 
NN 
Brown and Warner (1980, fn 5, p. 211) opine that in the absence of problems such as 
non-normality and non-synchronous trading, all of the methods for measuring 
abnormal performance are potentially more powerful with daily data. They also point 
to the fact that daily returns have smaller standard deviations than do monthly (or 
yearly, or weekly) returns and argue that the power of all the methodologies increases 
with knowledge about precisely when an event occurs. Hence, the "use of daily data 
is potentially useful in that it permits the researcher to take advantage of prior 
information about the specific day of the month on which an event took place. " 
Relationship between ex post abnormal returns and amount 
We try to determine whether the materiality of the amount mentioned in the news 
can correlate with ex post abnormal returns of each firm. In this regard, we will be 
regressing ex post abnormal returns on the log of amount mentioned in newspapers 
and log of total assets, thus: 
ARS t+ =a+ QILog Amount + ß2Log_TA + Ei,, ... {4.16} 
Where 
Ex post daily abnormal returns of the i`" firm, beginning from day zero 
Log Amount = log of the sum of the amount mentioned in the news publications 
Log_TA = log of total assets of each firmst. 
51 Miller (2006,1032) did not deflate sum of the amount involved but takes the log of it. We mimic him in 
this study. 
52 There is no theory that prescribes what proxy to use for firm size. Some studies are found to use total 
assets while others use some other measures, such as value of shareholders' equity or sales. What is 
important is that somehow one controls for size in one's study, using some logic and relevance. We could 
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This explicitly controls for firm size. Total assets data for each firm are taken as at 
the end of the year in which each firm's accounts manipulation is alleged to have 
occurred. As a control variable, total asset is to examine whether the consequences 
of exposed accounts manipulation echoes more according to the size of the firm 
caught in manipulation. 
In the model specifications in chapter 6, we investigate the extent to which these 
predictors can explain the variation in abnormal returns (especially that of day zero, 
being the day of news release). 
Chi-square test forplacementeffect 
The chi-square test of independence is a non-parametric statistical technique for 
testing the association between observed frequencies of two discrete variables. 
This study uses the cross-tabulation chi-square test to examine the association 
between the section where news is inserted in newspapers and ex post abnormal 
stock returns. 
The chi-square equation is of the type: 
X2 = J(fö-Fe)2 /Fe ..... {4.13} 
Where 
fo represents observed frequencies of changes in share prices and type of section 
Fe represents expected frequencies of changes in share prices and type of section. 
Tabachnick and Fidell (2007) shows that for a contingency table expected 
frequency, Fe, "for a given cell is obtained by multiplying together the totals for the 
row (R; ) and column (C) in which the cell is located and dividing by the total 
sample size (N)". 
not scale by sales for two reasons. First, we performed a correlation check and found that there is high 
positive correlation (0.52) between total assets and sales. Compare this to Roychowdhury (2006, p. 347) 
who reports a very high positive correlation (0.91) between total assets and sales. Second, sales are an 
integral part of earnings, which has been found to be mostly used in accounts manipulation (also, see 
Roychowdhury, 2006). 
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That is, F, R; Cj/ N ....... {4.14} 
The X2 test to be conducted tests the null hypothesis of no association (l lo) against 
the alternative hypothesis that there is an association between the section where 
news is inserted in newspapers and ex post abnormal stock returns (II1). 
4.6.4 1)cterminaaon ofeventday 
While collecting stock returns data for the analysis in chapter 6, the event day, day 
zero, of three of the 99 firms in the qualifying sample (see Table 4.3 on page 90) 
were found to fall on a non-trading day (a public holiday, or a weck-end). The 
three firms are part of the 16 firms without data on amount mentioned in the news 
which did not feature in the linear equation of section 6.2.2 in chapter 6. We have 
not controlled for events that fall on a non-trading day. What we did in that case is 
to regard the last trading day immediately before the publication of the news as the 
day zero. At first thought, this may appear likely to affect the precision of the event 
day or day zero used in the study, but since this did not affect the majority of the 
publications the effect will be inconsequential. 
In all activities relating to historical dates and calendar issues, we had an online 
calendar at our disposal. It is available at http: //www. timeanddate. com/calendar. 
4.7 Justticat ons for the statistical methods used in an4r data 
The following paragraphs provide justifications for the statistical methods used in 
analysing data of the study. Most of the materials in the paragraphs are adapted 
from Garson (2009), Tabachnick and Fidell (2007) and Cohen el al. (2003). 
4.7.1 Reaxnsfor usinSlogish'cr s=tun ana& s 
According to theory, logistic models allow the prediction of a dependent variable 
on the basis of continuous independent variable(s). Logistic regression also enables 
gr 
Effects of Inst/tutlonal Stwcturcs on Accounts Alanlpul atlon. 
and Consequences for Firms Exposed in the Act: An Intcrnatlonal Study 
CIIA PTBX i 
a researcher to determine the percentage variation in the dependent variable that is 
explained by the independent variables in the equation. Furthermore, it can be used 
to rank the relative importance of independents, and to assess interaction effects. 53 
4.711 Assumptions oflogisü'c reger ion 
The assumptions behind the use of logistic regression include (sec Garson 2009): 
1. It does not assume that a linear relationship exists between a dependent variable 
and the independent variable(s). It can handle nonlinear effects even when 
exponential and polynomial terms are not explicitly added as additional 
independents because the logit link function on the left-hand side of a logistic 
regression equation is non-linear. However, it is also possible and permitted to add 
explicit interaction and power terms as variables on the right-hand-side of the 
equation, as in OLS regression. 
2. It also assumes that a dependent variable need not be normally distributed. 
However, it does assume its distribution is within the range of the exponential 
family of distributions, such as normal, Poisson, binomial, gamma. Solutions may 
be more stable if predictors have a multivariate normal distribution. 
3. It assumes that a dependent variable need not be homoscedastic for each level of 
the independents; that is, there is no homogeneity of variance assumed: variances 
need not be the same within categories. 
4. It assumes that error terms are not normally distributed. 
5. It does not require that the independent variables be interval and unbounded 
53 (If interested, please see Garson (2009) online at http: //faculty. chass. ncsu. edu/garson/PA765/ logistic. htm 
for more elucidation of the uses of logistic regression). 
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4.7.2 Rc&vns lbr using linear trfflw rion analysis 
Linear regression generally is used when a researcher wishes to test that a straight 
line relationship can be established between a dependent variable and independent 
variable(s). Multiple linear regression is employed to account for (predict) the 
variance in an interval dependent, based on linear combinations of interval, 
dichotomous, or dummy independent variables. Multiple linear regression analysis 
is used to determine that the independent variables in an equation explain a 
proportion of the variance in a dependent variable at a significant level, 
conventionally at the 0.05 or 0.01 levels. 
An equation of the type, y=a+ bix, + b2x2 + ... + 
b, -c,, +c is a multiple linear 
regression equation whereas an equation of the type, y=a+b, x, +c is simple 
linear regression equation. In the equations, the intercept, a, is constant and the 
error term, c, is the residual. b is the slope or regression coefficient of the equation 
and x is a variable. Each b represents the amount by which a dependent variable 
changes when a corresponding independent variable changes by I unit. In 
coefficient tables, the b coefficients are the beta weights, and the ratio of the beta 
coefficients is the ratio of the relative predictive power of the independent 
variables. 
The R2 statistic, otherwise called coefficient of determination, and correlations 
between ex post abnormal returns and amount is used to determine the percentage 
of variation in a dependent variable that is explained by the combined independent 
variables in an equation. At the same time by comparing the relative beta weights 
of each independent variable, it can establish the relative predictive ability of an 
independent variable. 
4.7. P. 1 Assumptions ofRncarrrgrrssion 
There are four main assumptions of linear regressions, and these include: 
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1. Linearity. This is an assumption that the underlying relationship between a 
dependent variable, y, and the independent variable (s), x, follows a straight 
line. 
2. Independence. The error term, c, for one value of y is assumed to be 
independent of the error term in any other value of y. Simply put, independence 
assumption requires that the error term, should be uncorrelated with each of the 
independents. 
3. Constant variance. It is assumed that the variance, a2, of the random errors is 
the same for all values of the independent variables. This means that the points 
on either side of a straight line should be constant. 
4. Normality. This is an assumption that errors have a normal distribution with 
mean zero and variance a2. This means that if repeated measurements of the 
dependent variables are taken for a particular value of an independent variable 
then most of them are expected to fall close to the regression line and very few 
to fall far away from the line. 
In addition, other assumptions of linear regression include: 
5. It assumes that multicollinearity can be a problem among independent variables 
in a model. Multicollinearity occurs if independent variables in a model arc 
inter-correlated with each other. The impact of multicollinearity is that it 
inflates standard errors and makes assessment of the relative importance of the 
independents unreliable. 
6. It assumes that data are unbounded. That is, the regression line produced by 
OLS can be extrapolated in both directions but is meaningful only within the 
upper and lower natural bounds of the dependent variable 
4.73 Ressbnsfarusingchl-square ksiforp&cincitefl` d 
Tabachnick and Fidell (2007, p. 58) argue that chi-square test of independence is 
the appropriate method to analyse the relationship between two discrete variables. 
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Compared to the parametric techniques discussed above, the non-parametric chi- 
square test has "less stringent assumptions" (Pallant, 2007, p. 211). 
4.73.1 Asswnptions of chi-squaw test 
Two most important assumptions of chi-square include: 
1. The sample must be randomly drawn 
2. Observations must be independent where each case is counted only once, and 
cannot appear in more than one category or sample 
4. Z4 Rhisons for usir{q pwird samples t-test 
The paired samples t-test is used in pre/post test studies, especially in events studies 
where one is interested in what happens between the opposite sides of an event. 
Standard event study research (e. g., Brown and Warner (1980,1985), Faccio et al. 
(2006), Files et al. (2009), DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994), Bartov (1992), Oppong 
(1980) among others) has shown that the test is used to analyse and compare the 
differences between the means of ex post cumulative abnormal returns and ex ante 
cumulative abnormal returns around an event. This is done in order to determine 
whether there is a statistically significant difference between the two means. 
4.74.1 Assumptions of the paired mmplcs t-tost 
1. Data must be continuous and measured at the interval or ratio level. 
2. Observations must be independently measured. That is to say, for example, 
that ex ante share prices must not influence ex post share prices. 
3. Data must be normally independently identically distributed or, in cases where 
this is violated, sample size must be >_ 30. 
4. Data must have homogeneity of variance, which is to say that they must come 
from populations of cqual varianccs. 
or 
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The data analysis to be undertaken in chapters 5 and 6 involves running a battery 
of tests using the methods described above. 
4.8 &zmmary 
This chapter explicates in detail a number of methodological and research designs 
issues relating to the study. Some of the issues it addresses include definition of 
variables and how to measure or operationalise them and methods of data 
collection. Other issues are description of sample, methods of data analyses as 
well as the research method employed for the study. It shows why and how the 
study uses the quantitative research method for its investigations. 
In terms of analytical method, it describes the statistical research method 
employed including chi-square test of association, logistic regression, paired 
samples t-tests, and linear regression. These arc methods that are found to be 
pervasive in the positivist accounting literature, where the researcher assumes the 
role of a natural or neutral scientist, working with numbers as she observes them. 
For reasons explained in the chapter, the choice of the positivist method is 
consistent with established tradition in the economics-based positive accounting 
literature (e. g., Watts and Zimmerman 1978,1986,1990). As a deductive method, 
the hypotheses tested allow the study to make inferences, as we see in the ensuing 
chapters. 
Chapter 5 analyzes the data on environmental influences on accounts 
manipulation while chapter 6 analyzes the consequences data. 
Ad. e 
chftpteJ? S 
Anal, sis of institutional sfrucfures data 
and tests ofhypotheses 
51 Intmäuction 
In great details, the preceding chapter addressed various aspects of the 
methodology and research designs issues employed in the study. The present 
chapter analyzes the data on the environmental factors that can likely influence 
accounts manipulation. It carries out tests of the five hypotheses of this strand of 
the study. 
52 44 naly icsl staf c icsl sali! 'wa pwJbww used 
There are a number of alternative computational statistical software packages 
available on the market to analyse quantitative data, such as those of the present 
study. They include E-Views, SAS, SPSS, Stata, and MATLAB to name but a few 
of the well-known on the market. Each of these statistical software packages has its 
features or properties. An examination of the statistical methods used by prior 
research tends to reveal a predominance of the SPSS. Because of its pervasiveness 
in the positivist literature, and because of familiarity, case, and efficiency, this 
study uses the SPSS in analyzing its data. 
5.3 Measurrmcnt and oprrlaonalis$fon ofhulucncrs variables 
This section explains how the data relating to environmental influences on accounts 
manipulation are analysed. Logistic regression analysis is used to model the 
independent variables in this section, except legal origin, III. 
Because of statistical theory requirement (as explained in chapter 4 and the latter 
part of the present chapter), we use chi-square to analyse legal origin. 
9 
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Table 5.1 presents the variables investigated in this charter. The table also 
summarises the hypotheses relating to each of the independent variables as well as 
indicating the sources of the instruments used in measuring the variables. The table 
explains the source(s) of data used in measuring each of the explanatory variables. 
Variables relating to II= to Its enter the logistic regression equation as they are the 
hypothesised independent variables in the logistic equation. The control variables 
are national cultural values classified by Hofstede (2001) and country level of 
wealth (GNI) which is used to measure managers' economic status or wellbeing. 
Table 5.1 Summary of Institutional Structures hypotheses and Sources of Data 
Variables Summary of ltypolheses Sources of data 
There is no association between the legal La Porta el at. (1998,2008), 
Legal origin origins in which firms operate and the I larper and Mcnulty (2008) 
(LEGAL) occurrence of accounts manipulation, (III) and The World Factbook (2009) 
Corrupt Ceteris paribus, the level of corruption is not Corruption Perception Index 
environment likely to affect the occurrence of accounts of Transparency International 
(CORRUPT,,,,,, ) manipulation, (111) 
Press freedom 
(PRESSfREE) Celerisparibus, the level of press freedom World Press Freed Index 
is not likely to affect the occurrence of of Reporters Without 
accounts manipulation, II Borders 
State-Owned Ceteris paribus, State's ownership of Economic Freedom of the 
Enterprises enterprises is not likely to affect the World database 
SOEs occurrence of accounts manipulation, ll 
Investor Celeris paribus, the State's attempts at Strength of Investor protection 
protection investor -protection is not likely to index of World Banks' Doing 
(INVSTPro) affect the occurrence of accounts business 
manipulation. 111) 
Control 
1. Cultural environment: I lofstede (2001, pp. 500-502) 1.1 Power Distance and Variables: 1.2 Uncertainty Avoidance 
2. Gross national income World Bank's World 
Development Indicators 
53.1 Legal on in 
This is a categorically coded variable. Following the combination of sources used 
in classifying legal origin as described in detail in chapter 4, and in the above table 
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it is categorised as English common law origin, French commercial code, German 
commercial code, Scandinavian code, Russian legal origin (adapted from Harper 
and Mcnulty (2008)). 
53.2 Corrupt env im nment 
Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) is used to measure 
corrupt environment. In line with prior studies (e. g., Lee and Ng (2006), Pantzalis 
et al. (2008)), we re-recalibrate the index to range from 0-10 so that high score 
implies high level of corruption perceptions of a country. We arrive at the score 
used for each country in this study by taking the average of 2000-2008 scores. This 
is to reduce abrupt variations in scoring of the current year that might arise due to 
random effects. How corrupt environment is measured is fully explained in section 
4.4.1.3 of chapter 4. 
5 . 3.3 Plus freedom 
We measure press freedom using the instrument of Reporters without Borders. On 
a continuous scale, the score for press freedom ranges from 0 to 100. We re- 
calibrated the index in such a way that low score means low press freedom while 
high score indicates high press freedom. Section 4.4.1.3 of chapter 4 fully explains 
how press freedom is measured. 
5 3.4 State-owned Lnterpthes 
State-owned Enterprises (SOEs) indicates the extent of the State's dominance of 
the economic activities of a country. The scores for each country range from 0 
tolO. We associate a high score with a high level of government investment. 
Again, how the index is measured is fully explained in section 4.4.1.3 of chapter 4. 
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53.6 Investor piv%ctr'on 
We examine the State's intervention in commerce and industry to protect investors. 
Investor-protection is measured by the strength of investor-protection index taken 
from Doing Business, which is an arm of the World Bank. 
The index ranges from 0 to 10, with higher values indicating more investor- 
protection. The index is fully explained in section 4.4.1.3 of chapter 4. 
53.6 Power Distance 
The instrument to measure power distance is taken from Hofstede [2001, pp. 500- 
502]). The score for each country ranges from a scale of 1-100, the higher the 
score for a country the higher the inequality in the country. Please refer to the 
discussion of power distance in section 4.4.1.3.5 of chapter 4 
5.3.7 Uncer&intyAvoidance 
Uncertainty avoidance captures such concerns for time, the future, uncertainty, and 
anxiety. It defines how people deal with rule orientation, employment stability and 
stress. Countries are rated on a UA scale of 1-100. For example, a country whose 
citizens are worried about the future, are stressful, faces unstable employment 
situations will be scored high whereas a country whose citizens exhibit the opposite 
tendencies will be scored low. Section 4.4.1.3.5 of chapter 4 fully discusses 
uncertainty avoidance as enunciated by Iiofstede (2001). 
53.8 Giess Naionallncome 
We believe that managers' economic condition as captured by the wealth of the 
country in which they operate is likely to mediate their behaviour, hence we control 
for it in explaining the occurrence of accounts manipulation. We proxy a manager's 
economic status using countries' gross national income per capita, calculated at 
a7 
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purchasing power parity54 , GNI. We obtain data of each country's gross national 
income per capita for years 2000-2008 from the World Development Indicators 
database of the World Bank. " The GNI figure stated in this study is the average of 
the data for 2000-2008. Gross national income is fully explained in section 
4.4.1.3.5 in chapter 4 
5.4 The analysis 
The analysis of data relating to the institutional structures is presented in the 
following pages, beginning with legal origin. 
6.1.1 Analysis oflegal or{grn data 
Legal origin identifies the legal system from where the 183 firms exposed in 
accounts manipulation comes; please refer back to Table 4.4 of the preceding 
chapter. 
Table 5.2 Number of Exposed Accounts Manipulation and Average Number of 
Listed Companies in Legal Origins 
Le al Ori in Count % Number of listed companies % 
English 114 62.3% 20877 62.10 
French 29 15.8% 3448 10.25 
German 21 11.5% 7964 23.70 
Scandinavian 7 3.8% 892 2.70 
Russian 12 6.6% 451 1.34 
It is analysed separately as it is not included in the logistic regression model. We 
examine the distribution of exposed accounts manipulation in each legal origin. 
Physical counts of how many firms were reported in the act in each legal origin is 
presented in Table 5.2 and it shows that majority of the cases of accounts 
manipulation were reported to have occurred in countries operating the English 
sa This is based on the law of one price all over the world, implying that in the absence of transaction costs, 
identical goods will have the same price in different markets of the world. 
55 See http: //data. worldbank. org/indicator. 
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common law system. The counts and numbers in this table, respectively, come 
from the "total row" in Table 4.4 and Table 4.6 of chapter 4. It can be seen that 
62.3% of the observed cases of accounts manipulation were reported to have 
occurred in English common law system. This is followed by French commercial 
code origin with 15.8% of the reported cases. German commercial code origin 
comes next with 11.5%. The legal origin with the least observed cases of accounts 
manipulation is Scandinavia with 3.8% of the total cases. Russian legal origin has 
6.6% of the cases. 
The high number of published cases of accounts manipulation from English 
common law countries that our data collection exercise/search uncovered 56 can be 
attributed to two main factors: one, the relatively freer press environment in 
English common law countries when compared to the level of press freedom in 
other legal origins. Two, the high number of companies listed in English common 
law countries is far higher than the number of companies listed in other legal 
systems put together (more than 62% of the world's listed companies, see Table 
4.6 in chapter 4, page 113). 
54.1.1 Chi-Square testofss Talion forlegal origin loWthesis H1 
We now run two separate chi-square tests to test the association between accounts 
manipulation and legal origin. The first test relies on an unbiased assumption (or 
null hypothesis) that there is no association between legal origins in which firms 
operate and the occurrence of accounts manipulation, see Hl. That means that 
accounts manipulation is equally likely to occur anywhere in the world irrespective 
of the legal origin of a country. This assumption requires us to assign equal weight 
of 0.20 to each of the five legal origins. Thus we multiply 0.20 by 183 to get 
36.667 (rounded to 37, for mathematical processing purposes) as the expected 
frequencies of accounts manipulation from each legal origin. 
56 See Table 4.4 of chapter 4 for a distribution of published cases of accounts manipulation according to 
countries. 
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Under this assumption, we calculated X2 as: 
(114-37)2 (29-37)2 (21 - 37) 
2 (12-37)2 (7-37)2 
X2 = -+-+ -+-+ 37 37 37 37 37 
= 160.24 + 1.73 + 6.92 + 16.89 + 24.32 = 210.10 
Critical values of chi-square distribution (4 df) as in F-tables? are 9.49 (for p-value 
of 0.05) and 7.779 (for p-values of 0.10). 
Since the computed chi-square value is more than the Critical chi-square value, we 
reject the null hypothesis that the occurrence of accounts manipulation is not 
associated with a country's legal origin. 
The second test relates number of accounts manipulation reported in each legal 
origin to the proportion of the number of listed firms in that legal origin. Using 
2000-2008 data, we compute average number of listed companies in each legal 
origin and this is shown in Table 5.3. 
Table 5.3 Actual and Expected Number of Accounts Manipulation in Legal Origins 
English French German Russian Scand Total 
Average # of listed companies (a) 1 20877 3448 7964 892 451 33632 
Proportion of total companies (b) 0.62 0.10 0.24 0.03 0.01 1 
Actual number exposed (c) 114 29 21 12 7 183 
Expected number exposed (d)2 + 114 18 44 52 183 
1 Average of 2000-2008 
2 (c) = (b) * 183 = Expected number of accounts manipulation = proportion of listed companies *total 
number of accounts manipulation reported) + Rounded to the nearest whole number 
(114- 114)2 (29- 18) 2 (21 - 44) 
2 (12-5)2 (7-2)2 
X2 =++++ 
114 18 44 52 
X2 =0+6.72 + 12.02 + 9.80 + 12.5 = 41.04 
s' Critical Values of the Chi-Square Distribution can be found at the back pages of any standard statistics 
text. 
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Again, the computed X2 value of 41.04 is more than Critical X2 value, so we reject 
the null hypothesis that the occurrence of accounts manipulation is not associated 
with a country's legal origin. 
Based on these two chi-square tests, we therefore conclude that there is an 
association between legal origins in which firms operate and the occurrence of 
accounts manipulation. 
If the number of exposed accounts manipulation in English legal origin is related to 
the number of companies listed there vis-ä-vis the total number of companies listed 
worldwide, it will be appreciated why our result is inconsistent with Burgstahler et 
al. (2006, p. 1012) who argue that in countries with large and highly developed 
equity markets, public firms engage in even less earnings management. 
The inconsistency between our result and Burgstahler et al. 's (2006) can be 
reconciled by considering the almost unfettered press environment in which firms 
in English legal origin operate. If one were to refer to Table 5.3 one would see that 
more than 62% of listed companies in the world are based in countries that follow 
the English legal system, e. g. U. S. and UK. Arguably, these countries have a 
vibrant press so much so that the press is able to report more cases of accounts 
manipulations there. So the relatively free press environment in English legal 
origin which is able to publish most cases of accounts manipulation than the press 
in other legal origins could have driven the result obtained in this study. 
In support of our position, Ball (2009) observes that, 
"Common law countries, chief among then the United States, have built large 
debt and equity markets, and correspondingly large public corporate sectors, by 
following a model founded on high-quality financial reporting and disclosure. 
This allows lenders, shareholders, suppliers, and customers to transact at arm's 
length with corporations, across a public market, without private (insider) access 
to information about them. Consequently, high-quality financial reporting has 
long been viewed as a foundation of the U. S. financial system. " 
or 
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Ball (2009) adds that 
`7n contrast, public financial reporting has not played such an important 
economic role in code law countries, including most of continental Europe. Under 
the code law model, access to information has been more on a relationship basis, 
public financial reporting has been lower in quality by observable measures, 
large corporations have been more likely to be private, and public capital markets 
have been a comparatively smaller part of the economy. "- Ball (2009, p. 6) 
54.21 An4 srs ofa=unfs msnipulah'on usirz the pvdiclor vthables 
The analysis that follows examines the effect of the predictor variables on accounts 
manipulation. In the logistic regression equation, probability of accounts 
manipulation is regressed on corrupt environment (CORRUPTE,,,, ), press freedom 
(PRESSFREE), State-owned enterprises (SOEs), State's interest in the capital market 
by way of investor-protection (INVSTPro), Hofstede's PD and UA, and log GNI. 
In the logistic regression, we assign 1 to each of the 36 countries where accounts 
manipulation was reported (the treatment sample) and 0 to each of the 36 countries 
where it was not reported, the control sample. (Please refer back to the latter part of 
section 4.3 of the last chapter for a detailed discussion of how the 36 countries in 
the control sample were selected; also refer back to Table 4.1 on page 82, Panel B, 
of the same chapter for countries included in the control sample). The outcome of 
the logistic regressions is shown and analysed below. The case processing summary 
is shown in Table 5.4 while the descriptive statistics are shown in Table 5.5. 
Table 5.4 Case Processing Summary of Logistic Regression 
Unweighted Cases' N Per cent 
Selected Cases Included in Analysis 72 100.0 
Missing Cases 0 .0 
Total 72 100.0 
Unselected Cases 0 .0 
Total 72 100.0 
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Table 5.5 presents the descriptive statistics of the full sample. The minimum 
(maximum) score for CORRUPTE,,,,,, is 0.70 (8.50), with a mean score of 4.86 and 
standard deviation of 2.34. Minimum (maximum) score for the level of press 
freedom (PRESSF1ee) is 6.23 (99.14), mean score of 71.93 and standard deviation of 
28.57. 
Tnht 5.5 Tleccrintive Statistics of Logistic Repression (Full Sample) 
N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Corruption Perceptions Index 72 . 70 8.50 
4.8597 2.33972 
Press freedom 72 6.23 99.14 71.9297 28.57094 
Investor-protection 72 2.70 9.30 5.5316 1.50670 
State's ownership of enterprises 72 4.50 97.67 50.5581 25.75033 
GNI 72 2.89 4.93 4.0783 . 43780 
Power Distance 72 11.00 104.00 61.3056 21.97799 
Uncertainty Avoidance 72 8.00 112.00 65.7778 22.92623 
Valid N (listwise) 72 
Minimum (maximum) score for investor-protection (INVSTPro) is 2.70 (9.30), with 
a mean score of 5.53 and standard deviation of 1.507. Extent of the State's 
dominance of the economy (SOEs) has a minimum (maximum) score of 4.50 
(97.67), mean score of 50.56, and standard deviation of 25.75. 
The minimum (maximum) gross national income is $2.89 ($4.93), with an average 
of $4.08 and standard deviation of 0.44. Hofstede's PD or Power Distance has a 
minimum (maximum) score of 11 (104), mean score of 61.31 and standard 
deviation of 21.98. Hofstede's Uncertainty Avoidance has a minimum (maximum) 
score of 8 (112), mean of 65.78 and standard deviation of 22.93. 
5.4.21. I Bi vaziatoco rr dlat io ns 
Table 5.6 presents the Pearson bivariate correlations among the independent 
variables. The examination of correlations between pairs of the independent variables 
without controlling for a third variable is a useful starting point. 
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Table 5.6 Bivariate correlations 
Corrupt 1011 State's own- 
Pcrceptions 
( Press Imcstor- 
cr'hip of 
Pearson Correlations Indes 
i1 eedin prutcutrnn 
cntrrlpri,, r\ 
Press freedom -. 486" 
Investor-protection -. 379" . 204 
State's ownership of enterprises -. 520" . 241 . 
271 
(Log) GNI -. 724" . 313 
- 
. 251 . 511 
liofstede's Power Distance 
. 680" -. 
506" -. 218 -. 192 
Hofstede's Uncertainty Avoidance . 295* -. 070 -. 
348" -. 329" 
1101stcdc's 
(I. ýiýl IIt X%rr (INI 
-. 485-- _ 
. 018 .l )2 
Absolute values greater (lesser) than . 
300 are significant at the 0.01 andO. 05 level. These are identified by " and 
respectively. 
The bivariate correlations among the hypothesised variables are low, and as 
expected; with the exception of the correlation between corruption perceptions and 
State's ownership of enterprises which is moderately correlated at -. 520. A quick 
remark about the relationship between corruption perceptions and State's 
ownership of enterprises is in order. The negative sign suggests that high State's 
ownership of enterprises is associated with low level of corruption perceptions. 
This is puzzling because it would be expected that the level of corruption 
perceptions will be high with high State's ownership of enterprises. We call for 
caution in reaching conclusions about the relationship between these two 
independent variables in view of the correlation (0.520) that was approaching high 
levels. 
Another puzzling result is the correlation between press freedom and State's 
ownership of enterprises. The positive correlation suggests that higher the State's 
ownership of enterprises higher the level of press freedom. We expected a negative 
correlation because high State's ownership of enterprises would mean that the level 
of press freedom would be low because the State may own part of the press so that 
press freedom will be low, all things equal. 
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5 4.2.1.2 Partial Corrnlsiian Analysis 
There is a need to consider the partial correlations between any two variables as the 
influence of a third variable is controlled for. Table 5.7 (Panels A-I)) contains four 
panels of partial correlations. 
Panel A controls for power distance and uncertainty avoidance. 
Panel B controls for gross national income and power distance. 
Panel C control's for gross national income and uncertainty avoidance. 
Finally, Panel D, controls for gross national income only. This panel appears to be 
the less correlated of the panels. 
Table 5.7 Partial Correlations Coefficients between Independent Variables 
Panel A. Partial Correlations controlling for PD and UA 
Corruption State's Power 
Perceptions Press Investor ownership of I)istancc 
Control Variables Index freedom protection enterprises 
Log GNI Press freedom -. 396"" 
Investor-protection -. 295" . 136 
State's ownership of 253" . 
099 
. 171 enterprises 
Power Distance . 544" -. 
427"" -. 114 . 075 
Uncertainty Avoidance . 446"" -. 
080 -. 364 " -. 394** . 230 
**. Correlation is significant at 0.01 level *. Correlation is significant at 0.05 level 
Panel B Partial correlations controlling for PD and GNI 
Corruption State's Log 
Perceptions I'ress Investor O\\nership of' GNI 
Control Variables Index freedom protection rnterhrises 
Uncertainty Press freedom -. 489*' 
Avoidance Investor-protection -. 309" . 
192 
State's ownership of 
enterprises 
Log GNI 
Power Distance 
". Correlation is significant at 0.01 level 
-. 469ýý . 
231 
. 177 
-. 763 . 
315 
. 
274* . 
549*' 
. 
664" -. 504" -. 164 -. 139 
Correlation is significant at 0.05 level 
-. 498.. 
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Panel C. Partial correlations controlling for GNI and Uncertainty Avoidance 
Control Variables 
Power Press freedom 
Distance Investor-protection 
State's ownership of 
enterprises 
Log GNI 
Uncertainty Avoidance 
Corruption State's 
Perceptions Press Investor- ownership of I. oc 
Index freedom protcolon enterprises (iNI 
-. 225 
-. 322" . 
111 
-. 542" . 170 . 239' 
-. 615" . 
090 . 
170 
. 
487 
. 227 . 
032 -. 320" -. 303* . 130 
**. Correlation is significant at 0.01 level *. Correlation is significant at 0.05 level 
Panel D. Partial Correlations controlling for GNI 
Control Variables 
Power Distance 
& Uncertainty 
Avoidance 
Press freedom 
Investor-protection 
State's ownership of 
enterprises 
Log GN I 
State's 
Corruption Press Investor- ownership 
Perceptions Index freedom protection entcrpris( 
-. 239 
-. 270 ______________________________ 
*. Correlation is significant at 0.05 level 
-. 509" . 189 
-. 667" . 086 
157 
. 225 .5 
". Correlation is significant at 0.01 level 
The negative correlation between corruption perceptions and each of the 
hypothesised variables suggests that as the level of corruption perceptions increases 
the hypothesised variables associated with it decrease. With the exception of the 
relationship between corruption perceptions and State's ownership of enterprises, 
this result is expected. One would expect high State's ownership of enterprises to 
be associated with high level of corruption. 
The positive correlation between press freedom and investor-protection suggests 
that high level of investor-protection can be associated with high level of press 
freedom. 
The positive correlation between press freedom and State's ownership of 
enterprises is associated with high level of press freedom. It is hard to see how this 
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is true in real-life. One would expect that the level of press freedom will decrease 
with high State's ownership of enterprises. 
The control variables have had some mediating effects on the hypothesised variables 
in the partial correlations by reducing the strength of the correlations. The only 
exception is the correlation between corruption perceptions and press freedom. In 
Panel B of the partial correlations, controlling for power distance and gross national 
income have not had negative effect on the correlation between the two. The 
correlation between the two variables is -0.486 in the bivariate correlation in Table 
5.6 and -0.489 in Panel B of Table 5.7. The difference is very close to zero. 
Among the partial correlations themselves, controlling for gross national income and 
uncertainty avoidance have had the greatest mediating effect on the correlation 
between corruption perceptions and press freedom as the strength of the correlation 
becomes lower and not statistically significant, see Panel C. 
Controlling for power distance and uncertainty avoidance had the greatest negative 
effect on the correlation between press freedom and State's ownership of enterprises. 
The correlation dropped to 0.099; please see Panel A of the partial correlations. 
Controlling only for gross national income has the greatest effect on the correlation 
between corruption perceptions and State's ownership of enterprises. The strength of 
the correlation (0.509) is highest and is statistically significant, see Panel D of Table 
5.7. 
5 . 4.21.3 Multivariate model tarts of theses 
5.4.2.1.3.1 Dichotomous logistic regression model 
We use a multivariate logistic regression model with a dichotomous dependent 
variable. Countries where accounts manipulation was reported in newspapers are 
coded as one and control countries where accounts manipulation was not reported 
are coded as zero. This is to investigate the effects of the hypothesised, and stylised, 
institutional structures variables on the likely occurrence of accounts manipulation. 
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Altogether, we run eight different multiple logistic regressions (with or without all 
the control variables in a single model). The purpose of running different regression 
models is to check for robustness. The regression model in equation {4.3} of 
section 4.4.1 is used for each of the eight models below thus: 
Prob(ACCMan) = F(a +ßjCORRUPTE , +ß2PRESSFree +ß3SOE +ß41NVSTPro+ 
ßsLog GNI +/36PD+ß7UA + c) ... I 
Prob(ACCMan) = F(a + /3 f CORRUPTEM7 + ß2PRESSFree + /13SOE + 
ß41NVSTPro + ßsLog GNI + c) ... 11 
Prob(ACCMan) = F(a + ßj CORRUPTEml + ß2PRESSFree + fI3SOE + 
ß4INVSTPro + ßsLog GNI + ß6Hofstede PD + e) ,.. 11[ 
Prob(ACCMan) = F(a + ßu CORRUPTED., + ß2PRESSFree + /i3SOE + 
ß41NVSTPro + ßsLog GNI + ß6Hofstede UA + E) ... IV 
Prob(ACCMan) = F(a + ß' CORRUPTS,,, + ß2PRESSFree + ß3SOE + 
ß4INVSTPro + ßsHofstede PD + ß6Hofstede UA +s... V 
Prob(ACCMan) = F(a + ß' CORRUPTEN ,+ ß2PRESSFree + ß3SOE + 
/341NVSTPro + ßsHofstede UA + c) ... vi 
Prob(ACCMan) = F(a + /3' CORRUPT, + ß2PRESSFree + /33S0E + 
ß4INVSTPro + ßsllofstede PD + c) ... vl[ 
Prob(ACCMan) = F(a + ßl CORRUPTEN, + ß2PRESSFree + ß3SOE + 
ß4INVSTPro + c) ... VIII 
Model i is the full or the study's main model in equation {4.3}. It is regressing 
probability of accounts manipulation on corrupt environment, press freedom, State 
ownership of enterprises, investor-protection, gross national income and the two 
national cultural values. The result is reported exclusively in Table 5.8. 
Model vile excludes all the control variables from the regression. 
Model ii controls for GNI only 
Model in controls for national income and power distance 
oiap cr s An&&sls oflnsiitu& UMJshvcluWW data And tads othypathexs 
Model tv controls for gross national income and uncertainty avoidance. 
Model V controls for power distance and uncertainty avoidance 
Model vi controls for uncertainty avoidance only. 
Model vii controls for uncertainty avoidance only 
Table 5.8a, b presents the result of the regression of the main model only. 
Table 5.8a Variables In the Equation 
Prob(ACCAfan) = F(a + Q, CORRUPTEN67 + ß2PRESSFree + Q3SOE + ß4INVSTPro + 
Q., Log GNI +ß6Hofstede PD + Q7Hofstede UA + cd 
(Note that this is Model 1, main model, in Table 5.9) 
B S. E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Step 1' CORRUPTENVI -. 337 . 327 1.064 
1 . 302 . 
714 
PRESSFree . 000 . 
014 . 001 
1 . 974 
1.000 
INVSTPro . 765 . 369 
4.292 1 . 038 
2.150 
SOEs . 089 . 024 
13.814 1 . 000 
1.093 
LogGNI . 542 1.350 . 
161 1 . 688 
1.719 
Hofstede_PD . 039 . 030 
1.670 1 . 196 
1.040 
Hofstede_UA . 007 . 022 . 
111 1 . 739 
1.007 
Constant -12.210 6.519 3.508 1 . 
061 . 000 
CORRUPT, m - Corruption Perceptions Index, high score high level of corruption perception. 
Data taken from 
Transparency International 
PRESSREE - Extent of press freedom in a country. The higher the score the higher the press freedom. Data sourced 
from 
Reporters without Borders. 
SOEs - State-owned enterprises, measures the extent of the State's dominance of the economy. (high score, 
high State's 
dominance of the economy). Data taken from Economic Freedom Network 
INVSTPro - State's efforts at Investor protection. Higher the score the higher investor protection. Measure sourced 
from Doing 
business 
Log GNI - Logarithm of Gross National income (average of 2000-2008) measuring economic status of Individuals in a country. 
Data taken from World Bank's World Development Indicators 
11ofstede s PD -1lofstede 's Power Distance measuring the level of inequality in a country. (Ifigher the score, higher the 
level 
of inequality in a country) 
llofstede's UA - Ilofstede's Uncertainty Avoidance measuring the extent people try to avoid she unknown. (higher the score 
higher the level of people trying to avoid uncertainty) 
Table 5.8b Model Summary (Model 1) 
Step -2 Log likelihood Cox & Snell R Square Nagclkerke R Square 
1 48.419' . 0.0.510 . 
672 
Estimation terminated at iteration number 7 because parameter estimates changed by less than . 001. 
Statistics extracted from Table 5.8 as well as statistics of the remaining seven 
regressions are conveyed in Table 5.9. 
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Table 5.9 Multiple Logistic Regressions of Accounts Manipulation on Independent Variables 
Pro6(ACCM an) - F(a + J7, CP1 +ßsPRESSFree +/J. JNIYTPro +/SOE +/I, Log GNI + RJlofstede PD + Q, Ilofstede UA +C) 
CPI - CORRUPTS - Corruption Perceptions Index. (High score, high level of corruption perception). Data taken from 
Transparency International 
PRESS E= Extent of press freedom in a country. (High score, high press freedom). Data sourced from Reporters without Borders. 
INVSTPro = State's Interest in firms by way of investor protection. (High score, high Investor-protection). Uata from Doingbucmess 
SOEs = State-owned enterprises, measures the extent of the State's dominance of the economy. (High score, high Slale's 
dominance of the economy). Data taken from Economic i'eedom Network 
Log GNI - Logarithm of Gross National Income (average of2000-2008) measuring economic status of individuals in a country. 
Data taken from World Bank's World Development Indicators 
Hof Jede s PD = Hofstede's Power Distance measuring the level of inequality in a country. (High score, high inequality in countries) 
Hofstede's UA - Hofstede s Uncertainty Avoidance meavuring the extent people try to avoid the unknown. (Higher the score, higher 
people try to avoid uncertainty). 
Model Model Model Model Model Model Model Model 
Variables t Coefficie 
if 
Coefficie 
III 
Coetrcie 
IV 
Coefficie 
V 
Coefficie 
VI 
Coefficie 
VII 
Coefficie 
VIII 
Coeflicie 
(p-Value) Value (p-Value) -value) (p-Value) (p-Value) Value Value 
Intercept -12.210 -0.979 -12.495 -9.434 -10.112* -7.911 * -09.144* -7.170* 
(0.061) (0.098) (0.053) (0.115) (0.008) (0.010) (0.005) (0.008) 
CORRUPTENVI -0.337 -0.038 -0.296 -0.073 -0.394 -0.121 -0.359 -0.103 
(0.302) (0.869) (0.323) (0.765) (0.178) (0.514) (0.197) (0.572) 
PRESSFree 0.000 -0.005 0.000 -0.005 0.000 0.005 0.00 -0.005 
(0.974) (0.707) (0.998) (0.691) (0.950) (0.681) (0.997) (0.697) 
INVSTPro 0.765* 0.637 0.744* 0.654 0.791* 0.673 0.769* 0.660 
(0.038) (0.071) (0.041) (0.064) (0.031) (0.054) (0.036) (0.062) 
SOE 0.089* 0.085* 0.086* 0.087* 0.091* 0.088* 0.087* 0.086* 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Log GNI 0.542 0.599 0.743 0.397 
(0.688) (0.613) (0.539) (0.765) 
Iiofstede PD 0.039 0.038 0.038 0.036 
(0.196) (0.196) (0.203) (0.208) 
Ilofstede UA 0.007 0.007 0.011 0.010 
(0.739) (0.736) (0.572) (0.600) 
Nagelkerke R2 0.672 0.663 0.679 0.664 0.679 0.663 0.676 0.660 
Cox & Snell R2 0.510 0.497 0.509 0.498 0.509 0.497 0.507 0.495 
-2 Log likelihood 48.419 50.349 48.532 48.580 49.689 50.323 48.909 50.606 
N 72 72 72 72 72 72 72 72 
Modell - Prob(ACC. Man) - F(a +fi, CORRUPT , +Q2PRESSF ree + f1, INI^STPro +f #SOE+ PsLog GNI +fie 1 D+ll, (IA + v) 
Model l! - Prob(ACCMan) - Fla + fit CORRUPTem + fi, PRESCFree + fi, INV STPro + %14SOE + R, Log GNI - E) 
Model uJ - Prob(ACCAlan) - F(a +. 81 CORRUPT, + /J, PRESSFree + f1,1NiST Pro + ß430E + i, Log GNI + fibllofstede PD +e) 
Model iv - Prob(ACCAfan) - F(a +. 81 CORRUPTa + fi, PRESSFree + 83INI: STPro + fl *30E + /I, Log GNI + R611ofstede U. 4 + s) 
Modal Y- Prob(ACCMan) - F(a + /1, CORRUPTem + /12PRESSFree +/J, INVSTI'ro + fl, soE + fi, Ilofstede PD 4 fi6Hofstede UA 4 s) 
Model v! - Prob(ACCMan) - F(a + 81 CORRUPT +f jPRL'SSF ree + /, INV. %TPro + . 
8, SOF F f, Hofstede UA + c) 
Mx/el vu - Prob(ACCMan) - F(a + fi, CORRUPT&. w + f2PRESSFree + 8j/VVSTPro + fi. SOE + /l, liof cede PD +e) 
Model VIII = Prob(ACCMan) - F(a + R, CORRUPTmm + QJPRESSFree 4 fi, INVSTI'ro + 8*SOF, + s) 
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Table 5.9 presents regression coefficients and Sig. p-values (in parentheses). 
Significant coefficients are starred (*) and in bold print in the table. 
As can be seen from the table, the coefficients of corrupt environment arc low and not 
statistically significant, so we reject the null hypothesis that, ceteris paribus, the level 
of corruption is not likely to affect the occurrence of accounts manipulation. 
Rejection of the null hypothesis suggests that the alternative hypothesis may be 
accepted that the level of corruption is likely to affect the occurrence of the act. 
The coefficients of press freedom are low and not statistically significant, so we reject 
the null hypothesis that the level of press freedom is not likely to affect the 
occurrence of accounts manipulation. We can then conclude that the level of press 
freedom is likely to affect the occurrence of accounts manipulation. Our result is 
consistent with that of prior research in the area: Miller (2006) provides evidence that 
the press serves its roles well by being a watchdog for accounting fraud. Brunetti and 
Weder (2003) conclude that a free press is bad news for corruption. Dyck et al. 
(2008) suggest that the media may play a role in pressuring corporate managers and 
directors to behave in socially acceptable ways. They suggest that the press can shape 
corporate policy, and hence engender good corporate governance. 
This result should be considered in light of the fact that the study reckoned only with 
reported cases of accounts manipulation in newspapers. Therefore, our result can be 
attributed to two factors. First, it is possible that due to some probable existence of 
differences in national cultures the press in some countries may not report cases of 
accounts manipulation because it does not meet the definition of what the press in 
those countries considers as accounts manipulation. Due to data constraints, the study 
is not able to control for this. Second, it is possible that the press in some countries 
may not have reported cases of accounts manipulation because the press is not free to 
publish them as such. 
Investor-protection is statistically significant or marginally significant in five of the 
eight models. It is highly statistically positively significant in Models 1, iv, v, and vu 
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with respective Sig. p-values of=0.038,0.041,0.031, and 0.036 and marginally 
statistically positively significant at 0.05 in Model vt (p= 0.054). It is not statistically 
significant in Models 11 and Iv, and viii. 
The positive statistical significant is indicative that the State's attempt at investor- 
protection is likely to affect the occurrence of accounts manipulation, supporting the 
alternative hypothesis. In fact, the signed results suggest that the State's attempts at 
investor-protection may probably lead to the occurrence of accounts manipulation. 
The high statistically significant result in the main model (Model I) is an indication 
that a unit change in the State's attempts at investor-protection is likely to lead to the 
occurrence of accounts manipulation by 0.765, controlling for the intervening 
influences of the two cultural values and gross national income. The high statistically 
significant result in Model iii is an indication that a unit change in the State's attempts 
at investor-protection is likely to lead to the occurrence of accounts manipulation by 
0.744, controlling for the intervening influences of power distance and gross national 
income. 
The high statistically significant result in Model V is an indication that a unit change 
in the State's attempts at investor-protection is likely to lead to the occurrence of 
accounts manipulation by 0.791, controlling for the intervening influences of the two 
national cultural values. 
The high statistically significant result in Model vii is an indication that a unit change 
in the State's attempts at investor-protection is likely to lead to the occurrence of 
accounts manipulation by 0.769, controlling for the intervening influence of power 
distance only. The marginal statistical significance in Model vi is an indication that a 
unit change in the State's attempt at investor-protection is likely to lead to the 
occurrence of accounts manipulation by 0.673, controlling for the intervening 
influence of uncertainty avoidance only. 
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The acceptance of the alternative hypothesis is consistent with the views expressed by 
Ball (2009, p. 8) that regulation plays a substantial role in fostering a rules-based 
perspective, which plays an important role in setting the stage for the accounting 
scandals in the U. S. This finding is also consistent with Bushman and Petrioski 
[2006] who observe that in a scenario where a "benevolent" government intervenes in 
poorly performing firms, firms seek to avoid such interference by exploiting reporting 
discretion to portray an optimistic outlook. 
State's dominance of the economy (SEO) is consistently statistically positively 
significant at conventional levels in all the models. The strength of significance is 
very low. The statistically significant result in all the models accepts the alternative 
hypothesis that the State's ownership of enterprises is likely to affect the occurrence 
of accounts manipulation. The positive signs indicate that the State's ownership of 
enterprises is likely to lead to the occurrence of accounts manipulation. 
Analysing the result of the main research model, the statistically significant result 
suggests that a unit change in the State's ownership of enterprises is likely to lead to 
the occurrence of accounts manipulation by 0.089, controlling for the effects of the 
two national cultural values and individuals' economic status. 
In Model Ii where GNI is controlled for while holding the effect of the two cultural 
dimensions constant, the significant result suggests that a unit change in the State's 
ownership of enterprises is likely to lead to the occurrence of accounts manipulation 
by 0.085. 
The significant result in Model in is indicative that a unit change in the State's 
dominance of the economy is likely to leads to the occurrence of the act by 0.086, 
holding uncertainty avoidance constant while controlling for economic status (GNI) 
and inequality in society as captured by power distance. 
The significant result in Model tv suggests that a unit change in the State's 
dominance of the economy is likely to lead to occurrence of accounts manipulation 
by 0.087, controlling for the effect of gross national income and uncertainty 
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avoidance. Controlling for the effects of the two cultural values, Model V suggests 
that a unit change in State's dominance of the economy is likely to lead to the 
occurrence of the act by 0.091. 
Controlling for the effect of uncertainty avoidance alone in Model vi, the statistically 
significant result is an indication that a unit change in State's dominance of the 
economic activities of a country is likely to lead to the occurrence of accounts 
manipulation by 0.088. The significant result in Model vii is suggestive that a unit 
change in the State's dominance of the economy is likely to lead to the occurrence of 
the act by 0.087, controlling for inequality in societies. 
Finally, in Model viii where nothing is controlled for, the significant result suggests 
that a unit change in the State's dominance of the economy is likely to lead to the 
occurrence of accounts manipulation by 0.086. 
Our finding is consistent with Bushman and Piotroski (2006) who find that in 
countries characterised by high State involvement in the economy firms speed 
recognition of good news and slow recognition of bad news in reported earnings 
relative to firms in countries with less State involvement. Our finding is also 
consistent with Bushman and Piotroski's (2006) view that managers of publicly 
traded firms with partial State ownership are pressured by the State to optimistically 
tilt their reporting decisions. 
In terms of robustness, this result shows resilience for State's ownership of 
enterprises which was consistently positively statistically significant across all the 
models, and to some appreciable extent investor-protection which was positively 
statistically significant in five of the models. 
It is interesting to note that controlling for the combined effects of national cultures 
and the level of wealth in a country have not affected the high predictive ability of the 
models. In order to drive this claim home, compare the explained variation, pseudo- 
R2, in Model vita with any of the explained variations in Models I to VI!. 
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Odds ratios 
Odds ratios are associated with logistic regression coefficients (b). "The dependent 
variable in logistic regressions is the logarithm of the odds ratio, so the coefficients 
on the explanatory variables indicate the change in the logarithm of the odds ratio" 
(Efendi et al., 2007, p. 689). The odds of accounts manipulation represent the 
probability that accounts manipulation occurred divided by the probability that it did 
not occur. Exp (B) factors lower than 1 will reflect a negative regression coefficient 
whereas those greater than 1 will reflect positive regression coefficients. 
In analysing the odds ratio, our interest focuses on investor-protection (INVSTPrO) 
and State's owned enterprises (SOEs) of the main research model (Model t, or 
Table 5.9) because they are the only hypothesised independent variables found to 
be positively statistically significant. The test of the full model is exclusively 
contained in Table 5.8a; we use the table in analysing the odds ratios. 
The odds ratios are located in the column labelled Exp (B) of the table and they 
relate to effect size or magnitude of each variable's effect on likelihood of 
occurrence of accounts manipulation. Each entry in that column for the two 
significant hypothesised independent variables represents the change in odds of 
accounts being manipulated against not being manipulated. 
The odds ratio for investor-protection (INVSTPro) is 2.150 whereas that of State's 
ownership of enterprises is 1.091. In terms of effect size, the former has a greater 
effect on accounts manipulation than the latter. 
Pseudo-RZ 
As can be seen in Table 5.9, the strength of association between the predictor 
variables and likely occurrence of accounts manipulation is high and almost the 
same value in all the models. The Nagelkerke R2 is 67.20% for the full research 
model, and above 66% for the remaining models. The Cox and Snell R2 is 51.00% 
17 
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in the full research model and above 49% in the remaining models. The high 
explanatory power of the model suggests that the model has descriptive validity and 
that the independent variables in the regressions are able to explain a high 
percentage of the variation in the likely occurrence of accounts manipulation. In 
addition, there are no noticeable differences in pseudo-R2 of all the models. 
-2Loglikelihood (2LL) 
Consistent with the behaviour of the pseudo-R2, the -2LL is about the same (hovers 
around 48% and 51%) for all the models in Table 5.9, which goes to show that all 
the models are well-fitted. 
8.4.22 ChcGkformuldcollinearity 
Multicollinearity occurs when highly related independent variables measuring the 
same or similar constructs are included in the same regression equation (see Cohen 
et al. (2003, p. 420)). 
One possible consequence of multicollinearity is that regression coefficients may 
become unstable and inflated, which may lead to very large standard errors. Cohen 
et al. (2003, p. 425) posit that "when a researcher is interested solely in the 
prediction of r (the dependent variable) or the value of R2, multicollinearity has 
little effect and no remedial action is needed. " 
Because we are interested in explaining the likely occurrence of accounts 
manipulation based on the independent variables, we have not attempted to remedy 
for any multicollinearity that may arise; however, we call for caution in reaching 
conclusions in view of the correlations that were approaching high levels between 
some of the independent variables, particularly between corruption perceptions 
index and State's ownership of enterprises. 
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54.23 Reiidue! end outlier analysis 
Residual analysis reveals that there are no serious problems of residuals or outliers 
in all independent variables' data. We have plotted scatter graphs to show that 
there are no extreme cases of outliers in the independent variable. This is presented 
in Scatter graphs 5.1. 
Scatter Graphs 5.1 
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5.5 SLmmety 
This chapter has been analysing the data of the institutional structures that can 
likely affect accounts manipulation. The chapter explained in great detail the 
sources of variables and how they are measured and operationalised. The chapter 
used X2 test, logistic regression models to analyse the data. The battery of tests 
produced interesting results, which are to be presented in the results and findings 
chapter, chapter 7. 
In the meantime, we now turn to chapter 6, which analyzes the consequences data. 
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ChEtpter 6 
Analysis of consequences data and tests ofhypotheses 
6.1 Infnaduction 
This chapter explains how the data relating to the second strand of the study is 
analysed. The chapter addresses three hypotheses, namely 116,117, and 118. As the 
analysis progresses in the chapter, these hypotheses are restated. 
A variety of econometric methods are employed in this part of the analysis. These 
include (1) Paired Samples t-test, Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test and Sign Test to 
test data of both sides of the event window; (2) linear regression (through which we 
obtained or extracted R-squares) to test association between amount mentioned in 
the news and ex post abnormal returns, especially that of day zero; and (3) cross- 
tabulation chi-square test of association to test relationship (or lack thereof) 
between the section where the news is inserted and ex post abnormal returns. In 
addition, the chapter also uses graphs and charts for explication. 
6.2 The analysis 
This second part of the study uses firm-level data. It does not use the whole 183 
firms exposed in accounts manipulation in testing the three hypotheses. The 183 
firms reduce to 99 (reduced to 98), and 83 firms depending on the hypothesis being 
tested, which has to do with data availability. Below, we show where the different 
sample sizes are used in testing the three hypotheses: 
(1) Based on criteria listed in chapter 4, ninety-nine firms are used for testing H6 
and Ha. The ninety-nine firms qualify because they have clean data on share 
prices; however one of them was not used because of being an outlier. 
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(2) Eighty-three firms are used for testing 117, because they have clean data on 
share prices, amount mentioned in the news, total assets, and value of 
shareholders' equity. 
Table 6.1 summarises the three hypotheses stated for this part of the study. The 
sources of data used in measuring each variable are refreshed in the table, having 
first been listed in chapter 4. 
Table 6.1 Summary of Consequences Hypotheses, and Source(s) of Data 
Hypotheses Sources of data 
For firms exposed in accounts manipulation, there is Datastream, Bloomberg, Yahoo! Finance, 
no difference between ex post and ex ante abnormal Google finance, Amadeus, AOL money 
stock returns, (116) and finance, etc 
The amount mentioned in news of accounts Newspapers, Amadeus, Datastream, 
manipulation is not associated with ex post Bloomberg, Yahoo! Finance, Google 
abnormal stock returns, (117) finance, AOL money and finance 
The section used in publishing news of accounts Newspaper publications manipulation in newspaper is not associated with ex 
post abnormal returns, (118) 
For a proper flow with the analysis, the following definitions earlier introduced in 
section 4.6.2 of chapter 4 are restated: - 
Abnormal return, AR: This refers to abnormal return of any day in the event 
window. 
Cumulative abnormal returns, CAR: This is the summation of all the abnormal 
returns from day ±1 to day ±6 of one single firm, 
Average abnormal returns, AAR: This is one day abnormal returns of all 98 firms 
divided by the sample size (98). 
Cumulative average abnormal returns of all 98 firms, CAAR: This is the 
successive summation of the average abnormal returns of the six days from day ±1 
to day ±6 of all 98 firms. 
ar 
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6.2.1 F. ficientmarkethypothesls 
According to the semi-strong-form version of the efficient market hypothesis, the 
market should quickly reflect all publicly available information. Since this study is 
operationalising this hypothesis (especially with reference to hypothesis 6), we 
would like to run a test to see whether the hypothesis holds for the information 
content of exposed accounts manipulation. 
Although there is no specific or explicit hypothesis that mentions semi-strong form 
efficient market hypothesis, nevertheless the hypothesis underlies the investigation 
about information content of news of accounts manipulation as published in 
newspapers which is being formalised. The test below is expected to prove, or 
disprove, the study's a priori assumption that the stock market is informationally 
efficient in the semi-strong form with respect to news of accounts manipulation 
published in the newspapers. 
To run the test, we calculate "day-on-day" or "rolling" average abnormal returns, 
AAR, for a-twelve-day window: t-5 to t+6. We could not calculate the AAR for 
day six before the news because to do so would require stock data for day seven 
before the news, the event window does not cover. This is why we have a-twelve- 
day day-on-day or rolling AARS. 
As per equation {4.9}, the average abnormal returns, AAR, is given as, 
aii't - A1vr) ARrf Pill, P,, r-, Mi't - N1r, r-, AAR, = 98 ... {4.9} 
98 98 Pill-/ R91-, 
-0 
/ 
Using the above formulae, we compare AAR of the day the news was published 
(day zero) against the AAR of any of the days in the event window, left or right. 
The result of the day-on-day or rolling AAR is presented in Graph 6.1. 
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Data 
Dims AAR ("/a) 
-5 -1.26 
-4 0.74 
-3 -0.46 
-2 -0.48 
-1 -0.85 
0 -6.25 
1 -2.90 
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4 1.30 
5 0.73 
6 0.23 
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Please note that abnormal returns are converted to percentages in the 
analysis, although the formulae express them as price relatives. 
Graph 6.1 
Twelve-Dad (Rolling 
074 
i -0.86 
-1.28 
For 98 firms put together, the mean of cumulative average abnormal returns before 
the event day is -0.46% = (-1.26 + 0.74 + -0.46 + -0.48 + -0.85) -5 and the mean 
of cumulative average abnormal returns (excluding day zero average abnormal 
returns) after the event day for all 98 firms is -0.37% _ (-2.90 + -0.97 + -0.61 + 
1.30 + 0.73 + 0.23) - 6. When day zero is included, mean of cumulative average 
abnormal returns after the event will be -1.21% = (-6.25 -2.90 -0.97 -0.61 + 1.30 + 
0.73+0.23)=7. 
It is possible to produce a static or stationary graph whereby average abnormal 
returns are obtained by using, exclusively, share prices and market index returns of 
day zero as the denominator in all calculations. To do this one will have to apply 
equation {4.13} of chapter 4. 
j(Ri't - Mißt) AR,: i 
PP,,, 
- Pill-() Mr, l-o 
AAR, =__- 98 ... 14.131 
98 98 Pi,, 
-n 
M1f-0 
Graph 6.2 is used to capture the above function. 
5' Note that Graph 6.2 has been produced from calculations which relate stock returns of day t (numerator) 
against only stock prices of day zero (numerator) for each event day abnormal returns, the stationary 
average abnormal returns. Compare this graph with the "day-on-day" average abnormal returns graph 
shown in 6.1 which is constructed as stock prices of the next day (numerator) against stock prices of the 
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Graph 6.2 
Data* 14 
AAR (%)' 
12 
Days '= 10 
-6 11.21 a 8 
-5 9.63 6 
-4 10.03 4 
-3 9.38 2 
-2 9.24 
-1 8.04 
0 
0 0 -2 
-3.81 -4 
2 -5.06 -6 
3 -5.60 -8 
4 -5.91 
5 -4.20 
6 -3.38 
Thirteen-Day (Stationary) Average Abnormal Returns 
The AARs here are derived from using share prices and market indices of day zero as denominator 
in all calculation of abnormal returns, hence they are higher than those annexed to Graph 6.1 which 
are derived from day-on-day calculations of abnormal returns. 
' Please note that abnormal returns are converted to percentages in the analysis, although 
the formulae express them as price relatives. 
The mean of cumulative average abnormal returns to the left of day zero for all 98 
firms is 9.59% = (11.21 + 9.63 + 10.03+9.38+9.24+8.04)-6 and the mean of 
cumulative average abnormal returns to the right of the event day for all 98 firms is 
-4.66% = -(3.81 +5.06 +5.60 +5.91 +4.20 + 3.38) -- 6. 
In Graph 6.2, the area under and above 0.0, on they axis, and day zero, on the x 
axis, is shaded for more visual clarity and distinction. It can be seen from the graph 
that average abnormal returns after the news fall below point 0 (or becomes 
negative) after day zero. As one can see from the graph, the shaded area of ex post 
average abnormal returns is below the 0.0 point on the y axis whereas the shaded 
area of ex ante average abnormal returns is above the 0.0 point on the same axis. 
It is interesting to see the sharp turning point of the AAR between day -1 and 0 in 
Graph 6.1 and Graph 6.2. 
previous day (denominator). For example, (t,, - t.. I)/t-1, (t42 -t, i)/t,,, (t,, - t+2)/t,., and so on. To see the 
difference, compare and contrast eqn. {4.10} with eqn. {4.14} in chapter 4. 
Days relative to exposure day, day 0 
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To gauge how the stock market quickly reflects the published news in the 
newspaper, we are interested in what happens between the one day average 
abnormal returns of day -1 and day zero (-1,0). It is clear as presented in Graph 
6.1 that the stock market is, indeed, semi-strong efficient as reflected in the news of 
accounts manipulation. 
Using concrete values from Graph 6.1 to support the analysis, it can be seen that 
while the AAR of the day before the news (day t-1) is -0.85 per cent, it tumbled to 
-6.25 per cent on the event day, day zero, which is the day the news was published 
in the newspaper. Indeed, none of the AARs before day zero is as low as that of 
day zero and day 1 after the news (i. e., t+l), which are the days the stock market 
quickly reflected the publicly available news of accounts manipulation. It can be 
noticed that AAR begins to rise as from day t+2 and day t+4, only to tumble again 
on day t+5 and t+6. We are not in a position to explain this anomaly. 
Quantity-wise, our result is comparable with Miller (2006) who investigates day 
zero market reactions following publication of news alleging accounting 
malfeasance. He finds an average one-day market adjusted significant reaction to 
be negative (-6.30%). Miller (2006) also finds a three-day stock reaction to be up 
to -8.20%. 
Our result is also consistent with Beneish (1999a) and others who document 
evidence of a rapid and immediate price adjustment subsequent to unfavourable 
news about a company. Indeed, Beneish (1999a) finds an average stock price loss 
of up to 21% following revelation of financial statements manipulation by 
managers. Our result is also consistent with those of Bernile and Jarrell (2009) 
who find a statistically significant negative (-7%) abnormal stock returns on the 
first day of announcement of firm-specific backdating allegations in the press. 
In sum, using the average abnormal stock market reactions between day t-1 and day 
zero, we can conclude that there is information content in news of accounts 
manipulation published in newspapers, which is consistent with the semi-strong 
version of the efficient market hypothesis. 
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The above result should be juxtaposed in the context of on-going discourse 
regarding acceptability and efficacy of the semi-strong version of the efficient 
market hypothesis. We prefer to defer discussing this to chapter 7. 
621.2 Test ofl th=& 6, H6 
We follow Brown and Warner (1980,1985), DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994), and Files 
et al. (2009) who use Paired Samples Test, Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test and the Sign 
Test in their event studies. Brown and Warner, in particular, use the three methods to 
check for method sensitivity. Brown and Warner (1980) and Pallant (2007) comment 
that the Paired Samples Test is a more powerful test than the other two. Nevertheless, 
the results they obtained from using these three methods are consistent with one 
another. We now investigate the behaviour of cumulative abnormal returns, CAR, of 
each of the 98 firms. 
Using the modified market or adjusted market model as explicated in section 4.6.2, 
equations {4.10} or {4.14} of chapter 4, we calculate a six-day (-6 to 0) and (0 to +6) 
cumulative abnormal return of each of the firms thus: - 
ft, n ft, n 
CAR, 1 = SEAR, 
=12 IR,,, -Mj,, ßs9 
That is cumulative abnormal returns before and after day zero for each of the 98 
firms. 
59 Daily abnormal returns, ARj,,, for a firm has been defined in chapter 4. For a re-cast, 
Phi - P;,, -n 
A,,, - A;, c-o Using previous day's share prices and market index as the AR;,, =- , denominator in calculating abnormal returns, see {4.7}. This 
is otherwise called "day-on-day/rolling abnormal returns" 
P; u - p;, 1.0 
A;,, 
- M;,, 0 Using share prices and market index returns of the day the 
AR;,, =- news was release as denominator in calculating abnormal 
P;, t-o 
M;,, 
-0 returns, see 
{4.12}. This is otherwise called "stationary" or 
"static" abnormal return. Notice that {4.12} neutralises the 
abnormal return of day zero to the value 0. 
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Graphs 6.3 and 6.4 are used to show the behaviour of this function. In the graphs. 
the blue line represents cumulative abnormal returns before the news (annotated as 
('ARj)re) while the pink line represents cumulative abnormal returns aller the news 
(annotated as CAR__posi). 
Graph 6.3 
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Graph 6.3 is the CAR calculated using share prices and market index returns of the 
previous day as denominator. 
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Graph 6.4 is CAR calculated based on day zero's share prices and market index 
returns as denominator for all event days in the event window. 
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In the graphs, each point represents the cumulative abnormal returns, CAR, over 
six days, pre and post the news, of each of the 98 firms. 
It appears particularly in Graph 6.4 that the ex ante CAR line are higher than the 
ex post CAR line. It shows that majority of the points of ex ante CAR are above 
the 0.0 line, on they axis, while majority of the points of ex post CAR lie below the 
0.0 line, on the same y axis. 
Because Graph 6.3 is produced from day-on-day share prices movement, the 
position is less discernable than in Graph 6.4. In fact, most of the points in Graph 
6.3 tend to suggest that the CARjre line is below the CAR post line. 
Furthermore, the differences between the pre- and post-cumulative abnormal 
returns conveyed in Graph 6.3 are not as pronounced or discernable as they are in 
Graph 6.4. Graph 6.4 makes it clearer that the fall in ex post CAR is higher than 
the fall in ex ante CAR sequel to the news of accounts manipulation published in 
newspapers. 
We go beyond analysing cumulative abnormal returns of share prices behaviour by 
graphical methods by conducting three different tests for CAR. One of the tests is 
parametric and the others are two non-parametric tests. The parametric test is the 
Paired Samples Test while the non-parametric tests are the Wilcoxon Signed Ranks 
Test and the Sign Test. 
The purpose of the tests is to investigate whether there is a significant statistical 
difference between the mean of pre-event day CAAR/CAR and the mean of post- 
event day CAAR/CAR. In effect, hypothesis 6, H6, is being tested with the 
definitions of abnormal stock returns encountered in the preceding analyses. 
The analysis for each test is presented below, beginning with the descriptives in 
Table 6.2. And we begin with the result whereby stock returns of all event days 
were calculated by using share prices and market index returns of day zero as the 
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denominator throughout. These are to be found in the first two and last two rows of 
Table 6.2. 
Table 6.2 Descriptive Statistics 
Std. 
N Min. Max. Mean Median Deviation 
Day t-1 AAR, using day zero prices 98 -5.60 96.60 8.0462 2.52 16.82391 
Day t+1 AAR, using day zero prices 98 -51.39 24.33 -3.8136 -1.77 11.33883 
Day t-1 AAR, based on rolling calculation 98 -35.79 59.43 -0.8461 -0.69 8.84903 
Day t+l AAR, based on rolling calculation 98 -50.26 22.49 -2.9035 -1.44 9.55937 
Day Zero AAR, based on rolling calculation 98 -68.24 16.62 -6.2486 -1.98 12.85530 
Ex post CAAR, based on rolling calculation 98 -9.31 6.03 -0.3707 -0.12 1.90587 
Ex ante CAAR, based on rolling calculation 98 -21.00 10.87 -1.4256 -0.76 3.43773 
Ex post CAAR, using day zero prices 98 -74.50 24.33 -4.6597 -2.19 13.36039 
Ex ante CAAR, using day zero prices 98 -9.06 96.45 9.5898 3.23 17.52939 
Valid N (listwise) 98 
The table shows a mean decrease of 8.05% in one-day AAR before the news (t-1). 
The mean decrease in one-day AAR after the event (t+1) is 3.81%. The cumulative 
average abnormal return (CAAR) before the news shows a mean increase of 9.59% 
whereas the mean decrease in CAAR after the news is -4.66%. 
The minimum loss and maximum gain in AAR one-day before the news is 5.60% 
and 96.60%, respectively. The minimum loss and maximum gain in AAR one-day 
after the news is 51.39% and 24.33%, respectively. The minimum loss and 
maximum gain in CAAR before the news is 9.06% and 96.45%, respectively. 
Finally, the minimum loss and maximum gain in CAAR after the news is 74.50% 
and 24.33%, respectively. 
For the data based on rolling or day-on-day calculations, the table shows a mean 
decrease of 0.85% in one-day AAR before the news (t-1). There is a mean decrease 
of 2.90% in one-day AAR after the news (t+l). On the day the news was published 
(day zero) the mean decrease in AAR is 6.25%. The mean decrease in ex post 
cumulative abnormal returns (CAAR) is 0.37% while the mean decrease in ex ante 
CAAR is 1.43%. This shows that mean of ex ante CAAR is lower than mean of ex 
post CAAR, -1.43 < -0.37%. 
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The minimum loss and maximum gain in AAR the day before the news is 35.79% 
and 59.43%, respectively. The minimum loss and maximum gain in AAR the day 
after the news is 50.26% and 22.49%, respectively. The minimum loss and 
maximum gain in AAR on the day of the news is 68.24% and 16.62%, respectively. 
The minimum loss and maximum gain in CAAR before the news is 21.00% and 
10.87%, respectively. Finally, the minimum loss and maximum gain in CAAR 
after the news is 9.31 % and 6.03%, respectively. 
From all indications, it is appears that irrespective of whether AARJCAAR are 
calculated on static or dynamic basis, mean ex ante AAR are higher than mean ex 
post AAR. As for cumulative average abnormal returns, based on static 
calculation, mean of ex ante (9.59%) CAAR is higher than mean ex post CAAR (- 
4.66%). 
Table 6.3 provides information on Paired Samples test of difference between 
means and standard deviations, 95% confidence interval, t-value and significance 
levels for ex ante CAR and ex post CAR. 
Table 6.3 Paired Samples Test 
Paired Differences 
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference 
Std. Sig. (2- 
Mean Deviation Lower Upper t df tailed) 
Day t- I AAR - Day t+l AAR (using day zero prices) 11.859 20.808 7.688 16.031 5.642 97 . 
000 
Day t-1- Day t+I (using rolling data) 2.057 13.045 0-. 558 4.673 1.561 97 . 122 
Day t-I - Day Zero (using rolling data) 5.402 13.477 2.700 8.104 3.968 97 . 000 
Day t+l -Day Zero (rolling data) 3.345 15.705 0.196 6.494 2.108 97 . 038 
Ex post CAAR - Ex ante CAAR (using rolling datal) 1.055 3.906 0.271 1.838 2.674 97 . 009 
Ex post CAAR- Ex ante CAAR (using day 0 -14.249 23.707 -19.002 . 9.497 -5.950 97 . 000 prices) 
The paired samples tests relating to stock returns calculated based on day zero's 
share prices and market index returns are found in the first and last rows of Table 
6.3. It shows that the mean (8.0462) of one-day average abnormal return before the 
news is greater than the mean (-3.8136) of one-day average abnormal return after 
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the news, day (-1, +1) by 11.86%. The mean difference is statistically significant; t 
= 5.642,97df, 2-tailed Sig. p-value = 0.000. The mean (9.5898) of cumulative 
average abnormal returns before the news, ex ante CAAR, is greater than the mean 
(-4.6597) of cumulative average abnormal returns after the news, ex post CAAR, 
by 14.25%. The mean difference is statistically significant; t= -5.950,97df, 2- 
tailed Sig. p-value = 0.000. 
Analysing the table based on the result of day-on-day or rolling calculations, the 
mean (-0.8461) of one-day average abnormal return before the news is greater than 
mean (-2.9035) of one-day average abnormal return after the news (-1, +1) by 
2.06%, however the mean difference is not statistically significant, t-value of 1.561, 
Sig. p-value (2-tailed) = 0.122. The non-significant result is not surprising because 
this is actually a two-day return as there is an intervening day (day zero) in-between 
the two, which (perhaps) have impacted the result. 
Mean (-0.8461) of one-day average abnormal returns, AAR, before the news is 
higher than mean (-6.2486) of day zero average abnormal returns, AAR, (-1,0) by 
5.40%. The difference between the two means is statistically significant. T-value 
of the difference between day -1 and day zero is 3.97, Sig. p-value (2 tailed) _ 
0.000. The mean (-2.9035) of one-day AAR after the news is higher than mean (- 
6.2486) of day zero AAR (+1,0) by 3.35%. The mean difference between day +1 
and day zero is statistically significant at the 5% level, with t-value of 2.108, Sig. p- 
value (2-tailed) = 0.038. The two significant test results reported for days (-1,0) 
and (+1,0) suggest that there is difference between means of ex post and ex ante 
abnormal stock returns. 
The mean (-0.3707) of cumulative average abnormal returns after the news, ex post 
CAAR, is higher than the mean (-1.4256) of cumulative average abnormal returns 
after the news, ex ante CHAR, by 1.05. The difference between the two means is 
statistically significant. T-value is 2.67, with Sig. p-value (2-tailed) = 0.009. 
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In sum, absent the aberrant result of days (-I and +1) calculated on a rolling basis, 
of which has been explained as probably being impacted upon by the intervening 
day zero result, the statistically significant differences between means of ex ante 
and ex post average abnormal returns and ex ante and ex post cumulative average 
abnormal returns are suggestive that the difference between ex post abnormal 
returns and ex ante abnormal returns is not equal to zero. This statistical difference 
may be attributed to news of accounts manipulation as reported in newspapers, 
which is also consistent with the conclusion that there is information content in 
news of accounts manipulation. 
As a robustness check, we perform Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test and Sign Test to 
see whether this result is driven by the Paired Samples t-test method used. 
The test results are presented in Table 6.4, Panel A (Wilcoxon Signed Ranks test) 
and Panel B (Sign test). 
Table 6.4 Test Statistics 
Panel A. Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Tes t 
Day Zero Day Zero 
Day t+1 AAR Day t+1 AAR AAR - Day AAR - Day Ex ante CAAR - Ex ante 
CAAR - 
- Day t-1 AAR - Day t-1 AAR t-1 AAR t+l AAR Ex post CAAR Ex post CAAR 
(based on day (based on (based on (based on (based on rolling (based on day 
Zero data) rolling data) rolling data) rolling data) prices) Zero prices) 
Z -6.531' -1.556' -3.878' -1.270' -2.546' -7.007b 
Asymp. Sig. (2- . 000 . 120 . 000 . 204 . 011 . 
000 
tailed) 
'. Based on positive ranks. 
b. Based on negative ranks. 
`. Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test 
Panel B. Signed Test 
Ex ante 
Day t+I AAR - Day t+1 AAR - Day zero AAR Day Zero AAR Ex ante CAAR CAAR - Ex 
Day W AAR Day t-1 AAR - Day W AAR - Day t+l AAR - Ex post post CAAR 
(based on day (based on (based on (based on CAAR (based (based on day 
Zero data) rolling data) rolling data) rolling data) on rolling data) Zero data) 
Z -6.498 -. 505 -1.919 -. 909 -1.919 -6.364 
Asymp. Sig. (2- . 000 . 614 . 055 . 363 . 055 . 000 tailed) 
'. Sign Test 
or 
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The results are presented based on the two modes used in calculating abnormal 
returns. As per calculations based at t=0, Panel A shows that the difference 
between the medians of AAR of day t+1 and day zero is statistically significant. 
The z-value is -6.53, with Asymp. Sig. p-value (2-tailed) = 0.000. 
As per the rolling calculations, the difference in the medians of AAR of day t+1 and 
day t-1 is not statistically significant. The difference between the medians of AAR 
of day zero and that of day t+l is also not statistically significant. The differences 
between ex ante and ex post CAAR are statistically significant under both the static 
and rolling methods. The z-value of difference in CAAR under the static method is 
-7.01 whereas z-value under the rolling method is -2.55. 
The result of the Sign test shown in Panel B of Table 6.4 follows the same patterns 
observed with respect to the Wilcoxon Signed Ranks test where the median 
differences in the AAR of day t+1 and day t-1, and AAR of day zero rolling versus 
day t+lrolling are not significant. Comparing these two non-parametric tests and 
that of the paired samples test, which is a parametric test, there is only one instance 
in the paired samples t-tests where the result is not statistically significant. In the 
Wilcoxon Signed Ranks test and the Sign test, there are two instances where the 
statistical tests were not significant. 
In sum, robustness is achieved because these two non-parametric tests support the 
paired samples t-test carried out earlier on. Taken the above analysis together, the 
overall result is indicative that ex post abnormal returns are different from ex ante 
abnormal returns following newspaper publication of news of accounts manipulation. 
622 Test ofr, lah'oiu p ktwcn ex post abnormal rvhuns 
and amount mcntionca (hypothesis 7, H, ) 
In order to investigate the relationship between the amounts mentioned in the news 
of accounts manipulation and ex post abnormal returns, we run eight linear 
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regressions60 (following equation (4.16) in chapter 4) to obtain/extract RZ statistic 
as well as determine the partial correlations. The linear regressions are of the 
forms: 
AR1=a =a+Q, Log Amount + ß2Log_TA + ei .... 1 
AR,,, =a+Q, Log Amount + ß2Log TA + ei .... 11 
AR, +2 =a+ ß1Log Amount + ß2Log TA + Ei.... III 
AR, +3 =a+ ßjLog Amount + Q2Log TA + ei .... Iv 
ARt+4 =a+ ßl ß, Log Amount + ß2Log TA + Ei .... V 
ARS 5=a+ß jLog Amount + ß2Log TA + Si .... vi 
ARt+6 = a+ ß, Log Amount + ß2Log TA + ci .... vu[ 
CAR =a+ fl Log. Amount + ß2Log TA + ci .... VIII 
Where: 
AR,,,, = Abnormal returns of a single firm on a given event day 
CAR = Six-day cumulated abnormal returns of a single firm. That is, abnormal 
returns of a single firm from day t+1 to day t+6. 
Log_Amount = logarithm of the total amount mentioned in the news 
Log_Total assets = logarithm of total assets of the year of reporting of accounts 
manipulation. 
So, each regression is regressing abnormal returns of each of the event days, 
beginning from day zero, on logarithm of the sum of the amount mentioned in the 
news and the log of total assets, to control for size. We also run another set of 
regressions whereby shareholders' equity is used to control for firm size (please see 
Appendix 6-1) at the end of the thesis. The only thing that changes in the 
regressions is the dependent variable. 
60 We have assumed a linear relationship between the dependent and independent variables because both 
sets of data are likely to have similar properties of normality as well as being continuous. 
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Based on materiality, amount mentioned is likely to be weighed against firm size. 
For example, different reactions are likely to trail a firm whose total assets (or 
shareholders' equity) value is, say, $1,000,000 with amount mentioned in the news 
as $100,000 compared to another firm whose total assets (or shareholders' equity) 
value is, say, $100,000 with amount mentioned in the news as the same $100,000. 
The regression of day zero is of particular interest to us because it is the day of 
release of news, the day investors are faced with their first decision choices. 
Regressions after day zero serve to provide comparative information as well as for 
sensitivity checks. 
The number of firms used for the regression is the 83 firms that had clean data used 
in calculating abnormal returns, amount mentioned, total assets and value of 
shareholders' equity. Thus, the 16 firms that had no complete data are excluded 
from the regression. 
Descnvtsve statistics 
Table 6.5 presents the descriptive statistics of ex post abnormal stock returns, amount, 
total assets, and shareholders' equity including mean, minimum, maximum, standard 
deviation and standard error of both the dependent and independent variables. 
Table 6.5 Descriptive Statistics 
N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Error Std. Deviation 
Day zero AR 83 -68.24 16.62 -6.7102 1.50001 13.66579 
Day t+1 AR 83 -50.26 22.49 -3.0245 1.10760 10.09073 
Day t+2 AR 83 -63.92 14.68 -. 9841 1.06985 9.74675 
Day t+3 AR 83 -16.83 37.27 -. 0067 . 69253 6.30921 
Day t+4 AR 83 -14.72 51.25 1.3249 . 91575 8.34291 
Day t+5 AR 83 -17.95 37.83 . 5784 . 71168 6.48368 
Day t+6 AR 83 -11.02 27.58 . 4901 . 65212 5.94107 
CAR (t+1 to t+6) 83 -55.85 36.16 -1.6218 1.28740 11.72877 
Log_Amount 83 4.40 11.19 8.4865 . 13631 1.24189 
Log_TA 83 6.26 12.98 9.5576 . 13745 1.25227 
Log_Equity 83 7.23 10.34 8.5659 . 07401 . 67427 
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Among all the dependent variables the highest abnormal return loss occurred on day 
zero where the minimum abnormal returns loss was 68.24%; the maximum abnormal 
return gain was 16.62% on that same day. The mean abnormal return on the same 
day was a loss of 6.71%. Notice that the mean loss was greater on day zero than on 
any other day after the news. (Compare the mean reported here with 6.25% on day 
zero for the 98 firms. This can be seen in Graph 6.1 and the annexed table to the left 
of the graph). Among all the days after the news, the highest maximum abnormal 
returns gain (51.25%) occurred on day 4 after the news. On that day the minimum 
abnormal returns was a loss of 14.72% and the mean abnormal return on the same day 
was a gain of 1.3248%. The lowest abnormal loss (-11.02%) occurred on day 6 after 
the news. The maximum abnormal return gain was 27.58% on the same day. The 
descriptive statistics relating to the remaining ex post abnormal returns and the six- 
day cumulative abnormal return (CAR) can be found in Table 6.5. 
The minimum (maximum) log of amount mentioned in the news was 4.4 (11.19), with 
mean of 8.49. The minimum (maximum) value of log of total assets is 6.26 (12.98), 
mean value being 9.56. The minimum (maximum) value of log of shareholders' 
equity is 7.23 (10.34), average value being 8.56. 
Levels ofirbdonshlp between expo st abnormal vtums and amount 
We use several methods to analyse the relationship between ex post abnormal returns 
and the amount mentioned in the news. First we ordered the data in ascending order 
by amount mentioned and grouped the entire 83 firms into tertiles of Low, High and 
Medium group. Arbitrarily, we allocated the first 27 firms to the first tertile ("Low 
group"), the next 27 firms to the middle ("Medium group") and the last 29 firms to 
the third tertile ("High group"). The intention is merely to show the descriptive 
statistics of each group, so we did not truncate the data. The descriptives of the non- 
truncated but ordered and grouped data is presented in Table 6.6. 
As one would expect from Table 6.6, without truncating the data the highest value of 
the variables is to be found in the High group; naturally so because it contains the 
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highest number of firms with the highest values. For example, high mean of amount 
($9.77), high total assets ($10.94) and high shareholders' equity ($9.304) are 
associated with high mean (1.86) of day zero abnormal returns. 
Table 6.6 Descriptive Statistics of Ordered and Grouped Data n= 83 
N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Day zero AR, Low 27 -68.24 -5.71 -20.1637 16.66513 
Day zero AR, Medium 27 -5.7 -. 7 -3.009 1.8591 
Day zero AR, High 29 -. 66 16.62 1.8591 3.56293 
Day t+1 AR, Low 27 -50.26 -4.59 -13.2019 10.37269 
Day t+1 AR, Medium 27 -4.30 . 34 -1.4837 1.39744 
Day t+1 AR, High 29 . 40 22.49 5.0166 5.22860 
Day t+2 AR, Low 27 -63.92 -1.10 -8.3670 13.67591 
Day t+2 AR, Medium 27 -1.05 1.26 -. 0152 . 69914 
Day t+2 AR, High 29 1.40 14.68 4.9876 3.69945 
Day t+3 AR, Low 27 -16.83 -1.95 -5.3911 3.41454 
Day t+3 AR, Medium 27 -1.77 . 54 -. 1867 . 
62550 
Day t+3 AR, High 29 . 63 37.27 5.1738 
7.04285 
Day t+4 AR, Low 27 -14.72 -1.03 -4.3556 3.90419 
Day t+4 AR, Medium 27 -1.02 1.22 . 1330 . 
59045 
Day t+4 AR, High 29 1.25 51.25 7.7234 10.69927 
Day t+5 AR, Low 27 -17.95 -1.08 -4.1389 3.91962 
Day t+5 AR, Medium 27 -. 92 . 72 -. 2256 . 
41787 
Day t+5 AR, High 29 . 72 37.83 
5.7190 7.69629 
Day t+6 AR, Low 27 -11.02 -1.80 -4.1867 1.80518 
Day t+6 AR, Medium 27 -1.51 . 71 -. 4352 . 
60163 
Day t+6 AR, High 29 . 71 27.58 
5.7059 7.06495 
CAR, Low 27 -9.31 -. 75 -2.1990 1.80414 
CAR, Medium 27 -. 71 . 38 -. 1232 . 
30873 
CAR, High 29 . 44 6.03 1.3884 
1.27381 
Log amount, Low 27 4.40 7.88 7.1162 . 75866 
Log amount, Medium 27 7.89 9.01 8.4799 . 35428 
Log amount, High 29 9.07 11.19 9.7699 . 59067 
Log total assets, Low 27 6.26 8.72 8.2753 . 48141 
Log total assets, Medium 27 8.74 10.16 9.3564 . 44557 
Log total assets, High 29 10.17 12.98 10.9400 . 76597 
Log equity, Low 27 7.23 8.18 7.8324 . 26851 
Log equity_Medium 27 8.19 8.82 8.5155 . 19174 
Log equity High 29 8.85 10.34 9.2971 . 39456 
Valid N (listwise) 27 
Another way we examine the level of relationship between ex post abnormal returns 
and amount mentioned is to graph the relationship between the two variables' data by 
or 
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partitioning both sets of data into tertiles of Low, Medium, and High group after 
ordering and truncating the firm size to 8 1. We truncated the 83 firms to 81 in order to 
have equal number of firm sizes in each group. The data continue to be ordered by 
amount in ascending manner. Graphs 6.5a-h show the relationship between ex po. s! 
abnormal stock returns and amount mentioned. Day zero abnormal returns and 
cumulative abnormal returns are used as specimen. The red and blue lines represent 
the amount mentioned and abnormal stock returns, respectively. 
Graph 6.5a levels of Day Zero and Log Amount 
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Graph 6.5a and Graph 6.5b, respectively, presents the non-partitioned but truncated 
and ordered data of day zero abnormal return and CAR, and log amount. It appears 
from both graphs that abnormal returns and amount mentioned move in the same 
(positive) direction, although the increase in day zero abnormal returns line appears 
more rapid and discernable in Graph 6.5a where it almost touched the amount line 
from below. 
To see the differences between the groups (if any), we recommend that henceforth the 
graphs should first be read in vertical columns before comparing them horizontally. 
Graphs of truncated, ordered and partitioned data are presented below. Starting the 
analysis with day zero abnormal returns (represented by the first vertical set of 
panels), visual inspection of the panel shows that day zero abnormal return and 
amount appear to move in the same direction. However, the shape, and magnitude 
(magnitude to be discussed in a moment) of the differences between the group 
appears different. It can be seen that the I ligh group" shows a more rapid increase in 
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the level of day zero abnormal returns; so rapid that it almost touched the amount line 
from below at around 9 on they axis. 
Specifically, in Graphs 6.5c-g, it appears that day zero abnormal return and amount 
are recording some positive increases in all groups. However, the positive increase 
seems to be more rapid and pronounced at the beginning of the Low group (Graph 
6.5c) and at the end of the High group (Graph 6.5g) where day zero abnormal return 
line almost touched the amount line from below. 
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In Graphs 6.5d-h of the vertical panels to the right, it appears that both ('AR and 
amount mentioned are recording some gradual, positive increase for the groups, 
although the CAR line never touched the amount line from below in any of the 
groups. 
Please note that we did not control lbr size in drawing the graphs; we merely wanted 
to use them to show the relationship between abnormal stock returns and amount 
mentioned. This notice becomes necessary in view of the results or signs of the test 
reported in Table 6.10 below where the statistical significance between day zero 
abnormal returns, CAR and amount are tested. 
Magnitude of chaIIgc s in levels of'data 
The third way we examine the relationship between ex post abnormal returns and 
amount mentioned is by computing/extracting the mean of each group and then 
comparing the magnitude of the absolute mean relative changes, between any two 
combinations of the three groups. The computed absolute relative changes in means 
are presented in Table 6.7. The means in this table are the same as those in Table 6.6, 
except that the means in Table 6.7 have been rounded to 2 decimal places. 
Table 6.7 Means of Ordered and Partitioned Data and Relative Changes 
Low, L 
(n= 27) 
Medium, M 
(n 27) 
High, II 
(n 29) 
Relative Changes 
M-1, I I-M H-L 
Mean of day zero abnormal returns -20.16 -3.01 1.86 -0.85 -1.618 -1.09 
Mean of day t+ I abnormal returns -13.20 -1.48 5.02 -0.8') -4.39 -1.38 
Mean of day t+2 abnormal returns -8.37 -0.01 4.99 -1.00 -500 -1.60 
Mean of day t+3 abnormal returns -5.39 -0.19 5.17 -0.96 -28.21 -1.96 
Mean of day t+4 abnormal returns -4.36 0.13 7.72 -1.30 58.38 -2.77 
Mean of day t+5 abnormal returns -4.14 -0.23 5.72 -0.94 -25.87 -2.38 
Mean of day t+6 abnormal returns -4.19 -0.43 5.71 -0.90 -14.28 -2.36 
Mean of cumulative abnormal returns -2.20 -0.12 1.39 -0.94 -12.58 -1.63 
Mean of log amount 7.12 8.48 9.77 0.19 0.15 0.37 
Mean of log total assets 8.27 9.36 10.94 0.13 0.17 0.32 
Mean of log of shareholders' equity 7.83 8.51 9.30 0.09 0.0') 0.19 
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For each of the event days after the news, CAR, amount, total assets, and value of 
shareholders' equity, we examine the group with the highest relative changes among 
the groups. From the last major column of Table 6.7, it can be seen that the highest 
absolute relative change (11.618 I) in the mean of abnormal return of day zero 
occurred in the High-Medium group. 
The highest absolute relative change (14.39 I) in the mean of abnormal returns of day 
one after the news is to be found in the High-Medium group as well. For the 
abnormal returns of day two up to day six after the news and cumulative abnormal 
returns contained in the table, it can be seen that the High-Medium group column 
contains the highest absolute relative changes. So we concluded that the High- 
Medium group contains the greatest magnitude of changes in abnormal stock returns. 
However, the High-Low group contains the highest absolute relative changes in the 
means of amount mentioned, total assets and shareholders' equity. 
F4thrd Samples Tess 
We are now in a position to test for the differences between the means of any two 
groups. In order to perform paired samples test whereby the number of firms in each 
group are equal, we truncated the data at both ends of the continuum. Thus we 
removed the lowest and highest values from the data before dividing it into tertiles 
consisting of 27 firms in each group. We then computed the trimmed means of each 
of the respective groups: Low, Medium and High. The descriptive statistics resulting 
from this exercise are presented in Table 6.8. 
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Table 6.8 Descriptive Statistics of Ordered and Grouped Data n= 81 
N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Day zero AR, Low 27 -68.24 -5.71 -20.1637 16.66513 
Day zero AR, Medium 27 -5.7 -. 7 -3.009 1.8591 
Day zero AR, High 27 -. 66 6.44 1.605 1.9205 
Day t+1 AR, Low 27 -50.26 -4.59 -13.2019 10.37269 
Day t+1 AR, Medium 27 -4.30 . 34 -1.4837 1.39744 
Day W AR, High 27 . 40 12.21 3.9311 3.33 
Day t+2 AR, Low 27 -63.92 -1.10 -8.3670 13.67591 
Day t+2 AR, Medium 27 -1.05 1.26 -. 0152 . 69914 
Day t+2 AR, High 27 1.40 11.13 4.255 3.69945 
Day t+3 AR, Low 27 -16.83 -1.95 -5.3911 3.41454 
Day t+3 AR, Medium 27 -1.77 . 54 -. 1867 . 62550 
Day t+3 AR, High 27 . 63 10.80 3.7459 
3.1741 
Day t+4 AR, Low 27 -14.72 -1.03 -4.3556 3.90419 
Day t+4 AR, Medium 27 -1.02 1.22 . 1330 . 59045 
Day t+4 AR, High 27 1.25 18.50 5.1133 3.9255 
Day t+5 AR, Low 27 -17.95 -1.08 -4.1389 3.91962 
Day t+5 AR, Medium 27 -. 92 . 72 -. 2256 . 
41787 
Day t+5 AR, High 27 . 72 13.60 
3.9318 3.28539 
Day t+6 AR, Low 27 -11.02 -1.80 -4.1867 1.80518 
Day t+6 AR, Medium 27 -1.51 . 71 -. 4352 . 
60163 
Day t+6 AR, High 27 . 71 
18.60 4.27770 4.74321 
CAR, Low 27 -9.31 -. 75 -2.1990 1.80414 
CAR, Medium 27 -. 71 . 38 -. 
1232 . 30873 
CAR, High 27 . 44 3.03 1.13142 . 
80494 
Log amount, Low 27 4.40 7.88 7.1162 . 75866 
Log amount, Medium 27 7.89 9.01 8.4799 . 35428 
Log amount, High 27 9.1285 11.19 9.8215 . 57933 
Log total assets, Low 27 6.26 8.72 8.2753 . 48141 
Log total assets, Medium 27 8.74 10.16 9.3564 . 44557 
Log total assets, High 27 10.18 12.98 10.9969 . 76360 
Log equity, Low 27 7.23 8.18 7.8324 . 26851 
Log equity_Medium 27 8.19 8.82 8.5155 . 19174 
Log equity_High 27 8.88 10.34 9.3300 . 38894 
Valid N (listwise) 27 
The result of the paired samples t-test is presented in Table 6.9. 
g7 
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Table 6.9 Paired Samples T-Tests 
Mean 
DifT. Sig. (2- 
t df tailed) 
Pair 1 Day Zero AR, Medium - Day Zero Alt, Low 17.1544 5.915 26 . 000 
Pair 2 Day Zero AR, I ligh - Day Zero AR, Low 21.7687 7.544 26 . 
000 
Pair 3 Day Zero AR, I ligh - Day Zero AR, Medium 4.614 19.554 26 . 000 
Pair 4 Day t+l AR, Medium - Day +1 AR, Low 11.7182 6.646 26 . 
000 
Pair S Day t+1 AR, I ligh - Day t+ I AR, Low 17.133 10.845 
26 . 000 
Pair 6 Day t +1 AR, I ligh - Day t +1 AR, Medium 5.4148 10.274 26 . 
000 
Pair 7 Day t +2 AR, Medium - Day t +2 AR, Low 8.3518 3.269 26 . 003 
Pair 8 Day t +2 AR, I igh - Day t +2 AR, Low 12.622 5.426 26 . 
000 
Pair 9 Day t +2 Al;, I ligh - Day t +2 AR, Medium 4.2702 9.568 26 . 
000 
Pair 10 Day t +3 AR, Medium - Day t +3 AR, Low 5.2044 9.580 26 . 
000 
Pair 11 Day t +3 AR, I igh - Day t +3 AR, Low 9.1370 20.003 26 . 
000 
Pair 12 Day t +3 AR, High- Day t +3 AR, Medium 3.9326 7.609 26 . 000 
Pair 13 Day t +4 All, Medium - Day t +4 AR, Low 4.4886 6.907 
26 . 000 
Pair 14 Day t +4 AR, High - Day t +4 AR, Low 9.4689 9.283 
26 . 000 
Pair 15 Day t +4 AR, I igh - Day t +4 AR, Medium 4.9803 5.039 
26 . 000 
Pair 16 Day t +5 AR, Medium - Day t +5 AR, Low 3.9133 5.620 
26 . 000 
Pair 17 Day t +5 AR, I ligh - Day t +5 AR, Low 8.0707 10.561 
26 . 000 
Pair 18 Day t +5 AR, I ligh - Day t +5 Alt, Medium 4.1574 5.932 
26 . 000 
Pair 19 Day t +6 AR, Medium - Day t +6 AR, Low 3.7515 14.855 
26 . 000 
Pair 20 Day t +6 AR, I ligh - Day t +6 AR, Low 8.4644 10.045 
26 . 000 
Pair 21 Day t +6 AR, I ligh - Day t +6 AR, Medium 4.7129 5.378 
26 . 000 
Pair 22 CAR, Medium - CAR, Low 2.0758 6.902 
26 . 000 
Pair 23 CAR, I Iigh - CAR, Low 3.33042 11.625 
26 . 000 
Pair 24 CAR, I ligh - CAR, Medium 1.25462 10.445 
26 . 000 
Pair 25 Log Amount, Medium - Log Amount, Low 1.3637 14.604 
26 . 000 
Pair 26 Log Amount, I Iigh - Log Amount, Low 2.7053 27.790 
26 . 000 
Pair 27 Log Amount, I ligh - Log Amount, Medium 1.3419 30.047 26 . 
000 
Pair 28 Log Total Assets, Medium - Log Total Assets, Low 1.0811 16.291 26 . 
000 
Pair 29 Log Total Assets, I sigh - Log Total Assets, Low 2.7216 25.896 26 . 
000 
Pair 30 Log Total Assets, high - Log Total Assets, Medium 1.6405 28.093 26 . 
000 
Pair 31 Log Equity, Medium - Log Equity, Low 0.6831 37.017 26 . 000 
Pair 32 Log Equity, I ligh - Log Equity, Low 1.4976 40.759 
26 . 000 
Pair 33 Log Equity, I li h- Lo Equity, Medium 0.8145 20.887 26 . 000 
Table 6.9 shows that the differences between the magnitudes in the means of the 
paired groups are statistically significant at conventional levels for all variables. This 
suggests that the means of the different groups are not equal to one another. We can 
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conclude that the statistically significant differences observed in the magnitudes of the 
means of the groups are not due to chance but because of the "scientific" procedure 
used in dividing the data into tertiles. 
Bivaz ate and Par1Y'al Correlation analyxis 
Table 6.10 contains both bivariate and partial correlations, and p-values (p-values 
in parentheses and italicised) between ex post abnormal returns, and log amount; 
and between cumulative abnormal returns and log amount for each of days t+l up 
to t +6, and that of cumulative abnormal returns, CAR. The first column of the 
table contains the bivariate correlations between ex post abnormal returns, and log 
amount. The second and third columns contain the partial correlations of the 
variables, each controlling for total assets and shareholders' equities, respectively. 
It appears that all the correlations (bivariate and partial) are low, and none of them 
is statistically significant. 
Table 6.10 Correlations Between Ex Post Abnormal Returns and Log Amount 
Bivariate 
Correlations Partial Correlations 
Amount 
(N=83) 
Amount, controlling for 
total assets dF-80 
Amount, controlling 
for e quit (df=80) 
Day Zero abnormal returns 0.133 (0.237) 0.065 (0.561) 0.133 (0.233) 
Day t+l abnormal returns -0.004 (0.968) -0.041 (0.713) -. 030 (0.789) 
Day t+2 abnormal returns -0.113 (0.307) -0.178 (0.110) -0.080 (0.473) 
Day t+3 abnormal returns 0.002 (0.989) -0.065 (0.561) -0.025 (0.826) 
Day t+4 abnormal returns 0.014 (0.900) 0.087 (0.436) 0.037 (0.744) 
Day t+5 abnormal returns 0.042 (0.705) 0.044 (0.692) 0.006 (0.955) 
Day t+6 abnormal returns -0.023 (0.834) 0.065 (0.564) 0.001 (0.990) 
CAR -0.068 (0.540) -0.099 (0.375) -0.075 (0.501) 
Specifically, highlighting the correlations of day zero which is our main interest, it 
appears that there are low positive statistically non-significant correlations. The 
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bivariate correlation is 0.133. The partial correlation is 0.065 and 0.133, controlling 
for the effect of total assets and shareholders' equity, respectively. In addition, there 
is a low negative statistically non-significant correlation (-0.099, -0.075) between 
CAR and amount, controlling for total assets and shareholders' equity, respectively. 
The bivariate correlation for CAR is -0.068, which is also not statistically 
significant. 
The remaining respective bivariate and partial correlations for day t+l up to day t 
+6 are included in Table 6.10 for sensitivity check. For these remaining days, 
consistent with the results obtained for day zero correlations the highest absolute 
correlation among the low bivariate correlation is 0.113. The highest absolute 
partial correlation is 0.178. They are not statistically significant. These can be 
found on day t+2. 
The statistically non-significant correlations are suggestive that ex post (especially, 
day zero) abnormal returns are independent of the amount mentioned in the news. 
In other words, the magnitude of amount mentioned in the news of accounts 
manipulation is not associated with ex post abnormal stock returns61. 
Variation in ex post abnormal returns explained by amount, R2 
To what extent (if any) can amount mentioned in the news explain the variation in 
ex post abnormal returns? To answer this question we examine the computed R2 
statistic obtained from the linear regression. R2 has been described as a measure of 
association between a dependent variable and an optimally weighted combination 
of two or more independent variables (see Cohen et al. 2003, p. 69). In other 
words, "... it is the proportion of variation in the dependent variable that is predicted 
from the best linear combinations of the independent variables" (Tabachnick and 
Fidell (2007, p. 130)). 
61 Unfortunately, we encountered some difficulty in determining and summing the amount mentioned in 
the news. We expect that this may likely introduce some noise, but not bias the result. 
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Table 6.11 presents extracted R2 statistic from the linear regressions, controlling for 
firm size. Consistent with the partial correlations reported above, it can be seen that 
amount mentioned in the news explains very small proportion of the variation in 
abnormal returns after the news, after controlling for the two proxies of size - total 
assets and shareholders' equity. 
Table 6.11 
Ex post Abnormal Returns 
Day Zero abnormal returns 
Day t+I abnormal returns 
Day t+2 abnormal returns 
Day t+3 abnormal returns 
Day t+4 abnormal returns 
Day t+5 abnormal returns 
Day t+6 abnormal returns 
Cumulative abnormal returns 
R2, controlling for R2, controlling for 
total assets shareholders' equity 
0.024 0.019 
0.007 0.005 
0.035 0.014 
0.014 0.003 
0.019 0.003 
0.002 0.006 
0.023 0.003 
0.011 0.006 
Even for day zero, which is of particular interest, amount mentioned in the news is 
only able to explain (at the highest) 1.90%/2.40% of the variation, depending on 
what is used to control for firm size. 
Put together, the low and non-statistically significant correlations suggest that there 
is no statistically significant association between investors' reactions and amount 
mentioned in the news after controlling for the size of firms. The overall low R- 
square results also confirm this assertion. 
In conclusion, therefore, the low correlations and low explanatory powers suggests 
that there is almost a non-existent second-order effect between amount mentioned 
in newspapers and investors' reactions to news of accounts manipulation. 
Therefore, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the amount mentioned in news 
of accounts manipulation is not associated with ex post abnormal stock returns. 
R2 Values of Ex post Abnormal Returns 
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62.4.7 t ofhypvthcJis A H8 
In this section, we examine the association (or lack thereof) between ex pposl 
abnormal returns (especially that of'day zero) and the section where the news is 
inserted in newspapers. The hypothesis is tested by two methods. The first method 
uses cross-tabulation chi-square test`, whereby the computed mean o1' each type of 
section is tabulated against the number of' times each type of' section is used in 
publishing the news. This is shown in Table 6.12. 
Table 6.12 Cross-Tabulation of Type of section by Mean of Day Zero 
Abnormal Returns of each Category of Section Type. 
Section type Frequencies Mean abnormal returns of day zero 
B FC section =3 62 -8.566 
News section =2 22 -3.959 
Others sections =I 14 -16.794 
Total 98 
Based on average or mean values, it is interesting to see that the greatest investor- 
reaction was felt when the news was published in "olhei- sections" of the newspaper. 
One would have thought that since the "business, finance, and companies sections" 
were used to publish the news the most, the greatest investor-reaction would have 
come from those sections. I lowever, since this is a measure ofaverages, it is within 
the realm of possibilities to speculate that the extreme reactions of a tew investors 
who read the "ocher sections" of the newspaper may have given the impression that 
the greatest tall in abnormal returns is from those who read that section. 
The result of the chi-square test is reported in Table 6.13. Pearson chi-square value 
is 6.00 (4d1), Asymp. Sig. p-value (2-tailed) _= 0.199. which is not significant. The 
Likelihood ratio value is 6.59 (4df), Asymp. Sig. /)-value (2-tailed) = 0.159. By this 
test result, we are unable to reject the null hypothesis that the type of section used in 
publishing news of accounts manipulation in newspaper is not associated with ex 
post abnormal stock returns. 
62 We separate the abnormal returns of the 98 firms into three groups according to the type of section used 
in publishing the news of accounts manipulation. 
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Table 6.13 Chi-Square Tests 
Asymp. Sig. 
Value df (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 6.000(0) 4 . 
199 
Likelihood Ratio 6.592 4 . 159 Linear-by-Linear Association 
. 
430 I . 512 
N of Valid Cases 3 
9 cells( I (X). 0%) have expected count less than 5 The minimum expected aunt is 33 
As a robustness check, following Files el a!. (2009), we carried out a linear 
regression of section-type on section index to further test the null hypothesis. To he 
able to do this, we need "coefficients" of the three sections. We constructed and 
used a "weighted index of section-type" as surrogate Ir the coefficients. The 
weighted index of section-type is constructed whereby the product of each section- 
type and its frequency is divided by the total of the products. 
Table 6.14 presents this information. 
Table 6.14. News Placement Section Types and Section-type Weighted Index 
Section type Frequencies Product 
Weighted 
Index 
Business, Finance, & Companies section =3 62 186 0.762295 
News section =2 22 44 0.180328 
Others section =I 14 14 0.057377 
Total 244 1 
Next, we now use the weighted index of section-types to run a linear regression. The 
means of each section-type abnormal returns associated with each type of section is 
regressed on the associated section-type's weighted index thus: 
E'x Post A(x + Se(--lion Index t t: 
Where: 
Ex Pon ARS! «', = Mean of each section type cat' ex f)osl abnormal returns. 
Section Index: 0.76 = Business, finance and companies' sections; 0.18 = News 
Sections; and 0.06 = Other sections 
The descriptive of section-types are presented in Table 6.15. 
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Table 6.15 Mean Abnormal Returns of Event Days by Section-Type 
Business, Finance, and 
Companies section 
Index: 0.76 
News section 
Index: 0.18 
other section 
Index: 0.06 
Mean Mean Mean 
Mean of day zero abnormal returns -8.56576 -3.95877 -16.794 
Mean of day t+1 abnormal returns -2.22113 -5.71864 -1.50143 
Mean of day t+2 abnormal returns 0.131613 -3.43955 -1.98643 
Mean of day t+3 abnormal returns -1.80468 0.714545 2.610714 
Mean of day t+4 abnormal returns 0.862258 4.420909 -1.665 
Mean of day t+5 abnormal returns 0.711935 1.353636 -0.20214 
Mean of day t+6 abnormal returns -0.26629 0.996818 1.242857 
Mean of cumulative abnormal returns -2.58597 -1.67273 -1.50143 
The results of the linear regression runs are presented in Table 6.16. 
Table 6.16 Linear Regressions of Means of Section-Types on 
Section-Type Weighted Index 
Ex Post ARSEC9 =a+ Section_Index +e 
Section Index= index associated with each type of newspaper section: Business, 
Finance, and Companies section; News section; and Other sections 
Day Zero Day t +1 Day t +2 Day t +3 Day t +4 Day t +5 Day t +6 CAR 
Variables Coefficie Coef ici Coeftici 
Coefficie CocP6ci Cocffici 
e 
Coeffici 
e 
Cocfcie 
(p-Value) (p-Value) e e (p- e 
(p- (p- value) (p" (p- (P- 
Value Value) Value) Value Value 
Intercept -8.023 -3.543 -3.094 2.392 1.026 . 440 1.375 -1.404 
(0.002) (0.410) (0.233) (0.189) (0.827) (0.713) (0.005) (0.005) 
. 080 . 198 . 836 -. 962 . 066 . 
262 -1.000 -1.000 Section Index (0.427) (0.873) (0.370) (0.177) (0.958) (0.831) (0.007) (0.011) 
R2 . 053 0.039 0.699 0.925 0.004 0.068 
1.000 1.000 
Adjusted R2 -0.967 -0.922 0.398 0.86 -0.991 -0.863 1.000 . 999 
Day Zero ARSECv -a+ Section Index +e Day 1+I. 411&-cp -a+ Section_Index +e 
Day t+2 ARSecy -a+ Section Index +e Day t+3 ARSF"rp -a+ Section Index +e 
Day t+4 ARSECp -a+ Section Index +e Day t+5 ARSL'c'y -a+ Section Innlex +e 
Day t+6 ARSEC9 -a+ Section Index +c CAR ARSFcy -a+ Section_Index +e 
Section Index of day zero up to day t +5 are not statistically significant, whereas 
(interestingly) it is statistically significant for day t +6 and CAR. Using day zero as 
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point of reference, the test result is also unable to reject the null hypothesis that the 
type of section used in publishing news of accounts manipulation in newspaper is 
not associated with ex post abnormal stock returns. 
The inability to reject the null hypothesis from both tests is an indication that the 
section used in publishing news of the act has no second-order effect on investors' 
reactions. 
6.8 Suminazy 
This chapter has been analysing the data of the consequences of exposed accounts 
manipulation. 
One of the investigations we carried out is whether mean (median) of ex post 
abnormal returns are equal to mean (median) of ex ante abnormal returns for firms 
exposed in accounts manipulation. The test results suggest that there are 
statistically significant differences between means of ex ante and ex post average 
abnormal returns and means of ex ante and ex post cumulative average abnormal 
returns. The differences are not equal to zero. The differences may be attributed to 
news of accounts manipulation as reported in newspapers, which is consistent with 
the conclusion that there is information content in news of accounts manipulation. 
Another investigation we carried out is whether amount mentioned in the news of 
accounts manipulation is correlated with ex post abnormal returns of day zero. Both 
bivariate and partial correlation results show that there is low positive statistically 
non-significant correlation between ex post abnormal returns and amount. The partial 
correlations controlled for the effect of size via total assets and shareholders' equity, 
alternately. In other words, the amount mentioned in news of accounts manipulation 
is not associated with ex post abnormal stock returns. The result also shows that 
amount mentioned in the news explains very small proportion of the variation in 
abnormal returns after the news, after controlling for size. The low correlations and 
low explanatory powers suggest that there is almost a non-existent second-order effect 
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between amount mentioned in newspapers and investors' reactions to news of 
accounts manipulation. 
We tried to compare the differences in magnitude in means of the three groups of 
data. We found that the High-Medium group contains the greatest absolute relative 
changes in abnormal stock returns while the High-Low group contains the highest 
absolute relative changes in the mean of amount, total assets and shareholders' equity. 
Finally, test result suggests that we do not reject the null hypothesis that the section 
used in publishing news of accounts manipulation in newspaper is not associated 
with ex post abnormal stock returns. This means, therefore, that investors' 
reactions to the news of accounts manipulation arc not likely to depend on the 
section used in publishing news. 
The tests reported in this chapter and those of chapter 5, are now presented in 
chapter 7, which follows next. 
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Results and findings 
7.1 InfnWuction 
Together, the preceding two chapters analysed the data of the study. Interesting 
results emerged from the analysis, many of them not surprising. The present 
chapter synthesises and presents the results of the analysis and discusses the 
findings of the entire study. 
The findings reported in this chapter have been partitioned into two parts. The first 
part presents the findings on the institutional influences on accounts manipulation 
while the second part presents the findings on the consequences for firms exposed 
in the act. As the findings are discussed, they are interlaced with the foundational 
theories upon which the study is premised 63 
7.2 findings zv&A g to Part I 
The findings presented for Part I are reported in the order in which they were 
analysed in chapter 5. Accordingly, we begin with legal origin, which is addressed 
by the first hypothesis, (III). 
7.2.1 Test ofhypothesis one (HI) on legal orgin 
The first of the two chi-square tests relies on the unbiased assumption that accounts 
manipulation is equally likely to occur anywhere in the world irrespective of the 
legal origin of a country in which firms operate; in other words there is no 
association between legal origin and the occurrence of accounts manipulation. We 
test this null hypothesis against the alternative hypothesis that the occurrence of 
accounts manipulation is likely to be associated with legal origins. 
63 These are stated at the beginning of chapter 2. 
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The computed chi-square value of 210.10 (4df) is more than the Critical chi-square 
values of (4 dj) 9.49 (for p-value of 0.05,2-tailed) and 7.779 (for p-values of 0.10, 
2-tailed). Since this result rejects the null hypothesis, we therefore conclude that 
legal origins are associated with the occurrence of accounts manipulation. 
In the second test, we relate the number of accounts manipulation uncovered in 
each legal origin to the number of listed firms in that legal origin against the total 
number of listed companies in all five legal origins of the world. One would expect 
that the more the proportion of listed firms in a legal origin, the more there will be 
cases of accounts manipulation, ceteris paribus. The computed chi-square value of 
41.04 (4d1) is more than the Critical chi-square values of 9.49 (4 dF) (for p-value of 
0.05,2-tailed) and 7.779 (for p-values of 0.10,2-tailed), which again rejects the 
null hypothesis that there is no association between the occurrence of accounts 
manipulation and legal origins. 
If the number of exposed accounts manipulation in English legal origin is related to 
the number of companies listed there vis-ä-vis the total number of companies listed 
worldwide, it will be appreciated why our result is inconsistent with Burgstahler et 
al. (2006, p. 1012) who argue that in countries with large and highly developed 
equity markets, public firms engage in even less earnings management. 
The inconsistency between our result and Burgstahler et al. 's (2006) can be 
reconciled by considering the almost unfettered press environment in which firms 
in English legal origin operate. If one were to refer to Table 5.3 one would see that 
more than 62% of listed companies in the world are based in countries that follow 
the English legal system, e. g. U. S. and UK. Arguably, these countries have a 
vibrant press so much so that the press is able to report more cases of accounts 
manipulations there. So the relatively free press environment in English legal 
origin which is able to publish most cases of accounts manipulation than the press 
in other legal origins could have driven the result obtained in this study. 
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The findings on multivariate tests carried out on the institutional structures 
variables or hypotheses are presented in the following pages. 
Table 7.1.1 is a mirror image of Table 5.9 on page 148. It presents values of 
logistic regression coefficients and Sig. p-values (in parentheses). Significant 
coefficients are starred (*) and in bold print in the table. The findings are reported 
on each hypothesis. Note from the outset that the Sig. p-values associated with the 
three control variables are not significant across all the models. 
CORRMT,,, (Corrupt environment) 
The coefficient of corruption perceptions index is not statistically significant across 
all the models; so we reject the null hypothesis that, ceteris paribus, the level of 
corruption in a country is not likely to affect the occurrence of accounts 
manipulation. 
JW SSJ he (Parsfiredom) 
The coefficients of press freedom are low and not statistically significant in all the 
models. So, we reject the null hypothesis that a free press is not likely to affect the 
occurrence of accounts manipulation. Our result is consistent with that of prior 
research in the area: Miller (2006) provides evidence that the press serves its roles 
well by being a watchdog for accounting fraud. Brunetti and Weder (2003) 
conclude that a free press is bad news for corruption. Dyck et al. (2008) suggest 
that the media may play a role in pressuring corporate managers and directors to 
behave in socially acceptable ways. This finding is also consistent with the 
argument advanced few moments ago (see the discussion on test of legal origin 
above) that the relatively free press environment in English legal origin which is 
able to publish most cases of accounts manipulation than the press in other legal 
origins. 
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Table 7.1.1 Multiple Logistic Regressions of Accounts Manipulation on Independent Variables 
Prob(ACCý1/an) -F(a + fi, CPI + f, PRF. SSFree + fi, INISTPro + fi, SOE + fi, Log GNI + fi. Ilofsledt PD + /, llofsfede UA +e) 
CPI - CORRUPT - Corruption Perceptions Index. (High score, high level of corruption perception). Data taken from 
Transparency International 
PRESSFREE - Extent of press freedom in a country. (High score, high press freedom). Data sourced from Reporters without Borders. 
INYSTPro = Stales attempts at investor protection. (high score, high investor-protection). Data from Doinghuslness 
SOEs - State-owned enterprises, measures the extent of she State's dominance of the economy. (high score, high State's 
dominance of the economy). Data taken from Economic Freedom Network 
Log GN1- Logarithm of Gross National Income (average of 2000-2008) measuring economic status of Individuals in a country. 
Data taken from World Bank's World Development Indicators 
Hofi'tede's PD - Hofstede's Power Distance measuring the level of Inequality in a country. (High score, high Inequality in countries) 
Hofstede s UA - Hofstedc s Uncertainty Avoidance measuring the extent people try to avoid the unknown. (higher the score, higher 
people try to avoid uncertainty). 
Model Model Model Model Model Model Model Model 
Variables t Coefficie 
ti 
Coefficie 
ut 
Coeflieie 
IV 
Coefcie 
V 
Coefficie 
VI 
Coefficie 
%ii 
Coefficie 
VIII 
Cocfficie 
(p-Value) Value (p-Value) -value Value Value Value Value 
Intercept -12.210 -0.979 -12.495 -9.434 -10.112* -7.911* -09.144* -7.170* 
(0.061) (0.098) (0.053) (0.115) (0.008) (0.010) (0.005) (0.008) 
CORRUPTENVI -0.337 -0.038 -0.296 -0.073 -0.394 -0.121 -0.359 -0.103 
(0.302) (0.869) (0.323) (0.765) (0.178) (0.514) (0.197) (0.572) 
PRESSFree 0.000 -0.005 0.000 -0.005 0.000 0.005 0.00 -0.005 
(0.974) (0.707) (0.998) (0.691) (0.950) (0.681) (0.997) (0.697) 
INVSTPro 0.765* 0.637 0.744* 0.654 0.791* 0.673 0.769- 0.660 
(0.038) (0.071) (0.041) (0.064) (0.031) (0.054) (0.036) (0.062) 
SOE 0.089* 0.085* 0.086* 0.087* 0.091* 0.088* 0.087* 0.086* 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Log GNI 0.542 0.599 0.743 0.397 
(0.688) (0.613) (0.539) (0.765) 
Ilofstede PD 0.039 0.038 0.038 0.036 
_ (0.196) (0.196) (0.203) (0.208) 
Ilofstede UA 0.007 0.007 0.011 0.010 
(0.739) (0.736) (0.572) (0.600) 
Nagelkerke R2 0.672 0.663 0.679 0.664 0.679 0.663 0.676 0.660 
Cox & Snell 142 0.510 0.497 0.509 0.498 0.509 0.497 0.507 0.495 
-2 Log likelihood 48.419 50.349 48.532 48.580 49.689 50.323 48.909 50.606 
N 72 72 72 72 72 72 72 72 
Model !- Prob(ACCAfan) - F(a +Q, CORRUPTor, +/l, l'R. SSFree +fi, 1NVS7Pro +ailOE+ fi, Log GN! +/1s 1'D+ f7 UA + s) 
Model 11 - Proh(ACCAfan) - F(a + /3t CORRUPT, + 8, PRMI ree + Q, 1Nl'STPro + /1"SOE + fi I. ag GNI ' 9) 
Model 111 - Prob(ACCAfan) - F(a + fi, CORRUPTzm + f, PRF. SSF ree + /3, /NJ sTPro + a, 4qO6 + /35Log GNI +f ollofstede PD + 8) 
Model !v- Prob(ACCA an) - F(a + Q, CORRUPT + f, PR1_'SSF ree + /3, INVSTPro + f+SOE + Rslog GN! + /lellofstede 11A + c) 
Model Y- Prob(ACCkfan) - F(a + /3, CORRUPT,, + f, PRE. SSFree +/I, INVSTPro + fi4COE + /1, Hofvtede PD + /feilt fstede (IA + s) 
Model H- Prob(ACCAIan) - F(a + fit CORRUPT,,., + Q, PRF. SSF ree + fi, 1A'{STPro + fi,, SOE + f, llot Cede (lA + v) 
Model v!! - Prob(ACCAdan) -1"'(a + /3, CORRUPT,,, + fi, PRF; SSFree + p, I)VVS71'ro + 8, $OE + fi, llofstede PD + c) 
Model $711- Prob(ACCAkm) -1"'(a + fit CORRUPT, H + ßlPRFýSFree + ß, 1N1 tiTl'ro + fl, SOG 46) 
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The consistency between the results reported here together with those in the cited 
prior literatures' findings and the argument advanced during the discussion of legal 
origin can be attributed to two factors. First, it is possible that the press in some 
countries may not report cases of accounts manipulation because it does not meet 
the definition of what the press considers as accounts manipulation, in which case it 
will not be reported. We could not control for this due to absence of measurement 
instruments that track differences in press's perception of accounts manipulation in 
different countries. 
Second, the study considers reported cases of accounts manipulation in newspapers. 
It is possible that the press in some countries may not have reported cases of 
accounts manipulation not because it is not free to do so but simply because there 
are other higher priorities to report on or about, such as the major news events that 
occurred throughout the world during this period (2000-2008). 
IIWSJTh, (State-Isattiemptatlnvc. stor prntecfion) 
Investor-protection is statistically significant or marginally significant in five of the 
eight models. It is highly statistically positively significant in Models 1, in, v, and VII 
with respective Sig. p-values of=0.038,0.041,0.031, and 0.036 and marginally 
statistically positively significant at 0.05 in Model vi (p= 0.054). It is not significant 
in Models l[ and Iv, and viii. 
The positive statistical significant is indicative that the State's attempt at investor- 
protection is likely to affect the occurrence of accounts manipulation, supporting the 
alternative hypothesis. The signed results suggest that the State's attempts at 
investor-protection may probably encourage the occurrence of accounts manipulation. 
The high statistically significant result in Model I is an indication that a unit change 
in the State's attempts at investor-protection is likely to lead to the occurrence of 
accounts manipulation by 0.765, controlling for the intervening influences of the 
two cultural values and gross national income. The high statistically significant 
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result for Model iii is an indication that a unit change in the State's attempts at 
investor-protection is likely to lead to the occurrence of accounts manipulation by 
0.744, controlling for the intervening influences of power distance and gross 
national income. 
The high statistically significant result in Model v is an indication that a unit 
change in the State's attempts at investor-protection is likely to lead to the 
occurrence of accounts manipulation by 0.791, controlling for the intervening 
influences of the two national cultural values. The high statistically significant 
result in Model vii is an indication that a unit change in the State's attempts at 
investor-protection is likely to lead to the occurrence of accounts manipulation by 
0.769, controlling for the intervening influence of power distance only. The 
marginal statistical significance in Model vi is an indication that a unit change in 
the State's attempt at investor-protection is likely to lead to the occurrence of 
accounts manipulation by 0.673, controlling for the intervening influence of 
uncertainty avoidance only. 
The remaining models (Models ii, iv and viii) for INVSTPro would be statistically 
significant if one were to be lenient by considering 0.10 or 10% level of statistical 
significance. 
The evidence presented here that the State's attempt at investor-protection is likely 
to affect the occurrence of accounts manipulation may be due to the conjecture that 
firms may find more innovative ways to beat the game in the face of legislation or 
regulation. The tendency exists that managers who are under increased regulation 
or legislation will explore loop-holes or clever ways that enable them to cut 
corners, hence in the process engage in accounts manipulation. 
This view is consistent with the one expressed by Ball (2009, p. 8) that regulation 
plays a substantial role in fostering a rules-based perspective, which plays an 
important role in setting the stage for the accounting scandals in the U. S. This 
finding is also consistent with Bushman and Petrioski [2006] who observe that in a 
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scenario where a "benevolent" government intervenes in poorly performing firms, 
firms seek to avoid such interference by exploiting reporting discretion to portray 
an optimistic outlook. 
SOE(State's owncmhip of ecrrierprrses) 
We find support for the alternative hypothesis that accounts manipulation is likely 
to occur in economies dominated by the State. For the full model in the first 
column of Table 7.1.1, or Table 5.8a standing alone on page 147, the significant 
result suggests that a unit change in the State's dominance of the economic 
activities of a country is likely to lead to the occurrence of accounts manipulation 
by 0.089, controlling for the effects of the two national cultural values and 
individuals' economic status. 
In Model if where GNI is controlled for while holding the effect of the two cultural 
dimensions constant, the significant result suggests that a unit change in the State's 
ownership of enterprises is likely to lead to the occurrence of accounts manipulation 
by 0.085. 
The significant result in Model in is indicative that a unit change in the State's 
dominance of the economy is likely to leads to the occurrence of the act by 0.086, 
holding uncertainty avoidance constant while controlling for managers' economic 
status (GNI) and inequality in society as captured by power distance. The significant 
result in Model tv suggests that a unit change in the State's dominance of an economy 
is likely to lead to the occurrence of accounts manipulation by 0.087, controlling for 
the effect of gross national income and uncertainty avoidance. Controlling for the 
effects of the two cultural values, Model v suggests that a unit change in State's 
dominance of the economy is likely to lead to the occurrence of the act by 0.091. 
Controlling for the effect of uncertainty avoidance alone in Model vi, the 
statistically significant result is an indication that a unit change in State's 
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dominance of the economic activities of a country is likely to lead to the occurrence 
of accounts manipulation by 0.088. The significant result in Model VII is 
suggestive that a unit change in the State's dominance of the economy is likely to 
lead to the occurrence of the act by 0.087, controlling for inequality in societies. 
Finally, in Model vin where nothing is controlled for, the significant result suggests 
that a unit change in the State's dominance of the economy is likely to lead to the 
occurrence of accounts manipulation by 0.086. 
Our finding is consistent with Bushman and Piotroski (2006) who find that in 
countries characterised by high State involvement in the economy firms speed 
recognition of good news and slow recognition of bad news about reported earnings 
relative to firms in countries with less State involvement. Our finding is also 
consistent with Bushman and Piotroski's (2006) view that managers of publicly 
traded firms with partial State ownership are pressured by the State to 
optimistically tilt their reporting decisions. 
It is interesting to note that controlling for the combined effects of national cultures 
and the level of wealth in a country did not affect the high predictive ability of the 
models. In order to drive this claim home, compare the R2 in Model vlit with any 
of the R2 in Models t to Vii. 
The high explanatory power of the models suggest that the model has descriptive 
validity and that the variables in the regressions are able to explain more than 66% 
of the variation in the likely occurrence of accounts manipulation. 
Consistent with the behaviour of the pseudo-R2, the -2LL is about the same (hovers 
around 48% and 51%) for all the models in Table 7.1.1, which goes to show that 
all the models are well-fitted. 
Chapter VIA: Results & Findings 
7.3 Jndings nilating to the consequencm - Pari il 
In this section, we report three main findings relating to Part II ofthc study. 
73.1.1 Semi-shnr{Z form efficiency of stock markets 
To gauge how the stock market quickly reflects published news in the newspapers, 
we took particular interest in the abnormal returns of the day the news was released 
in the newspapers (that is the abnormal returns of day zero) comparing it with 
abnormal returns of day one before and after the news, days (-1,1), and other event 
days in the event window as well. 
To continue connecting with the reader, Graph 6.1 on page 161 in chapter 6 is 
duplicated here as Graph 7.1.1 below. It is to show how the stock market is 
informationally efficient in the semi-strong-form. 
Data 
Days AAR (%) 
-5 -1.26 
-4 0.74 
-3 -0.46 
-2 -0.48 
-1 -II. 85 
0 -6.25 
1 -2.90 
2 -0.97 
3 -0.61 
4 1.30 
5 0.73 
6 0.23 
Graph 7.1.1 
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From the graph, we find that while the average abnormal return of the day before 
the news (day t= -1) is -0.85 per cent, it tumbled to -6.25 per cent on day zero, 
which is the day the news was published in the newspapers. 
It suggests that average abnormal return is at its lowest decline ever on day zero, 
the day the news was published in newspapers. Indeed, none of the average 
Twelve-Day (Rolling) Average: Abnorin. il Returns 
abnormal returns before day zero is as low as that of day zero and the day after, day 
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t+1. The two days (0, +1) are the days the stock markets quickly reflected the 
publicly available news. 
We find that average abnormal returns began to rally as from day t+l, which had a 
negative average abnormal stock return of 2.90%; but not up to the levels of those 
on the left side of day zero, days t-1 to t -6. The rise in average abnormal return 
peaked at 1.30% on day four after the news and then began another round of 
descent from day t+5. It tumbled to 0.23% on day t+6. We cannot explain the 
apparent anomaly in average abnormal returns of the day t+4. 
But the rise in AAR from day t+1 onwards could be an indication that as the days 
on the right side of day zero go by the news began to fizzle out such that its 
negative impact on average abnormal returns began to peter out. 
From Graph 7.1.1 or from the data table annexed to the right of it, the cumulative 
average abnormal return (CAAR) from the day the news was released on day zero 
is -8.47% and -2.22% when day zero is not included. The mean decrease in mean 
cumulative average abnormal return after the event is 1.21% = 8.47% =7, by 
including day zero or 0.37% = 2.22% = 6, by not including day zero. The 
cumulative average abnormal return before day zero is -2.31%. The mean 
decrease in cumulative average abnormal return before the event is 0.385% _ 
2.31%=6. 
The results obtained in this part of the thesis is consistent with those obtained in a 
number of extant studies such as Karpoff et al. (2008a, b), Beneish (1999a), 
Dechow et al. (1996), and Feroz et al. (1991) who find evidence of a fall in 
cumulative abnormal stock returns of firms under SEC investigation after the news 
broke out. 
Quantity-wise, the result is also consistent with those of Bernile and Jarrell (2009) 
who find a statistically significant negative (-7%) abnormal stock returns on the 
first day of announcement of firm-specific backdating allegations in the press. The 
result is also in accord with Miller (2006) who finds day zero (and a three-day) 
gr 
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stock reaction to be up to -6.30% and (-8.20%), respectively. It is also consistent 
with 13eneish (1999a) who documents evidence of a rapid and immediate price 
adjustment subsequent to unfavourable news about a company. Beneish (1999a) 
documents evidence of a loss in stock price of up to 21% following revelation of 
financial statements manipulation by managers. 
The picture becomes clearer and more revealing when one looks at the graph 
constructed by calculations from using share prices and market index returns of day 
zero as denominator throughout. This is presented in Graph 7.1.2 below, 
replicating Graph 6.2 on page 162. 
Graph 7.1.2 
Data* Thirteen-Day (Stationary) Average Abnormal Returns 
14 
Days AAR (90) 12 
-6 11.21 10 
-5 9.63 
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-4 10.03 6 
-3 9.38 ct 4 
-2 9.24 2 
-1 8.04 0 0 0 0 C Q -2 
-3.81 
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t 2 -4 
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-4 
4 -5.91 -8 
5 -4.20 
The AARs here are derived from using share prices and market indices of day zero as denominator 
in all calculation of abnormal returns, hence they are higher than those annexed to Graph 7.1.1 which 
are derived from day-on-day calculations of abnormal returns. 
It can be seen from the graph that average abnormal returns after the news fell 
below point 0 (or became negative) after day zero. As one can see from the graph, 
the shaded area of ex post average abnormal returns is below the 0 point on the y 
axis whereas the shaded area of average abnormal returns before the news is above 
the 0 point on the same y axis. For the first time ever, average abnormal return 
became negative (and remained so throughout the remaining event days) after day 
zero. The mean of cumulative average abnormal returns to the left of day zero for 
all 98 firms is 9.59% = (11.21 + 9.63 + 10.03 + 9.38 + 9.24 + 8.04) .6 and the 
gT 
Days relative to exposure day, day 0 
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mean of cumulative average abnormal returns to the right of the event day for all 
98 firms is -4.66% = -(3.81 +5.06 +5.60 +5.91 +4.20 + 3.38) = 6. Notice that this 
method neutralises day zero average abnormal returns to the value 0. 
The finding regarding information content of news of accounts manipulation should 
be considered in the context of an on-going discourse regarding the efficacy of the 
semi-strong form efficient market hypothesis. It is pertinent to mention that prior 
research evidences are far from being unanimous regarding the information 
efficiency of the stock market, including the semi-strong form efficiency. (Please 
see the literatures reviewed in chapter 2 in this respect). Some of the literatures 
present mixed research evidences about the validity of the semi-strong form 
efficient markets hypothesis. 
Quoted recently in a Times of London column, Fama, "the father" of efficient 
markets hypothesis (as the column would refer to him), publicly lamented that 
"... nobody wants to believe that markets are efficient... " 64 He was quoted in that 
column to have said that: 
"Different views account for the chasm between popular opinion about the non- 
efficiency of financial markets and the status of the theory among financial 
economics. There is no conclusive evidence that asset prices reflect true 
underlying reality. "- culled from The Times of London issue of May 5 
2009. 
Having kept abreast of the irregularity of research evidences and the controversy 
surrounding the efficient market hypothesis, based on our own research findings in 
this thesis, we cannot but take a position by reaching the conclusion that the stock 
market is informationally efficient in the semi-strong form. 
Our position is predicated on the fact that the information about accounts 
manipulation used in this study was published in newspapers in 36 countries around 
64 The Times of London, May 5 2009, page 46 
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the world, and we have strong reasons to believe that newspapers are a source of 
public information available to investors65. 
Z3.1.2 Ending n 1a to abnormal stockt turns 
Table 7.2.1 containing the descriptive statistics is a duplicate of Table 6.2 in 
chapter 6. Table 7.2.2 mirrors Table 6.3 of the same chapter 6 and it contains the 
result of the Paired Samples test of difference between means of ex ante/ex post 
abnormal returns data. 
Table 7.2.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Std. 
N Min. Max. Mean Median Deviation 
Day t-1 AAR, using day zero prices 98 -5.60 96.60 8.0462 2.52 16.82391 
Day t+1 AAR, using day zero prices 98 -51.39 24.33 -3.8136 -1.77 11.33883 
Day t-1 AAR, based on rolling calculation 98 -35.79 59.43 -0.8461 -0.69 8.84903 
Day t+1 AAR, based on rolling calculation 98 -50.26 22.49 -2.9035 -1.44 9.55937 
Day Zero AAR, based on rolling calculation 98 -68.24 16.62 -6.2486 -1.98 12.85530 
Ex post CAAR, based on rolling calculation 98 -9.31 6.03 -0.3707 -0.12 1.90587 
Ex ante CAAR, based on rolling calculation 98 -21.00 10.87 -1.4256 -0.76 3.43773 
Ex post CAAR, using day zero prices 98 -74.50 24.33 4.6597 -2.19 13.36039 
Ex ante CAAR, using day zero prices 98 -9.06 96.45 9.5898 3.23 17.52939 
Valid N (listwise) 98 
65 An anonymous commentator thinks that if stock markets are informationally efficient they should 
already have anticipated or priced the bad news in stock prices and not be surprised by it. We reply 
that there probably is a merit in this argument if one were considering test for private information, 
which is the strong form efficient markets hypothesis. Indeed, for all practical purposes, it may be 
possible that any private information at the disposal of any one market participant is available to every 
other market participant who may not be aware that others are in possession of the same information. 
This is the premise upon which the strong-form efficient markets hypothesis or test for private 
information is anchored, which the present research does not operate on. At the risk of repeating 
ourselves, the present study is not concerned with test for private information or strong-form market 
efficiency. 
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Table 7.2.2 Paired Samples Test 
Paired Differences 
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference 
Std. Sig. (2- 
Mean Deviation Lower Upper t df tailed) 
Day t-1 AAR - Day t+1 AAR (using day zero prices) 11.859 20.808 7.688 16.031 5.642 97 . 000 
Day t-1- Day t+1 (using rolling data) 2.057 13.045 0-. 558 4.673 1.561 97 . 122 
Day t-1 - Day Zero (using rolling data) 5.402 13.477 2.700 8.104 3.968 97 . 000 
Dayt+l -Day Zero (rolling data) 3.345 15.705 0.196 6.494 2.108 97 . 038 
Ex post CAAR - Ex ante CAAR (using rolling data! ) 1.055 3.906 0.271 1.838 2.674 97 . 
009 
Ex post CAAR- Ex ante CAAR (using day 0 prices) -14.249 23.707 -19.002 -9.497 -5.950 97 . 000 
We begin reporting the tables with the result whereby stock returns of all event 
days were calculated by using share prices and market index returns of day zero as 
the denominator throughout. The descriptives to this are found in the first two and 
last two rows of Table 7.2.1. The paired samples tests relating to stock returns 
being calculated based on day zero's share prices and market index returns are 
found in the first and last rows of Table 7.2.2. The mean (8.0462) of one-day 
average abnormal return before the news is greater than the mean (-3.8136) of one- 
day average abnormal return after the news, day (-1, +1) by 11.86%. The mean 
difference is statistically significant; t=5.642,97df, 2-tailed Sig. p-value = 0.000. 
The mean (9.5898) of cumulative average abnormal returns before the news, ex 
ante CAAR, is greater than the mean (-4.6597) of cumulative average abnormal 
returns after the news, ex post CAAR, by 14.25%. The mean difference is 
statistically significant; t= -5.950,97df, 2-tailed Sig. p-value = 0.000. 
Analysing the table based on the result of "day-on-day" or "rolling" calculations, 
the mean (-0.8461) of one-day average abnormal return before the news is greater 
than mean (-2.9035) of one-day average abnormal return after the news (-1, +1) by 
2.06%, however the mean difference is not statistically significant, t-value of 1.561, 
Sig. p-value (2-tailed) = 0.122. The non-significant result is not surprising because 
this is actually a two-day return as there is an intervening day (day zero) in-between 
the two, which (perhaps) have impacted the result. 
g7 
Cl ptvr VII R. iulis ti'Flad/aBs 
The mean (-0.8461) of one-day average abnormal returns, AAR, before the news is 
higher than the mean (-6.2486) of day zero average abnormal returns, AAR, (-1,0) 
by 5.40%. The difference between the two means is statistically significant. T- 
value of the difference between day -1 and day zero is 3.97, Sig. p-value (2 tailed) 
= 0.000. The mean (-2.9035) of one-day AAR after the news is higher than the 
mean (-6.2486) of day zero AAR (+1,0) by 3.35%. The mean difference between 
day +1 and day zero is statistically significant at the 5% level, with t-value of 
2.108, Sig. p-value (2-tailed) = 0.038. The two significant test results reported for 
days (-1,0) and (+1,0) suggest that the difference between mean of average 
abnormal returns of day zero and the day before and after it are not equal zero. 
The mean (-0.3707) of cumulative average abnormal returns after the news, ex post 
CAAR, is higher than the mean (-1.4256) of cumulative average abnormal returns 
after the news, ex ante CAAR, by 1.05. The difference between the two means is 
statistically significant. T-value is 2.67, with Sig. p-value (2-tailed) = 0.009. 
Absent the aberrant result of days (-1 and +1) calculated on a rolling basis, of which 
has been explained as being likely impacted upon by the intervening day zero result, 
the statistically significant differences between means of ex ante and ex post average 
abnormal returns and ex ante and ex post cumulative average abnormal returns are 
suggestive that there are differences between means of ex post and ex ante abnormal 
stock returns. The statistical differences may be attributed to news of accounts 
manipulation as reported in newspapers, which is also consistent with the conclusion 
that there is information content in news of accounts manipulation. 
The statistically significant test result is not affected by the methods used in the 
tests, except for the Sign Test which is statistically significant at the 0.05 level. 
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732 Reladom p betwca i abnormal returns and amount in the news 
We run two related parametric tests to investigate the association (or lack thereof) 
between the amounts mentioned in the news of accounts manipulation and ex post 
abnormal returns. We first examine the bivariate and partial correlations between 
ex post abnormal returns and amount mentioned in the news, controlling for size 
(using total assets and shareholders' equity alternately) in the partial correlations. 
The second test examines the extent to which amount mentioned in the news is able 
or unable to influence investors' decisions or reactions to the news through 
abnormal returns, an effort informed by the materiality concept in accounting. 
We find that the correlations between amounts mentioned and ex post abnormal 
returns of all event days are very low and statistically not significant, for both the 
bivariate correlations and partial correlations. The partial correlations controlled 
for the effect of size via total assets and shareholders' equities, see Table 6.10 in 
chapter 6, page 182. The statistically non-significant correlations are suggestive 
that ex post abnormal returns are independent of the amount mentioned in the news. 
In other words, the magnitude of the amounts mentioned in news of accounts 
manipulation is not associated with ex post abnormal stock returns. 
We go further in the investigation of the extent to which amount mentioned in the 
news explains the variation in ex post abnormal returns. Consistent with the low 
correlations, results indicate that amount mentioned in the news has a very low (in 
most cases, close to zero) explanatory power, see Tables 6.10 and 6.11 in chapter 6. 
Surprisingly, this applies to even day zero whose fall in abnormal returns was most 
dramatic, as captured pictorially succinctly by Graphs 7.1.1 and 7.2.2 above. 
At the highest, amount mentioned in the news is able to explain only about 3.5% 
and 1.9% of the variation in ex post abnormal stock returns, controlling for the 
effect of total assets and shareholders' equity, respectively. Even for day zero, 
which is of particular interest, amount mentioned in the news is only able to explain 
1.9%/2.4% of the variation in abnormal returns, depending on what is used to 
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control for firm size. The other low explanatory powers of amount mentioned in 
relation to ex post abnormal returns can be seen in Table 6.11, chapter 6, page 184. 
Put together, the two results suggest that we cannot reject the null hypothesis that 
there is no association between investors' reactions and amount mentioned in the 
news of accounts manipulation after controlling for (and not controlling for) the 
size of firms. In other words, the results suggest that amount mentioned in the news 
of accounts manipulation has no significant second-order effect on ex post 
abnormal stock returns. 
7.3.3 Relaf'onsiupbciwem expastabnormal returnsand the 
section where news ofaaavunts manipuistion is hzszied 
We examined the association between ex post abnormal returns and the section 
where the news is inserted in newspapers. Using two different approaches, we 
tested the null hypothesis that the type of section used in publishing news of 
accounts manipulation is not associated with ex post abnormal stock returns. 
The result of the chi-square test is reported in Table 6.13 in chapter 6, page 186. 
Pearson chi-square value is 6.00 (4dj), Asymp. Sig. p-value (2-tailed) = 0.199, 
which is not significant. Also, except for day t+6 and CAR, all the results of the 
linear regression run reported in Table 6.16 in chapter 6, page 186, indicate a non- 
statistically significant relationship between ex post abnormal returns and the type 
of section used in conveying news of accounts manipulation. 
Based on day zero which is the main research interest, this results suggest that the 
type of section used in publishing news of accounts manipulation in newspaper is 
not likely to be associated with ex post abnormal stock returns. So, the type of 
section used in publishing the news has no second-order effect on investors' 
reactions. 
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This is inconsistent with prior research findings based on limited attention theory. 
For example, Klibanoff et al. (1998) find negative price reaction to major news event 
published on the front page of The New York Times. The lack of statistical 
significance of our result may be a pointer to the apparent negative effect which other 
competing sources of news which are based on advances in information and 
telecommunications technology may be having on newspapers for investment 
decisions nowadays, especially with respect to sophisticated or informed investors. 
In spite of this, we believe that newspapers may remain important for investors in 
general; a belief that is re-enforced by the anecdotal and research evidences on page 9 
of chapter 1. Moreover, in our opinion, the newspaper is still likely to provide more 
detailed or in-depth analysis than instantaneous or electronic news media. We will 
address this issue further in chapter 8 when we discuss threats to certain aspects of the 
thesis, section 8.6.1. 
74 How (and where) the theories were ope tionaised in the study 
In the next few remaining paragraphs of this chapter, we discuss how (and where) 
we operationalised the theories mentioned in this study. We also identify the 
specific hypotheses that are used in applying the theories. It is instructive to 
reiterate that it has not been intended from the outset that any one theory should be 
overly emphasised against the others. As they were conceived, none of the theories 
is meant to override the others; so any misinterpretation of weight or importance or 
prominence which may have been ascribed to any one particular theory at the 
expense of the others is hereby corrected. 
In this development, due recognition is accorded to issues that are likely to threaten 
the validity of certain aspects of this study in relation to the theories applied in the 
study. Some of these concerns or threats have already been mentioned elsewhere in 
earlier parts of the study, especially in the footnotes, but we will try to reiterate and 
articulate them more formally in the concluding chapter, chapter 8, when we 
discuss the limitations of the study in general. 
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7.4.1 Contingency theory 
The tests for all hypotheses in the first part of the thesis draw upon the contingency 
or situational theory. The theory suggests that managerial behaviour is constrained 
or contingent upon internal and external factors in the environment in which a 
manager operates. 
David et al. (2010, p. 257) write that "an optimal fit may require different 
organisational characteristics to suit different external conditions. " Mockler (1971) 
posits that "in doing any job, the manager's first step is to identify the major 
characteristics of the situation confronting him. " It is with this in mind that Gardin 
and Greve (2004,307) say that "fit is the result of a natural selection process that 
ensures that only the best-performing organisations survive to be observed at any 
point of time"; compare this with Alchian (1950) who argues that survivors may 
appear to be those having adapted themselves to the environment. 
Jermias and Gani (2004) also find that contingent fit has a significant positive 
relationship with business unit effectiveness regardless of the strategic choice, 
which is consistent with the proposition from contingency theory that no systems 
are universally appropriate to all organisations and to all circumstances. 
This finding reported in this thesis does not imply any thing about the validity or 
otherwise of the contingency theory. 
Z4.2 Foliiical economy 
The tests of the impact of legal origin (III), corrupt environment (N2), the role of 
the press (H3), the State's ownership of enterprises (H4), and investor- protection 
(HS) draw upon political economy theory of accounting. Among others, Bushman 
and Piotroski (2006) use the theory to explore how reported accounting numbers 
are shaped by the institutional structure of the country in which firms are 
domiciled. Specifically, the premise of their analysis is that legal/judicial system, 
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securities laws, and tax regime create incentives that influence the behaviour of 
corporate executives, investors, regulators and other capital market participants. 
Also, Haw et al. (2004) use the theory to arrive at the conclusion that private 
control benefits are limited in situations where there is both an independent press 
that publicises information about improper behaviour and a large number of 
educated investors who read the newspaper and sanction improper behaviour. 
Z4.3 Political costhypothesis 
The test of the State's involvement in capital markets through regulations and 
legislations aimed at investor-protection is drawing upon political cost hypothesis 
of positive accounting theory The theory uses firm size as a surrogate for political 
attention and suggests that large firms, especially, are more likely than small ones 
to use accounting choices to reduce reported earnings because when reported 
earnings are very high the interest of the State, its operatives and agencies and 
politicians are likely to be attracted to the firm so much so that these parties would 
want to "redistribute" or appropriate part of the high earnings to themselves by way 
of taxes, levies and politically-motivated solicitations. 
74.4 Semi-sftnnge(ßdcntmarkethypivthesis 
Hypothesis 6 draws upon the semi-strong-form version of the efficient market 
hypothesis. This theory tests the information content of news generally, and it says 
that the stock market fully reflects all publicly available information. We applied 
the theory to see how news that is published in newspapers impounds stock prices. 
The tests conducted in the study confirm that the means of ex post abnormal stock 
returns are different from those of ex ante abnormal stock returns, one likely reason 
being attributed to the information contained in the news. 
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The relationship between ex post abnormal stock returns and the magnitude or size 
of the amount mentioned in newspapers (III) does not rely on any formal theory. 
However, the investigation is informed by one of the objectives or elements of 
financial statements, which is the materiality concept or assumption. The 
International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) Framework says, in part, that "... 
materiality is a screen or filter used to determine whether information is sufficiently 
significant to influence the decisions of users in the context of the entity... " The 
IASB Framework goes on to note that materiality provides a threshold or cut-off 
point for taking decisions. 
The amount mentioned in news of accounts manipulation is "material" if the size 
influences the decisions of investors in pricing the securities of firms exposed in the 
act of accounts manipulation. 
Miller (2006, p. 1004) argues that frauds that involve a large dollar magnitude may 
be deemed as more newsworthy which is likely to increase the benefits of being 
published in an article. The present study mimics Miller (2006) by empirically 
investigating whether ex post abnormal stock returns, especially of the day the 
news is released, are correlated with the magnitude of the amount mentioned in 
newspapers. 
74.6 Limits d attention theory 
The test regarding the association between ex post abnormal stock returns and the 
section where news is inserted in newspapers, 14, attempts to exploit the properties 
of limited attention theory (aka Klibanoff et at (1998), Daniel et al. (2002), 
Hirshleifer and Teoh (2003), and Peng et al. (2007), among others). 
As it is used in this study, we investigated whether the type of section used in 
publishing news of accounts manipulation in newspapers is one element that helps 
the "completeness" of stock prices reactions to the news. We tested the hypothesis 
that ex post abnormal stock returns are not associated with the type of section used 
a, 
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in publishing the news in newspapers. The hypothesis was not rejected, leading to 
the conclusion that the type of section where the news is inserted in newspapers 
does not have a second-order effect on investors' reactions. 
Short discussion 
At first sight, limited attention may seem to relate more to individual decision 
making which may make it appear less convincing as an explanation of how share 
prices are formed as the outcome of thousands of individual decisions. Well, from 
behavioural finance perspectives, Lee (2001, p. 235) has argued that "price 
discovery is a dynamic and complex process, which is accomplished through the 
interplay between noise traders and information arbitrageurs". 
In addition, based on conceptual grounds some people might be concerned that 
even though a single investor's attention is likely to be limited, doesn't the market 
aggregate all the noisy information used by individuals and reflect all available 
information, especially given that there are professional, informed investors, or 
institutional investors on the market? There are mixed opinions on this, divided 
along the lines of the early economists' (typified by Adam Smith, Irving Fisher and 
John Maynard Keynes) and the behavioural finance aficionados typified by Lee, 
Haw et al., and I-lirshleifer, among others. Lee (2001), Haw et al. (2004), 
Hirshleifer (2001), Hirshleifer and Teoh (2003), among others argue from 
behavioural finance perspective that imperfect rationality affects investment 
decisions and market outcomes. This is against the mainstream finance and early 
economists' argument that perfect rationality and information efficiency prevails in 
the capital market (e. g., Fama, 1991). 
Prior literature in behavioural finance and accounting (see, for example, Shleifer 
and Vishny (1997), Hirshleifer (2001), Lee (2001), Daniel (2002), and Hirshleifer 
and (Teoh, 2003); among others) concur with the simple intuition that arbitrageurs' 
and sophisticated investors' (including institutional investors) ability to bear against 
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mispricing is limited, and that larger noise trader shocks lead to less efficient 
pricing. 
From behavioural finance school, there are probable explanations why naive 
investors' reactions are likely to affect stock prices. The explanations come from 
awareness based on market incompleteness and fundamental risk which places limit 
to arbitrage by informed or sophisticated investors. Some of the explanations also 
include transactions costs, sentiment risk, financial constraints, agency, or anything 
else that deters rational investors from taking large positions (see for example 
Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Klibanoff et aL, 1998; and Lee, 2001). Any such limits 
to arbitrage would allow irrational investors to affect prices, so that "investor 
naivete can influence stock prices" (Hirshleifer and Teoh 2003, p. 375). 66 
75 , Auneary 
This chapter is a synthesis of chapters 5 and 6. It has been presenting the findings 
of the tests performed in those two chapters. Still treating issues in accordance with 
the two-part trajectory of the study, it presented the findings according to the 
hypotheses of the study. While making its presentation, it aligns the findings to 
extant research findings and the many foundational theories upon which the 
research is berthed. 
Finally, from a global perspective it engages in some very important discussions on 
issues that revolve around the study as a whole. 
The next chapter, chapter 8, draws the curtain on the entire study by making 
conclusions, highlighting the contributions of the study to the literature, looking at 
policy implications and suggesting possible areas for further future research. 
66 In the spirit of tiirshleifer and Teoh (2003), this study has made the simplifying assumption that 
investors are ex ante identical. 
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Conclusions, pnlicyimplicationsmd 
suggestions for furher studies 
8.1 Summary 
Up until this point, this study has been undertaking empirical investigations of the 
incidence of accounts manipulation. Following the study's trajectory, the 
investigations have been conducted in two related respects, which are dichotomised 
as (a) effects of institutional structures on accounts manipulation and (b) 
consequences for firms exposed in the act. 
The present chapter wraps up the entire research process begun in chapter 1. One 
after the other, this concluding chapter is revisiting each of the past seven chapters, 
reviewing and summarily presenting what each of them has to offer. This is 
accomplished in section 8.2. Section 8.3 summarises the study's findings. The 
chapter also points to areas in which we believe the study has made important 
contributions to the literature (section 8.4). In section 8.5 we present the policy 
implications of the study. Section 8.6 looks at the limitations of the study as well 
as threats to the validity of certain theories used in the study. Finally, section 8.7 
offers suggestions as to likely areas for further future researches. 
8.2 Reviewofpivccdthg chapter c 
The introductory chapter, chapter 1, set the ball rolling by contextualising the area of 
study. It identified accounts manipulation as the topic of study, defining the term in 
the process. In that chapter, we explained why we chose the terms accounts 
manipulation as part of the title of the thesis. 
Another major issue addressed by chapter 1 is whether the newspaper is still relevant 
in today's capital markets. We addressed this issue in minutiae details, and provided 
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research and anecdotal evidences that point to the relevance and possible use of the 
newspaper by every category of investors in their decision calculus, even in this 
twenty-first century modem age of technological advancements. 
With data compiled and published by renowned world organisations such as the 
United Nations and International Telecommunications Union, we were able also to 
show evidences to the effect that newspapers are still widely used in this century, 
although this is being challenged by emergent electronic sources. We hope the 
evidences and data are convincing. 
Chapter 2 reviewed the literature, and this was done in the following order: Section 
2.2 reviewed the literature regarding the theories that were drawn upon to conduct 
the study. Section 2.3 reviewed related literatures on earnings management or 
accounts manipulation, as we use the term in this study. 
Chapter 3 formally presented the research questions and accompanying hypotheses 
for the study. There were research questions and hypotheses relating to the 
environment-wide influences on accounts manipulation as well as research 
questions and hypotheses relating to the consequences of the act being exposed in 
the newspaper. Respectively, section 3.2 and 3.3 handled these issues. 
Chapter 4 dealt with methodological and research designs issues. In the main, it 
addressed several issues ranging from data collection to method of data analysis. In 
specific terms, section 4.2 explained the methods of identifying the research sample 
and sources of data. Section 4.3 of chapter 4 also described the study's sample. 
The chapter also provided minutiae descriptions of variables of the study, section 
4.4. Furthermore, the chapter listed sources of the instruments used in measuring 
variables of the study, including types and sources of data bases. Finally, section 
4.6 explicated the methods of data analyses that were employed in chapters 5 and 6, 
and provided justifications for their use (section 4.7). Overall, chapter 4 is a step- 
by-step guide to the research designs and methodology. 
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Chapters 5 and 6 concentrated on analysing the data for the study. While chapter 5 
concentrated on analysing the institutional structures' data, chapter 6 occupied 
itself with analysing the consequences data. As a prelude to the analysis proper, 
among other things, the chapters explained how the data on the two strands of the 
research are analysed. 
Chapter 7 synthesised and reported the findings of the analyses carried out in the 
two chapters before it. 
In the meantime, we present Table 8.1 to show in one place the institutional 
structures and consequences hypotheses as well as their sources of data. 
Accordingly, the table is separated into two panels: Panel A for environment-wide 
issues and Panel B for consequences issues. 
Table 8.1 Panel A. Summary of Influences, Hypotheses and Source(s) of Data 
Variables Summary of hypotheses Sources of data 
There is no association between the legal La Porta et al. (1998,2008), 
Legal Origin origins in which firms operate and the Harper and Mcnulty (2008) 
occurrence of accounts manipulation, (111) and the World Factbook, 
2009 
Corrupt Ceteris paribus, the level of corruption is not Corruption Perception 
environment likely to affect the occurrence of accounts Index of Transparency 
(CORRUPT,,,, ) manipulation, (112) International 
Press freedom Ceteris paribus, the level of press freedom is World Press Freed Index of (PRESSFREE) not likely to affect the occurrence of accounts Reporters Without Borders 
manipulation, (1I3) 
State-Ownership Ceteris paribus, State's ownership of Economic Freedom of the 
Enterprises enterprises is not likely to affect the World database 
(SOEs) occurrence of accounts manipulation, 114 
Investor Ceteris paribus, the State's attempts at Strength of Investor 
protection investor-protection is not likely to affect Protection index of World 
(INVSTPro) the occurrence of accounts manipulation, 115 Banks' Doing business 
1. Cultural environment: 
Control 1.1 Power Distance and flofstede (2001, pp. 500-502) 
Variables: 1.2 Uncertainty Avoidance 
2. Gross national income World Bank's World Development Indicators 
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Table 8.1 Panel B Summary of Consequences Hypotheses, and Source(s) of Data 
For firms exposed in accounts manipulation, there is Datastream, Bloomberg, YahoolFinance, 
no difference between ex post and ex ante abnormal Google finance, Amadeus, AOL money 
stock returns, (116) and finance, etc 
The amount mentioned in news of accounts Newspapers, Amadeus, Datastream, 
manipulation is not associated with ex post Bloomberg, Yahoo! Finance, Google 
abnormal returns, (fly) finance, AOL money and finance 
The section used in publishing news of accounts Newspaper publications manipulation in newspaper is not associated with ex 
post abnormal stock returns, (11, ß) 
. 93 Sumrnazyoffindings 
Results from of the findings will now be summarised, beginning with legal origin. 
The two chi-square tests of legal origin reject the null hypothesis that there is no 
association between the legal origins in which firms operate and the occurrence of 
accounts manipulation. This leads to accepting the alternative hypothesis and 
concluding that legal origins in which firms operate are likely to be associated with 
the occurrence of accounts manipulation. This conclusion can be tempered by the 
view that most of the accounts manipulations were reported in common law 
countries, which arguably, have a vibrant press that is perhaps able to report cases 
of accounts manipulations more than the press in other legal origins. This could 
have driven the result obtained in this study. We will refer to this later in the next 
few paragraphs. 
We tested the null hypothesis that the level of corruption is not likely to affect the 
occurrence of accounts manipulation. The documented evidence is inconsistent with 
this hypothesis, so it is rejected. Rejection of the null hypothesis suggests that the 
level of corruption is likely to affect the occurrence of accounts manipulation, the 
alternative hypothesis. So, it is, perhaps, possible that the occurrence of accounts 
manipulation can be associated with a country's level of corruption. 
ar 
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We tested the null hypothesis that a free press is not likely to affect the occurrence 
of accounts manipulation. The test result is not statistically significant, so we reject 
the null hypothesis that a free press is not likely to affect the occurrence of accounts 
manipulation. We can therefore conclude that a free press is likely to affect the 
occurrence of accounts manipulation 
The null hypothesis that the State's attempt at investor-protection is not likely to 
affect the occurrence of accounts manipulation was tested. At the 0.05 level, investor- 
protection is statistically significant or marginally significant in five of the eight 
models. It is highly statistically positively significant in Models i, in, v, and VII with 
respective Sig. p-values of=0.038,0.041,0.031, and 0.036 and marginally statistically 
positively significant at 0.05 in Model vi (p= 0.054). Using the result of the main 
research model, Model i, the positive statistical significant is indicative that the 
State's attempt at investor-protection is equally highly likely to affect the occurrence 
of accounts manipulation, supporting the alternative hypothesis. 
Note that if we reduce a level to 0.10, investor-protection would be statistically 
significant in all the models. 
Furthermore, the signed results in all the models where investor-protection is 
positively statistically significant suggest that the State's attempts at investor- 
protection may probably lead to the occurrence of accounts manipulation. 
Legislations and/or regulations are supposed to provide a level playing field for firms 
and other participants in the capital market hence one would have expected attempts 
to protect investors will mitigate the occurrence of accounts manipulation. The result 
obtained here is against this expectation. One possible explanation we can proffer for 
this result is by conjecturing that when faced with increased regulation or legislation, 
firms perhaps seek out innovative ways to circumvent the rules. So, there is a 
possibility that managers who are under increased regulation or legislation can 
explore loop-holes or look for new clever ways that enable them to circumvent the 
rules, hence in the process engage in accounts manipulation. 
or 
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We find support under all the eight regression models for the alternative hypothesis 
that State's ownership of enterprises is likely to affect the occurrence of accounts 
manipulation. The tests in all the models show a statistically significant result, 
albeit with very low or close to zero level of significance. 
As to the predictive ability of the institutional structure variables and accounts 
manipulation, the Nagelkerke (Cox & Snell) R-squared statistic is used to provide 
documented evidences that suggest that the level of corruption, press freedom, 
State's dominance of the economy, and the State's attempts at investor-protection 
are together able to explain more than 66% (51%) of the variation in the likely 
occurrence of accounts manipulation. The deletion and/or iteration of the control 
variables from the main model did not affect the explanatory powers of the models 
as -2 Log Likelihood hovers around 48 and 51, which is a very small change. 
** ** ** 
In the second set of tests carried out in chapter 6, we documented evidence 
suggesting that the stock market is informationally efficient in the semi-strong form 
by reacting to newspaper publication of news of accounts manipulation. To this 
effect, we showed that average abnormal returns were at their lowest ebb the day 
the news of accounts manipulation was published in daily newspapers in 36 
countries around the world. In addition, the paired samples t-tests carried out 
indicate that there are statistically significant differences between means of ex ante 
and ex post abnormal stock returns, which may be attributed to the information 
content of news of accounts manipulation, 0. 
Our finding showed that amount mentioned in the news of accounts manipulation is 
not statistically significantly associated with ex post abnormal stock returns. This 
was after controlling for the effect of firm size, in all the models. The same result 
obtained when we did not control for size at all. All the models have low 
explanatory power as the amount mentioned in the news is able to explain, after 
controlling for firm size through total assets, between 0.20% (minimum, as per day 
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t +5) and 3.50% (maximum, as per day t +2) of the variations in ex post abnormal 
returns, see first column of Table 6.11 on page 183. Considering day zero 
abnormal returns, the amount mentioned in the news is able to explain between 
1.90% and 2.40% of the variation; see the first row of Table 6.11 of the same page. 
We tested the null hypothesis that the type of section used in publishing news of 
accounts manipulation is not associated with ex post abnormal stock returns. The 
two tests carried out using both the chi-square test and linear regressions are 
consistent in not rejecting the null hypothesis. The inability to reject the null 
suggests that the type of section used in publishing news of accounts manipulation 
is not likely to have a second-order effect on investors' reactions. This may be due 
to the fact that investors are using other alternative sources of news (e. g., 
newswires, radios, television and other instantaneous sources) to make their moves. 
8.4 Contributions of the study to the literntwv 
In terms of contributions, this research makes some significant number of 
contributions to the literature. First, to the best of our knowledge, this study is the 
first in the annals of accounting and finance research to investigate the effect of 
corrupt environment, role of the press, State's ownership of enterprises and State's 
attempts at investor-protection on the occurrence of accounts manipulation in one 
study. The documented evidences show that these variables explain more than 
66% (Nagelkerke) or 51% (Cox and Snell) of the variation in the likely occurrence 
of accounts manipulation, after controlling for the effects of inequality and 
uncertainty avoidance in national cultures as well as managers' economic status via 
countries' level of wealth or gross national income. 
Second, this study contributes to the literature by showing that State's dominance 
of the economic activities of a country is likely to lead to the occurrence of 
accounts manipulation. 
or 
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Third, we contribute to the literature by showing that the State's attempts at 
investor-protection is highly likely to lead to the likelihood of accounts manip- 
ulation occurring. 
Fourth, we contribute to the literature by showing that for firms exposed accounts 
manipulation, ex post abnormal returns are different from ex amte abnormal returns, 
and that the information contained in news of accounts manipulation impounds 
stock prices negatively. 
Fifth, the study contributes to the literature on limited attention by showing that 
investors' reactions to the news of accounts manipulation may not be associated 
with the type of section used in publishing the news in daily newspapers. This 
contribution is unique in that we show this through exogenous placement of news 
in different sections of a newspaper. The only study that has attempted to 
implement the theory with a newspaper is Klibanoff et al. (1998). Their study was 
very narrow because they investigated share prices reaction by looking at the effect 
of news inserted on only the front page of only one daily newspaper (The New 
York Times) in only one country, the U. S. 
As well as exogenously implementing limited attention theory, our study looked at 
three sections of numerous newspapers from 36 countries around the world (some 
of the newspaper titles are listed on page 85 of this thesis). This may explain why 
our result differs from Klibanoff et al. (1998). Furthermore, we contribute to the 
literature by showing that there is no statistically significant association between 
investors' reactions and amount mentioned in the news, after controlling for the 
size of firms. 
Finally, we contribute to the literature from theoretical and epistemological 
standpoint. In specific terms, the study contributes to the literature by proposing a 
C aplorVIII: Conclusloa" 6-Summery 
conceptual framework for understanding accounts manipulation67 after offering a 
more embracing name than earnings management from what earnings management 
is hitherto narrowly construed to mean. 
8.5 Po icyimpicaians of the study 
The result of this study has implications regarding the extent to which the capital 
market can be regulated. At the moment, the IOSCO is collaborating with a 
number of countries to ensure that there are high standards and a strong, fair, 
efficient and robust capital markets that will protect investors across the globe68. 
Underlying this collaboration is the need for greater (perhaps, enhanced) regulation 
and monitoring of, and legislation for, the capital market. This will entail that the 
IOSCO and its member-countries actively intervene in capital markets. The lesson 
to be learnt here is that there is a limit to which these measures can go. It is a good 
thing to "fight against cross border securities market misconduct" 
(https: //www. iosco. org)69 but if applied wrongly, interventions can lead capital 
market participants to invent innovative ways to beat the rules, advertently or 
inadvertently, thereby engaging in practices that can harm investors. 
Furthermore, even though it has been said that standards alone have not been 
sufficient or effective in curtailing accounts manipulation, the IOSCO can 
collaborate more with International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) and 
Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) in the accounting standard setting 
process to see how to strike a balance between rules-based and principles-based 
accounting standards. 
67 We note that this is not one of the original aims of the study, but this contribution should not be over- 
looked in view of the fact that one needs to understand the theoretical/epistemological foundation of what 
one is doing. 
68 See http: //www. thisdayonline. com/nview. php? id=174358 for one example of this collaboration. 
69https: //www. iosco. org/news/pdf/IOSC ONEWS 185. pdf 
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8.6 Limitations of the study 
As expected of any study, it is realistic to state that there are limitations which the 
study encountered. We enumerate some of them in this section. 
First, the requirement that all materials used for the study must be in English 
language may be a limitation. Without doubt, this may have affected the depth and 
breadth of data collection for events that are not written in English (or do not have 
English language translation). Also, this requirement may have undoubtedly 
reduced the sample size of the study. 
Second, we could not collect all our data from one source. Particular mention must 
be made of the variety of databases that we used to collect share prices. The reason 
for this combination is that no one data base was found sufficient for our purpose 
due to the international nature of the study, with companies and countries coming 
from the developed and developing markets. For example, neither DataStream nor 
Amadeus nor any other database standing alone could provide information about all 
companies involved in the study. DataStream hosts data of firms incorporated 
mostly in the U. S. and other advanced economies whereas Amadeus holds data on 
Europe-based firms. 
Third, we would have wished that we also had the hard copies of newspapers that 
published cases of accounts manipulation, at least to feel the texture the way 
investors do. This was not possible because most of the newspaper editions are out 
of print, and/or removed from the archives because of their old, old age. We 
requested for past hardcopies of newspapers from newspaper houses but were told 
that they were unavailable or out of stock. Those who had the old copies had them 
in electronic or microfilm format. (The interested reader may wish to see Appendix 
8-1 for a couple of replies to our request from newspaper houses). However, since 
we were able to access the newspapers on the internet, our work was not hindered 
though some people might want to pick an issue with this. To those people, our 
defence is that other researchers have used the same method, and their references 
are provided throughout the thesis. 
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Our study suffers from the inability to capture cultural differences in what 
newsmen regard as accounts manipulation for it to be reported as such. To the best 
of our knowledge, there is as yet no such available benchmark that captures all 
aspects of our all-embracing definition of accounts manipulation. Relatedly, we 
could not develop a measure of the extent of exposed account manipulation in 
various countries; all we did was to assign a code to countries where the act 
occurred. 
&6. I Thzvats to some aspects Of the study 
This study is based entirely on newspaper reports of accounts manipulation. In this 
day and age of revolution in information and (tele)communications technology, one 
might question whether the newspaper still has relevance in investors' decision 
making process. We argue that both individual and institutional investors and 
electronic channels, such as television channels, still largely use the newspaper as 
source of their news. For example, in England both Sky News and BBC and other 
television stations preview next mornings' newspapers beginning from 1945hrs of 
the evening before they hit the newsstand or uploaded on the internet. The 
newspaper is accessible to all and sundry unlike the other more sophisticated 
sources which, because of economic considerations, may be mainly accessible to 
institutional investors. Moreover, this threat is assuaged in the light of anecdotal 
and research evidence (as we saw on page 9 in chapter 1 of the thesis), which 
reassures that the newspapers are ever-relevant in influencing investors' reaction. 
For a number of reasons, using the newspaper to operationalise the limited attention 
theory may be problematic. First, where more than one newspaper published the 
same news in different section types, it is unclear which newspaper or section type 
was relied upon by investors. 
Second, we speak as if all investors are naive whereas there are sophisticated 
investors who can "see through" the news irrespective of which section it is 
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inserted. Some, like Lambert (2003) believes that idiosyncratic errors made by the 
unsophisticated, nave or individual investor should wash out in aggregate because 
of the law of large numbers, and because of the actions of sophisticated or informed 
investors who have the ability to see through the news no matter which section it is 
in. 70 
To our rescue, however, this threat is assuaged by the unanimous opinion in 
behavioural finance that arbitrageurs' and sophisticated investors' (including 
institutional investors) ability to bear against mispricing is limited because of 
market incompleteness, fundamental risk, transaction costs, sentiment risk, and 
anything else that places limits to arbitrage by informed or sophisticated or rational 
investors. 
Finally, some might say that the news could have been carried by other real time 
online electronic sources before the newspapers get to the newsstand. They might 
also say that newspapers could be a very useful source of information for the 
individual investor, but much less so for the sophisticated investor who, in addition 
to the newspaper, has the wherewithal to probably acquire other sources of 
information. 
We recognise that these problems may have introduced some noise (but not bias) in 
the test of limited attention theory used in the second part of the study, and they are 
likely to reduce the power of the test. However, this threat is likely to evaporate 
when one realises that even reliable and cutting-edge electronic medium such as the 
well-known Dow Jones News Corporation "publishes an investor sentiment index 
based on textual analysis of 15 U. S. newspapers". Investment banks also rely on 
media coverage of issues. 
70 We have not examined the role of sophisticated investors in this study, and in the spirit of Hirshleifer 
and Teoh (2003, pp. 374-378) this study has made the simplifying assumption that all investors are ex ante 
identical. 
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8.7 Suggestions fvrfirlhcrfutuzvitxamh 
This study has accomplished what it set out to do; however, there will always 
remain areas to be further researched: one cannot foreclose other future researchers 
that have the potentials to advance knowledge. 
Based on experiences garnered from the study, we would like to suggest the 
following areas for future research. First, in this study we offered some probable 
reasons why accounts manipulation may occur more in one legal origin than the 
other. This result may be attributed to the existence of a possible joint effect 
between corruption perceptions and the level of reportorial freedom in the five legal 
regimes. We did not investigate this possible joint effect; hence, for those who are 
interested, we would like to recommend it as a future area of research. 
Second, this study called for caution in reaching conclusions regarding the direction 
of the relationship between State's ownership of enterprises and corruption 
perceptions, on the one hand; and State's ownership of enterprises and the level of 
press freedom, on the other. These may warrant further future investigation. 
Third, it can also be interesting to know which specific mode(s) among the State's 
intervention mechanisms is (are) likely to encourage the occurrence of accounts 
manipulation. 
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Appendices 
Appendix 4-1 Test Statistics(`) --Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test Result 
I Iofstcdc'$ Ilofstcdc's 
State GNI per Power Uncertainty 
Corruptions Investor- ownership of capital, Distance, Avoidance. 
Perceptions Press protection, enterprises - PPP - co - co - 
Index, CG - freedom, CO- State GNI per I Iofstedc's 
1lofstedc's 
Corruptions CG - Press Investor- ownership of capital, Power Uncertainty 
Perceptions freedom, protection, enterprises, PPP. Distance, Avoidance, 
Index, TO TO TO TO TO TO TO 
Z 
-3.072(a) -2.467(b) "2.932(b) -4.965(b) 3.189(b) -1.548(a) -2.171(a) 
Asymp. Sig. (2- 
. 002 . 014 . 003 . 
000 . 001 . 
122 . 030 tailed) 
" Based on negative ranks. 
b Based on positive ranks. 
` Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test 
Appendix 6-1 
The linear regressions using shareholders equity as control for size: 
AR, so =a+Q, Log Amount + 
ß2Log Equity + ci .... I 
ARt,., =a+ß jLog Amount + f12 Log Equity + ci .... U 
AR, +2 =a+ ßjLog Amount + ß2 Log 
Equity + cl .... 
AR,. 3 =a+ QýLog Amount + Q2 Log Equity + ei .... IV 
AR04 =a+ /3, ß, Log Amount + /32Los Equity + ei .... V 
ARr+s =a+ß, Log Amount + ß2 Log Equity + ci .... v1 
ARt+6 =a+ß, Log Amount + ß2 Log Equity + Ei .... VII 
CAR =a+ß, Log Amount + ß2 Log Equity + ei .... VIII 
Where 
AR = Abnormal returns of a single firm on a given event day 
CAR = Six-day cumulated abnormal returns of a single firm. That is, abnormal 
returns of a single firm from day t+1 to day t+6. 
Log_Amount = logarithm of the total amount mentioned in the news 
Log Equity = logarithm of shareholders of the year of reporting of accounts 
manipulation. 
Appendix 8-1: 
Selected letters from newspaper houses based upon requests for printed conics fa 
newspapers 
(1) 
From: RBouygues a iht. com [Rßouygucs n iht. com] 
Sent: Wed 15/10/2008 11: 30 
To: Asien EN Mr (PGIR - SoM) 
Cc: 
Subject: your request for back issues 
Attachments: 
Hello, 
Thomas Kan of the HIT subscriptions service has forwarded your email to us. I am sorryto inform you that we no 
longer have hard copies of the edition of February 9,2006. If you tell me %%hat article or page you are looking for, I 
could send you a. pdf of the page you need. 
I do have a copy of June 23,2008 which I will mail to you today. 
Sincerely, 
Rebecca Bouygues 
Deputy Head of Information Services 
International I Jerald Tribune 
6 bis rue des Graviers 
92521 Neuilly Cedex 
France 
33.1.41.43.94.18 
www. iht. com 
(2) 
From: Reader I lelpline (QLD) [readerhelp ci gnp. newsltd. com. au] 
Sent: Thu 09/10/2008 00: 35 
To: Asien EN Mr (PG/R - SoM) 
Cc: 
Subject: FW: Past issues of your newspaper 
Attachments: 
Dear Etumudon, 
We keep back copies of newspapers for approximately twelve months afcr publication, and we can post them to 
you. If you let us know which newspapers you require, we can give you a quote, as it is based on weight and 
postage. 
For older stories, we can post you a copy of the page for $10.00 per page. We can also email you PDFs of pages 
dated after June 2001, for $20 per page. 
Payment is by MasterCard or Visa. 
Regards, 
Reader I Ielpline 
Queensland Newspapers 
41 Campbell Street, Bowen I tills, QLD 4006 
or 
Ap)"ndkw 
Direct +617 3666 6133 1 Fax +61 7 3666 6723 
Email readerhelp a gnp. newsltd. com. au 
152 
(3) 
RE: Past issues of the printed edition of your newspaper 
Back Copies [BackCopies y globeandmail. com] 
To: Asien EN Mr (PG/R - SoM) 
Cc: 
Attachments: 
Thank you for your email. 
We currently have copies of The Globe and Mail from August 1,2008 - present date. 
The cost per paper is $12.00, including shipping. Please let me know which copies you are looking for and I will 
make the necessary arrangements. 
Kind regards, 
JESSICA BLACK I Back Copies 
The Globe and Mail, CTVglobemedia 
(416.585.527317: 416-585-55751 
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